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A bstract
How important are financing constraints in explaining the cyclical behaviour of invest­
ment? How do they affect the investment responses to macroeconomic shocks? This 
thesis answers these questions by developing a structural model of investment with financ­
ing and irreversibility constraints and by analysing its implications both theoretically and 
empirically.
After briefly reviewing the recent advancements of the investment literature in chapter 
1, in chapter 2 we present a preliminary empirical analysis of the links between financial 
structure and firm dynamics. In chapter 3 we develop a basic structural model which analy­
ses optimal investment and saving choices of entrepreneurs in the presence of uncertainty 
as well as of financing constraints. We show that future expected financing constraints 
generate a precautionary saving behaviour which affects the optimal allocation between 
risky investment and saving.
In chapter 4 we extend the basic model to include both fixed and variable capital as 
well as financing constraints and irreversibility of fixed capital. We show that the inter­
actions between financing and irreversibility constraints amplify the effects of financing 
constraints on the cyclical fluctuations of investment and production. This interaction 
together with the precautionary saving behaviour is essential in explaining a number of 
stylised facts about investment dynamics: i) aggregate inventory investment is very volatile 
and procyclical, especially in recessions; ii) it leads the business cycle, while fixed capital 
investment lags it; iii) fixed and especially inventory investment are sensitive to net worth; 
iv) output and inventories are more volatile and procyclical for small firms than for large 
ones.
In chapter 5 we verify empirically the theoretical results derived in chapter 4. We use 
our panel of balance sheet data on Italian manufacturing firms to test and not reject the 
financing constraints hypothesis. This hypothesis is also strongly supported by the direct 
qualitative information about the problems faced by the entrepreneurs in financing new 
investment projects.
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Introduction
In order to explain the aggregate behaviour of investment and production, it is impor­
tant to understand the factors that determine the investment decisions at firms level. Most 
of the neoclassical investment theory studies the determinants of the investment in fixed 
capital, like plants and equipment. A common feature of these studies is the difficulty in 
explaining the cyclical movements of aggregate investment: they predict that fixed invest­
ment should be driven by the cost of capital and by the expected marginal profitability 
of capital. However in practice both factors explain only a small fraction of investment, 
while measures of liquidity and cash flow have a much higher explanatory power.
Some authors argue that financial factors may be important in explaining these phe­
nomena. Financial conditions may affect the ability of firms to invest when financiers are 
unwilling to fund their profitable investment opportunities. This could happen because 
once the funds have been handed to the firms, contractual and/or informational problems 
may prevent the financiers appropriating their share of the revenues from the investment’s 
output. But if firms are unable to raise external financing, they only invest when internally 
generated funds become available. A literature started by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988) shows that this seems to be the case: investment is significantly correlated with 
proxies for changes in net worth or internal funds, and such correlation is most important 
for firms likely to face capital-market imperfections.
The first motivation of this thesis is the consideration that the majority of these studies 
focus on the estimation of the reduced form investment equation, without explicitly solving 
the structural model. This reduced form approach is subject to the Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997) critique: there is no theoretical support for the claim that the cash flow-investment 
sensitivity is monotonously increasing in the intensity of financing constraints. This implies 
that such empirical evidence is not conclusive, because the criteria used in these studies to 
select firms ’’more likely to face capital-markets imperfections” are themselves arbitrary. 
More importantly, the reduced form approach cannot answer the main questions: how 
important are the financing constraints in explaining the cyclical behaviour of investment? 
How do they affect the investment responses to macroeconomic shocks?
The second motivation of this thesis is the consideration that the investment litera­
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ture analyses separately fixed capital investment and inventory investment. This approach 
makes it difficult to explain a series of stylised facts about investment: i) aggregate inven­
tory investment is very volatile and procyclical; ii) its decline accounts for a large part of 
the GDP decline in recessions iii) it is contemporarily correlated with sales; iv) it leads the 
business cycle, while fixed capital investment lags it; v) output and inventories are more 
volatile and procyclical for small firms than for large ones.
Our thesis answers these questions by developing a structural theory of investment 
in both fixed capital and variable capital in the presence of financing constraints and 
irreversibility of fixed capital, and by analysing its implications both theoretically and 
empirically.
In chapter 3 we develop a simple structural model of investment with financing con­
straints1 where the entrepreneur has the opportunity to invest either in a risky technology 
that requires physical capital or in safe financial assets. Because of an enforceability prob­
lem, the entrepreneur2 can obtain external financing only if she secures it with collateral. 
The only collateral accepted by the lenders is the physical capital used in the production. 
Because capital depreciates and only its residual value after production is valuable as 
collateral, the entrepreneur needs some downpayment to finance her investment. There­
fore her borrowing capacity depends on her financial wealth, which is endogenous being 
a function of past investment, saving and consumption decisions. We determine the con­
ditions under which, because of the uncertainty about productivity, the entrepreneur has 
a positive probability of facing future financing constraints. When this happens, the en­
trepreneur keeps some financial assets, or spare borrowing capacity, as a precautionary 
saving motive. The amount of this precautionary saving is proportional to the intensity 
of future expected financing constraints.
This precautionary saving is important because it affects the allocation of wealth be­
tween investment and saving: the more the entrepreneur is likely to face future financing 
constraints, the more she reduces the investment in the risky technology to increase her
1 Other recent works in this direction by Gross (1994) and Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2000) are 
briefly revewed in chapter 1.
2We use in this thesis the term ’’entrepreneur” rather than ’’firm”. However the maximising agent in 
our models can be interpreted either as an entrepreneural household or as the management of a firm.
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holding of safe assets. This implies that financing constraints may be quantitatively im­
portant for aggregate investment dynamics even if only a small share of entrepreneurs 
face binding financing constraints at any point in time. For example a macroeconomic 
shock which reduces the net worth of all entrepreneurs would also on average increase 
their precautionary saving and hence reduce their risky investment.
Moreover by engaging in precautionary saving entrepreneurs prevent the financing con­
straint from binding in most states of nature. We show that this implies that investment 
can be more sensitive to internal finance in response to future expected financing con­
straints rather than to current ones. In this sense our theoretical analysis supports the 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique that the correlation between investment and cash 
flow is not monotonously increasing in the intensity of financing constraints. However it 
also provides a new interpretation of their empirical findings. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
find that the investment-cash flow correlation is stronger for firms which are profitable 
and financially very wealthy than for firms that are less profitable and more levered3. Our 
analysis in chapter 3 shows that this is consistent with the view that cash flow-investment 
sensitivities are related to future expected financing constraints. We compare two identical 
entrepreneurs subject to different realisations of their productivity shocks: a productive 
and profitable entrepreneur who increases her financial wealth and reduces her borrowing 
and an unproductive loss making one who decreases her financial wealth and increases 
her borrowing. In both cases investment is sensitive to cash flow and in both cases the 
sensitivity is determined by the change in future expected financing constraints.
We also simulate a simple aggregate partial equilibrium economy to show that the pre­
cautionary saving effect implies large fluctuations of capital in response to macroeconomic 
shocks. This is especially true for entrepreneurs with smaller businesses, because the het­
erogeneity of entrepreneurs with respect to their net worth implies that smaller businesses 
are on average more financially constrained, even though all are ex ante identical regarding 
their ability to access external finance. This is because small entrepreneurs tend to have 
smaller net worth relative to output, either because they have younger growing businesses, 
or because they became small after experiencing recent low productive periods.
3 Similar evidence is produced by Cleary (1999), who studies a larger sample of 1317 US firms.
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The formalisation of the precautionary saving effect and of its consequences for aggre­
gate investment is an original contribution of this thesis4. In fact precautionary saving 
has been extensively studied in consumption literature as an important determinant of 
the intertemporal consumption allocation, but no study analyses its effects on investment 
decisions. The importance of this analysis is confirmed by a recent empirical work by 
Hubbard and Gentry (2000), which finds evidence of a higher amount of precautionary 
saving of entrepreneurial households with respect to non entrepreneurial ones.
The model developed in chapter 3 is the basis for the analysis in chapter 4, which is 
the main theoretical contribution of this thesis. In chapter 4 we extend the basic model by 
considering an environment in which entrepreneurs have access to a multifactor technology 
with both fixed and variable capital and cannot sell fixed capital without liquidating their 
whole business. This extended model allows us to examine how the interaction between 
fixed capital investment, variable investment and saving of financial assets leads to rich 
dynamics when fixed capital investment is irreversible and the firm is subject to financing 
constraints. In particular, we show that the effects of financing imperfections on investment 
are amplified by the presence of irreversibility of fixed capital.
The intuition is that, when fixed capital is irreversible, the entrepreneur knows that 
in the case of an economic downturn it will take some time to reduce the stock of fixed 
capital to the new optimal level. During the adjustment period expected profits drop 
and the expected rate of wealth accumulation drops as well relatively to a situation where 
fixed capital is reversible. As a result the entrepreneur has a higher chance of facing future 
financing constraints: i) if the contraction period is long enough, then the drop in wealth 
can be so severe that she does not have enough funds to invest in variable capital; ii) if 
the contraction period ends, she will have not enough resources to invest in both fixed and 
variable capital and will be financially constrained for some time. In order to compensate 
these higher costs of future expected financing constraints, the entrepreneur engages in 
precautionary saving ex ante, more than she would have done with reversible fixed capital.
We explicitly solve and obtain the policy functions of the dynamic investment prob­
4 A similar effect is studied by Gross (1994), even though in a different theoretical setting. However he 
mainly focuses on the consequences for firms financial policy rather than for aggregate investment.
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lem and derive the consequences of financing an irreversibility constraints for aggregate 
investment dynamics. We simulate an artificial economy with heterogeneous entrepre­
neurs and with both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty5. The amplification effect 
described before implies not only that the precautionary saving effect is stronger, but also 
that during downturns it mainly affects variable capital, fixed capital being irreversible. 
Because we assume a time lag for the investment to produce output, changes in the level 
of variable capital in the model can be interpreted as investment in input inventories, 
such as raw materials and work in progress. Thus our model explains the high volatil­
ity and procyclicality of inventories: ” Changes in business inventories, which constitute 
but a small fraction of total GDP, account for one-fourth of the cyclical movements in 
GDP” in the US. (Stock and Watson (1998)). Ramey (1989), Blinder and Maccini (1991) 
and Ramey and West (1999) show that this is especially true during recessions, when the 
drop in inventory investment accounts for a large part of the GDP decline. They also 
provide evidence in support of our approach to model inventories e l s  a production factor, 
because they emphasise that input inventories6 are quantitatively more important and 
more volatile than finished goods inventories.
Our model can also explain why inventories are contemporaneously correlated with 
sales (Ramey and West (1999)) and very sensitive to financial conditions: US data show 
that ” inventory investment for small firms absorb from 15% to 40% of cash flow fluctua­
tions” (Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen, 1998).
In our artificial economy aggregate uncertainty is given by a combination of recurrent 
transitory and persistent aggregate shocks that generate an exogenous stochastic business 
cycle. This means that the cross-sectional distribution of net worth and fixed capital 
among entrepreneurs is determined by both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty and 
it affects the way aggregate output and investment react to aggregate shocks.
In particular the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs with respect to fixed capital together
5 This methodology is analogous to the one adopted by some authors in the nonconvex adjustment cost 
literature (see for example Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Caballero, Hengel and Haltiwanger (1995), 
reviewed in chapter 1), which in the past decade has been very successful in providing a microfoundation 
of the observed nonlinearities in fixed investment dynamics. In this respect our model can be considered an 
extension to this literature, since we show that the interactions between the two problems are important 
in explaining the stylised facts about not only fixed capital but also variable capital investment dynamics.
6Raw materials and work in progress.
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with the fact that precautionary saving effect affects variable capital implies that aggregate 
fixed investment has a lagged reaction to persistent shocks, which affect variable capital 
first. This helps to explain why inventory investment leads the business cycle, while fixed 
investment lags it (Stock and Watson, 1998). Moreover the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs 
with respect to their net worth, which implies that smaller businesses are on average more 
financially constrained, explains why small firms are more procyclical than large ones in 
inventories, output, and short term debt (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996).
Chapter 5 examines empirically the implications of the model analysed in chapter 4, by 
developing a new procedure to detect the presence of financing constraints at firm level. 
The motivation for this empirical analysis is twofold: first, we verify that the data do 
not reject the financing constraints hypothesis, which is essential for the aggregate results 
derived in chapter 4. Second, we show that our method is more efficient than the cash 
fiow-investment correlation in detecting financing constraints at firm level.
The model developed in chapter 4 implies that, because variable capital investment 
is reversible, the ’’premium” of expected marginal productivity over user cost of variable 
capital reflects the tightness of current and future expected financing constraints. We 
call this premium the ’’excess” expected marginal productivity of variable capital. More 
specifically the financing constraints hypothesis implies that this premium is monotonously 
decreasing in the financial wealth of the entrepreneurs, conditional on fixed capital stock 
and productivity shock. We test this hypothesis by estimating empirical measures of the 
productivity shocks and of the expected marginal productivity of variable capital.
This test has two important properties: i) it is based on an indicator which, according 
to our structural theory, is monotonously increasing in the intensity financing constraints. 
Therefore it is robust to the Kaplan and Zingales critique mentioned before; ii) it main­
tains its power of discriminating the financing constraints hypothesis from the perfect 
markets hypothesis in the presence of two potential misspecification problems: the pres­
ence of convex adjustment costs and the misspecification of the stochastic process for the 
productivity shock. This is because we argue that in the presence of these two problems 
the test is biased towards ’’rejecting the financing constraints hypothesis when it is true” 
rather than ” accepting it when it is false”.
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These properties make our test more efficient than the tests based on the cash flow- 
investment correlation. In fact, as we argued before, both the Kaplan and Zingales cri­
tique and our analysis in chapter 3 argue that there is no theoretical foundation for the 
monotonous relationship between the cash flow-investment correlation and the intensity of 
financing constraints. Moreover the cash flow-investment correlation is likely to be biased 
upwards when future expected profitability is not properly estimated. This is because 
cash flow is very sensitive to current profitability, which in turn is correlated to future ex­
pected profitability. Therefore the positive cash flow-investment correlation could simply 
be caused by the fact that the former absorbs the positive effect of the unobserved future 
expected profitability on the latter. This empirical problem can explain why many authors 
(including Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997)) esti­
mate positive cash flow coefficients for very large firms. Such firms have direct access to 
equity and bond markets, and it is very difficult to argue that they can be financially con­
strained, in the sense of being unable to obtain external financing for profitable investment 
opportunities.
We use the balance sheet information on a panel data of 561 Italian manufacturing 
firms for 11 years to estimate the excess expected marginal productivity of variable capital 
for each firm-year observation. A unique feature of our dataset is the availability, for the 
same firms, of a rich survey with qualitative information about their financial decisions and 
especially about the financing problems they faced in funding investment. This information 
is a direct proxy for financing constraints, unique in the empirical investment literature. 
We use it to show that the value of our indicator of financing constraints, the excess 
expected marginal productivity of variable capital, is strongly positively correlated with 
the likelihood that the entrepreneurs state financing problems. We then use the estimated 
indicator to verify the prediction of the model, and we show that the test does not reject 
the financing constraints hypothesis for all the firms in the sample but the larger ones.
The thesis is organised as follows: chapter 1 briefly reviews the recent advancements 
in the investment literature. Chapter 2 proposes a preliminary empirical analysis of our 
dataset of Italian firms, using both qualitative and quantitative information. Chapter 3 
illustrates and solves the basic theoretical framework with financing imperfections and
15
discusses the implications of current and future expected financing constraints for firm 
level and aggregate investment. Chapter 4 illustrates and solves the extended model with 
both fixed and variable capital and both financing and irreversibility constraints. We 
discuss the qualitative features of the solution and calibrate an artificial economy with 
many entrepreneurs to study the effects of financing and irreversibility constraints on the 
cyclical fluctuations of output and investment. Chapter 5 illustrates the empirical test of 
our theory. We combine qualitative and quantitative information to test and not reject 
the financing constraints hypothesis.
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C hapter 1
A selected  review  o f investm ent 
theory
1.1 In tro d u ctio n
Comprehensive reviews of the recent advancements in investment theory are already 
present in the literature. In particular, Caballero (1997) focuses mainly on the recent 
contributions concerning the investment theory with nonconvex adjustment costs, and 
Hubbard (1998) considers the literature about capital market imperfections and invest­
ment. Therefore this chapter simply provides a brief overview of these two literatures, 
emphasising their achievements as well as their limits, in order to motivate the empirical 
and theoretical analysis proposed in this thesis.
As Caballero (1997) points out, both literatures are based on the consideration that 
”the quintessential problem of investment is that it is almost always sunk, possibly along 
many dimensions. That is, the number of possible uses of resources is reduced dramatically 
once they have been committed or tailored to a specific project or use [...]. To invest often 
means opening a vulnerable flank. Funds which were ex-ante protected against certain re­
alisation of firm or industry specific shocks, for example, are no longer so” . The literature 
about non convex adjustment costs considers physical barriers to investment, while the 
literature about capital markets imperfections considers problems which limit the willing­
ness of financiers to fund profitable investment opportunities: once the funds have been 
handed to the entrepreneurs, contractual and/or informational problems may prevent the
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financiers to appropriate their share of the revenues from the investment’s output.
Since both approaches focus mainly on fixed investment, in the last section of this 
chapter we briefly review the empirical literature about inventory investment, especially 
focusing on those stylised facts on inventories dynamics which are important in under­
standing the business cycle.
The outline of this chapter is as follows: in section 1.2 we introduce the neoclassical 
investment theory. In section 1.3 we briefly revise the main results of the recent literature 
about investment with nonconvex adjustment costs. In section 1.4 we critically revise 
the literature about capital markets imperfections. In section 1.5 we briefly review the 
literature about inventory investment. Section 1.6 presents some conclusions.
1.2 N eo c la ssica l in vestm en t th eo ry
Jorgenson (1963) is the first to derive the investment function as the first order condition 
of the optimisation problem of a firm. Assuming perfect competition, no adjustment costs, 
and a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas technology, he shows that the optimal capital 
is equal to the ratio between the capital share of output and the cost of capital.
The idea that not only current but also future expected profitability should affect 
current investment is put forward by Tobin (1969), who argues that investment in physical 
capital K  should be a function of, among other things, its available rate of return r^. Such 
a rate of return is equal to:
R
n  =  —  ( l . i )
Pk
where R  is the ” marginal efficiency of capital relative to reproduction cost” and pk is the 
current market price of capital goods. By definition R  includes the net present value 
of all future profits generated by a unit of capital installed today. Such relation implies 
the so called Q — theory : investment is a function of average Q , the ratio between the 
market value and the replacement cost of capital. Abel (1979) and Hayashi (1982) show 
that the Jorgenson model with convex adjustment costs is equal to a marginal q — model. 
The problem is that marginal g, the ratio between marginal productivity and replacement 
cost of capital, is not directly observable, and the conditions under which the marginal q
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and average Q are equal (Hayashi, 1982) are very restrictive. In any case the empirical 
success of the estimated Q— based models is modest (Von Furstenberg, 1977; Summers, 
1981; Blanchard and Wyplosz, 1981). Abel and Blanchard (1986) take the alternative 
approach to directly estimate marginal q and show that, as is the case for average Q , also 
the estimated marginal q explains only a small fraction of the fluctuations in investment1.
1.3  In vestm en t w ith  non  con vex  ad ju stm en t co sts
The quadratic adjustment cost model implies decreasing returns in the adjustment tech­
nology. This implies that it is optimal, at firm level, to increase the stock of capital 
smoothly and gradually towards the desired level. Such smooth investment at firm level 
implies smooth aggregate investment. In reality adjustment costs are more complicated 
than the quadratic cost assumption. In fact it is reasonable to assume that new projects 
that involve investment in plant and equipment also include relevant fixed costs and a cer­
tain degree of irreversibility. The presence of fixed costs implies increasing returns in the 
adjustment technology, and this is sufficient to generate ’’lumpiness” in investment, which 
implies an advantage in bunching rather than in smoothing new investment over time. 
Caballero (1997) provides a simple version of the investment model with fixed adjustment 
costs: when the only uncertainty in the investment decision is a productivity shock that 
follows a continuous stochastic process, the desired stock of fixed capital k% follows a sto­
chastic process with similar characteristics. The actual level of capital kt instead remains 
constant and changes only when the absolute difference \k* — kt\ is large enough. That is 
when the fixed cost in adjusting capital from kt to k% is smaller than the loss of value in 
keeping kt constant. When such adjustment takes place, it is optimal to invest up to the 
optimal level k%. Intuitively the bigger the fixed cost, the larger the difference |k% — kt\ 
before the entrepreneur finds optimal to invest or disinvest. In this case we should observe 
more lumpy investment at firm level.
Models with fixed costs have been successful in explaining why we observe lumpy 
investment at plant level. Among the empirical evidence, Dorns and Dunne (1998) analyse
1 Caballero (1997) provides a review of the recent literature that shows how cost of capital and q are more 
relevant in determining investment in two cases: i) long-run relationship; ii) in presence of tax adjustments 
that determine large swings in the cost of capital.
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the investment patterns of over 13,700 plants in the U.S. manufacturing sector, drawn 
from over 300 four digit industries, for the period 1972-1988. They find that over half the 
plants in their sample experience a 1 year capital adjustment of at least 37%, and that 
smaller plants and plants that changed ownership have lumpier investment patterns. They 
also show that the simulated investment models that best fit with the observed capital 
adjustment patterns are those in which plants mainly invest only when the difference 
between the desired and the actual capital stocks is large. More importantly they show that 
such lumpiness at plant level does not wash out at aggregate level: 25% of expenditures 
on new equipment and structures goes into plants that are increasing their real capital 
stock by more than 30%, and that makes up only 8% of the sample.
This evidence suggests that microeconomic lumpiness has important consequences for 
aggregate investment dynamics. Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) use information 
on a similar dataset of approximately 7000 U.S. manufacturing plants for the same period 
and estimate the hazard function, that is the probability to adjust the capital level con­
ditional on the imbalance between desired and actual capital. They find that the hazard 
function has a value of approximately zero in presence of zero or positive imbalance (actual 
capital greater than desired capital), while it is increasing for negative imbalances. This 
means that plants do not disinvest when actual capital is too high, suggesting the presence 
of irreversibility, while they are more likely to adjust when actual capital is too low.
On the theoretical side Caballero and Engel (1999) derive the aggregate investment 
function in presence of non convex adjustment costs, to show that in general aggregate 
investment depends on the cross sectional density of plants capital imbalances. The dy­
namic implications of this result are particularly important: in fact a sequence of positive 
aggregate shocks not only causes some plants to invest, but also changes the cross sectional 
distribution of imbalances, meaning that more and more plants are likely to adjust at each 
subsequent aggregate shock. Caballero, Hengel and Haltiwanger (1995) show that such 
mechanism implies much higher investment volatility in presence of large macroeconomic 
shocks.
Another source of nonconvexity in adjustment costs is the irreversibility of fixed capital, 
which can be seen as an infinite fixed cost of disinvestment. Why is fixed investment
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irreversible? Dixit and Pindyck (1994) argue that investment expenditures are sunk costs 
when they are firm specific. Also industry specific investment can be irreversible if the 
industry is sufficiently competitive. In this case, even though in principle a firm could sell 
its plants to another firm in the industry, this would not happen because all firms in the 
industry would want to disinvest at the same time as a consequence of a negative aggregate 
shock. Other sources of irreversibility are informational problems: potential buyers may 
be unwilling to buy from a firm that wants to sell its own fixed capital because they cannot 
observe its quality.
Irreversibility implies that investment is ”cautious”: the rate of return required to 
convince firms to invest is higher than when fixed investment is reversible. The difference 
is a premium that compensates the expected cost of being unable to reduce the capital 
in the future conditional on a negative productivity shock2. Bertola and Caballero (1994) 
build and calibrate a model of firm fixed investment with irreversibility and uncertainty, 
and show that irreversibility is useful in explaining why fixed investment is much smoother 
at aggregate level than at firm level.
1 .4  In v estm en t w ith  cap ita l m arkets im p erfection s
All the papers reviewed in the previous section assume the absence of any capital market 
imperfection. In this case the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem states that, in absence 
of tax distortions, financial structure and financial policy are irrelevant for real investment 
decisions. The choice of financing is irrelevant because internal finance, debt and equity are 
equivalent sources of funds with identical opportunity costs. Many authors have disagreed 
with the view that financial structure is irrelevant, and have argued that financial factors 
may have an impact on real business cycles (Fisher, 1933; Gurley and Shaw, 1955 and 
1960). Yet models of optimal firm investment have been maintaining the perfect market 
hypothesis for some time. Since the 70s many papers have shown that under asymmetric 
information or contract incompleteness (imperfect enforceability) adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems limit the availability of debt (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Besanko and
2 A formal illustation of this effect is provided in chapter 4.
22
Thakor, 1986; Milde and Riley, 1988; Hart and Moore, 1998; Albuquerque and Hopenhayn, 
2000). Adverse selection can also increase equity financing costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Such models imply either that external finance is not available, or that there is a cost 
differential between internal and external financing sources, which may itself depend on 
the financial wealth of the borrower. In both cases the implication is that investment is 
inefficiently low when internal finance is not available. An avenue of empirical research, 
henceforth referred to as the ” investment-cash flow literature”, focuses on the sensitivity of 
firm investment to internal finance availability as a way of testing for the effect of financing 
imperfections3. The idea is that, if firms face high cost, or rationing, of external funds 
due to capital markets imperfections, then investment should be more sensitive to internal 
funds than neoclassical models predict.
As Hubbard (1998) points out in his review: ” The principal findings of these studies 
are that: (1) all else being equal, investment is significantly correlated with proxies for 
changes in net worth or internal funds; and (2) that correlation is most important for 
firms likely to face information-related capital-market imperfections” .
In order to derive these results, most of this literature is based on a joint test of two 
distinct hypotheses (henceforth HI and H2): HI) Some observable characteristics of firms 
(size, age, affiliation to group, etc.) are related to how likely they are to be financially 
constrained. H2) Financially constrained firms, selected according to these characteristics, 
can invest optimally only when internal finance is available. As a consequence they reject 
the neoclassical model because of excess sensitivity of investment to cash flow.
All these papers adopt a quadratic adjustment cost assumption in order to derive a 
testable investment equation. As we mentioned in the previous section, this assumption 
implies that future expected productivity affects current investment choices. Therefore it 
becomes of crucial importance to find a robust method of estimating future investment 
opportunities. Otherwise, since current productivity is correlated to future productivity, 
and since cash flow is correlated to current productivity, we would be unable to distinguish
3Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989), Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharf- 
stein (1992), Withed (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994), Hubbard, Kashyap and Withed (1995), Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg (1995) and (1998), Hu and Schiantarelli (1998), Bagella, Becchetti and Caggese, (2001), 
and many others.
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HI and H2 from the following alternative joint hypotheses: Hla) a priori information is 
not related to financing constraints; H2a) cash flow just captures the significance of an 
omitted variable, the unobservable future investment opportunities.
Since the quadratic adjustment cost model implies that marginal — q is a sufficient 
statistic for the effect of future expected productivity on current investment, many au­
thors assume that the Hayashi (1982) conditions are satisfied and estimate an investment 
demand function where marginal — q is proxied by average — Q (Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen, 1988; Devereaux and Schiantarelli, 1989; Hoshi, Kashyap and Sharfstein, 1992). 
The problem with this approach is that the Hayashi (1982) conditions are very restrictive4. 
Moreover, there are also substantial problems in measuring average — Q , both regarding 
the numerator (market value of firms) and the denominator (replacement value of capi­
tal). An alternative approach is to follow Abel and Blanchard (1986) and use a vector 
autoregression (VAR) forecasting framework that directly estimates future profitability 
(Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995 and 1998).
Another strategy is to solve the first order condition of the quadratic adjustment 
cost model backwards instead of forward, and to estimate an Euler equation that does 
not include marginal — q among the regressors, because expectations are valued at re­
alised values (Withed, 1992; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Hubbard, Kashyap and Withed, 
1995; Hu and Schiantarelli (1998); Bagella, Becchetti and Caggese, 2001). Among the 
results provided by this approach, Hubbard Kashyap and Withed (1995) show that the 
Euler equation based on an alternative model with exogenously imposed financing im­
perfections5 is not rejected for firms a priori selected as financially constrained. Bagella, 
Becchetti and Caggese (2001) use direct qualitative information regarding the financing 
problems faced by the entrepreneurs to identify financially constrained firms, and show 
that the neoclassical model is not rejected for non financially constrained firms, while it 
is rejected for financially constrained ones because of an excess investment sensitivity to
4They are: perfect competitions in the factor and product market, homogeneity of fixed capital, linear 
homogeneity of technologies for production and adjustment costs.
5"Exogenously imposed” means that the authors assume a certain functional form that links the cost 
of external finance to observables, rather than providing the explicit microfoundation of the f in a n c in g  
problems, as it is done in Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2000) or in the models illustrated in chapters 3 
and 4 of this thesis.
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cash flow. These encouraging results are however limited because of the low reliability of 
the Euler equation tests. As Caballero (1997) notes: ”...unlike the case in basic finance 
and consumption applications, these [Euler equation] procedures are a form of morphine 
rather than a remedy: their lack of statistical power allows us to sometimes not see the 
problem”.
In addition to these methodological problems, two additional criticisms more seriously 
question the results of the cash flow-investment literature: i) the empirical success of the in­
vestment models with non convex adjustment costs implies that the quadratic adjustment 
cost assumption is most likely not correct. Therefore all the cash flow-investment models, 
which adopt this assumption to derive a testable investment equation, are misspecified 
regarding the way marginal — q enters in the investment equation. This misspecification 
is likely to be important. In fact non convex adjustment costs imply that the monotonous 
relationship between investment and marginal — q no longer holds (Caballero and Leahy, 
1996) and even for the subclass of model for which it holds the relation becomes nonlinear 
(Abel and Eberly, 1994).
ii) Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000) argue that there is no theoretical foundation 
for the claim that the correlation between investment and cash flow is monotonously 
increasing in the intensity of financing constraints, and that there is no empirical evidence 
that such correlation is more intense for financially constrained firms. The latter statement 
is based on the in-depth analysis of the 49 firms classified as financially constrained by 
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). Kaplan and Zingales find that the investment- 
cash flow correlation is stronger for firms which are financially very wealthy and surely 
not financially constrained6. Similar evidence is produced by Cleary (1999), who studies 
a larger sample of 1317 US firms with complete financial information available for the
6 Among the points raised by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (2000) in their reply there is the objection 
that the criteria chosen by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) are such that financially constrained firms are 
distressed firms, which may be ”restricted by creditors from using internal funds for investm ent”. This 
reflects what we think is a weakness of the Kaplan and Zingales analysis: in their classification scheme they 
implicitly assume a monotonous relation between the financial wealth of firms and the intensity of their 
financing constraints. We instead think that the intensity of financing constraints is rather monotonic in 
the shadow value of money for the firm. The higher such value, the higher the loss for not being able to 
invest in profitable projects, the higher the intensity of the constraints on external financing. Therefore 
such intensity depends on the available wealth but also on the investment opportunities, while Kaplan and 
Zingales consider only the former.
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1987-94 period.
Even rejecting all these criticisms and accepting that investment-cash flow sensitivi­
ties are useful in detecting financing constraints, it is finally important to note that the 
cash flow-investment literature does not answer the most important question, which in­
stead receives maximum attention in the non-convex adjustment cost literature: what are 
the implications of these constraints for aggregate investment dynamics? Following the 
tradition of Fisher (1933) and Gurley and Shaw, (1955) and (1960), a recent theoretical 
literature has emphasised three channels which can, in the presence of financing imper­
fections, amplify and propagate the effects of initial real and monetary shocks (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1989 and 1990; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; 
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1998): i) the financial accelerator effect: constrained 
firms can only invest if internal finance is available. Hence at the beginning of a downturn 
the reduction in profits depresses investment; ii) the asset price effect: when the borrow­
ing capacity of a firm depends on the collateral value of its assets, at the beginning of 
a downturn the drop in asset prices reduces borrowing and investment ; iii) the flight to 
quality effect: during a downturn banks increase collateral requirements, thereby reducing 
loans to borrowers facing financing constraints. All three effects have opposite direction 
during an upturn.
Recent empirical work provides some evidence supporting this view. As in the cash 
flow-investment literature, the first step is the identification of firms that are more likely 
to be constrained in the access of external finance. The second step is the inspection 
of the behaviour of constrained versus unconstrained firms across different phases of the 
business cycle regarding sales, debt and inventories. Kashap, Stein and Wilcox (1993), 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Oliner and Rudebusch (1996) compare the behaviour of 
small versus large manufacturing firms after Romer dates, that represent episodes of tight 
monetary policy that led to a recession. Size is used as a proxy of financing problems. 
Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) conduct a similar study. They inspect quarterly 
data disaggregated at firm level, and are able to control for industry effects and to use 
bank dependence as an alternative criterion to identify financially constrained firms. They 
observe that after a monetary policy tightening short term debt increases for large firms,
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which increase the supply of commercial papers, while it decreases for small firms. More­
over during the downturn that follows such monetary action sales drop earlier for small 
firms, which also substantially decrease inventories, while large firms maintain inventories 
at a higher level. As a result sales, short term debt, inventories and the inventory/sales 
ratio are more procyclical for small than for large firms. This behaviour is observed also 
during business cycle fluctuations not directly related to monetary actions. Bernanke 
Gertler and Gilchrist’s (1996) computations show that one third of aggregate fluctuations 
can be accounted for by the difference between small and large firms.
The limit of these empirical studies on aggregate data is that they lack of a proper 
theoretical microfoundation. In fact the key assumptions that certain categories of firms 
(smaller firms and bank dependent firms) are more financially constrained, and that as 
a consequence they should be more procyclical, are imposed rather than derived from 
a structural theory of individual firm behaviour. As we argue in the introduction of the 
thesis the investment-cash flow literature, because of its reduced form approach, is not able 
to provide such microfoundations. The basic model in chapter 3 of this thesis is a first step 
in this direction, as are some recent works by Gross (1994), Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 
(2000) and Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2000). Gross (1994) considers a dynamic 
investment problem similar7 to our basic problem in chapter 3, with one reversible factor 
of production and only debt financing available. He obtains the explicit solution of the 
problem using a numerical method and discusses the implications of financing problems 
for the investment and financing decisions of the firm. Albuquerque and Hopenhayn 
(2000) consider an investment model with imperfect enforceability where the bank can 
precommit to a long term lending contract with the entrepreneur. This allows for long term 
entrepreneur - bank relationships where the former is financially constrained in the initial 
phases of her business. Later she accumulates financial wealth, reduces the borrowing from 
the bank and becomes unconstrained. The Albuquerque-Hopenhayn framework is used 
by Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2000) to derive the aggregate consequences of these 
financing constraints. This framework is similar to our basic framework with financing 
constraints only. Indeed our financing constraints assumption is a special case of the
7 See footnote n.4 in the introduction.
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Albuquerque-Hopenhayn contract when the bank cannot precommit. Their approach has 
the advantage of endogenising the differences in the financial contracts between small and 
large firms, and this has interesting implications for the growth dynamic of firms. Our 
approach focuses more on business cycle dynamics rather than on growth dynamics, and 
in our opinion is better suited to explain the effects of financing constraints on the cyclical 
behaviour of firms, especially thanks to the precautionary saving effect derived in our 
model.
1.5 In ven tory  in vestm en t
All the literature cited so far, with only a few exceptions, focuses exclusively on fixed 
investment. This is quantitatively much more important than inventory investment, that 
in developed countries averages for about only 0.5% of the GDP (Ramey and West (1997)). 
Nonetheless inventory investment theory has received a growing interest in recent years. 
The main reason is that inventory investment is very volatile and procyclical, and is a very 
important component of the business cycle fluctuations during recessions. What follows 
is a summary of the main empirical evidence about inventories.
1. ” Changes in business inventories, which constitute but a small fraction of total GDP, 
account for one-fourth of the cyclical movements in GDP” in the US (Stock and 
Watson (1998)).
2. Quarterly US data from 1948 to 1991 show that inventory divestment accounts for 
more than 100% of the fall in GDP in three recessions (from 48:4 to 49:2; from 
60:1 to 60:4; from 69:3 to 70:1) and between 21% to 59% in the others. In the 
early 90s recession inventory divestment accounted for 12 to 71% of the fall in GDP 
in the G7 countries8 (Ramey and West (1997)). Hence inventories are procyclical. 
The correlation between inventory investment and sales is around +0.1/+0.2 in 
G7 countries (Ramey and West (1997)). In the US it is also positive both at the 
aggregate level (around +0.4) and in single industries (Blinder (1986)).
8 This is based on annual data, that at least in the US case underestimated the more accurate quarterly 
data figure.
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3. Inventories are much more procyclical for small than for large firms. The difference 
between small and large firms cumulative growth rates of inventories and of the 
inventory/sales ratio is highly procyclical (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)).
4. Raw materials make up approximately 40% of total inventories and are much more 
volatile than work in progress and finished goods inventories (Blinder and Maccini 
(1991)). Ramey (1989) shows that raw materials and input inventories are more 
volatile than finished goods inventories during recent US recessions. Ramey and 
West (1997) show that, for G7 countries, finished goods inventories only account for 
13% of total inventories, and are not particularly volatile.
5. Production is more volatile than sales at aggregate level (Blinder (1986), Ramey 
and West (1997)). This is confirmed also by firm level studies (Blanchard (1983), 
Kashap and Wilcox (1993), Schuh (1996); opposite evidence by Krane and Braun 
(1991)).
6. Inventory movements are persistent, even conditional on sales9. Ramey and West 
(1997) find the autoregression coefficient of a stationary linear combination of in­
ventories and sales to be around 0.8. Schuh (1996) also finds an autoregression 
coefficient around 0.6 using disaggregated firm level data.
7. At the aggregate level, the ratio of sales to stocks (production +  beginning of the 
period finished goods inventories) is highly persistent and procyclical. The sales- 
stocks ratio decreases in each recession, typically by 5% or 10%. This means that 
although inventory changes are correlated to sales, aggregate inventories are less 
procyclical than aggregate sales (Bils and Kahn, 2000).
While most of the literature focuses on finished good inventories and on explaining 
facts 5-7, facts 1-4 emphasise that inventories dynamics are important to understand 
business cycle fluctuations, and that input inventories are especially important in this 
respect. Ramey (1989) is, to our knowledge, the only paper to focus exclusively on input
9This is confirmed by a very slow estimated adjustment speed in models of optimal inventory 
management.
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inventories. She notes that inventories can have several roles in the production process: i) 
reduce transaction and fixed costs; ii) reduce uncertainty about materials supply lines; iii) 
reflect the time element of production. These roles motivate the modelling of inventories 
as factors of productions. Starting from a restricted form cost function she derives and 
estimates factor demands, with the following results: inventories are very elastic with 
respect to output. 40% of the inventory investment is explained by a change in output 
(accelerator effect). This is stronger for work in progress than for raw materials or finished 
goods inventories. Ramey also finds that 60% of the decline in inventory investment during 
a recession is due to shifts in the demand for inventories. Hence it remains an open question 
whether this large shift is due to technological factors or it has financial explanations.
The idea that financial imperfections can help explaining inventories behaviour is 
present in the work by Kashap, Stein and Wilcox (1993). They note that after a tight mon­
etary policy there is a change in firms financing regarding the mix between bank lending 
and commercial papers, and they argue that this confirms the presence of a credit channel 
of monetary policy. Their interpretation is that at the beginning of a recession banks re­
duce lending and firms are forced to substitute it with commercial papers (larger firms) or 
internal finance (smaller firms). In fact the financing mix (bank credit/commercial papers) 
is at the same time a very effective business cycle predictor and a powerful explanatory 
variable of inventory and partly also of fixed investment. As we mentioned earlier, also 
Bernanke Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) argue that the credit channel, and especially the 
inability of smaller firms to substitute bank lending with other forms of external financing 
at the beginning of a recession, is responsible for the heterogeneous behaviour of small 
versus large firms across the business cycle, in terms of sales and inventory investment.
The link between financing constraints and inventory investment is explored at the 
microeconomic level by Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1994 and 1998). They note 
that corporate profits (internal finance flows) are extremely procyclical, and tend to lead 
the business cycle. Sales and revenues fall, often very sharply, just before and during a 
recession; hence for a financially constrained firm a contraction in investment is required 
if there is a negative shock in internal finance. Which assets would such firms liquidate? 
This depends on relative liquidation and adjustment costs. Hence the larger effect should
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be on inventories, whose liquidation costs are considerably lower. The authors employ 
a standard model of inventories, augmented with measures of internal finance estimated 
using quarterly US manufacturing data, from 1981 to 1992, available at firm level. Their 
findings strongly support the view that financial conditions affect inventory investment, 
especially for smaller firms.
1.6 C onclu sion s
In the last 15 years two independent strands of the investment literature have been 
analysing investment dynamics, one focusing on financing imperfections, the other on 
adjustment costs. Despite some similarities, they have been developing along different 
levels of analysis: the non convex adjustment cost literature aims at providing a micro­
foundation of aggregate investment behaviour. It analyses structural models with hetero­
geneous agents and studies their aggregate implications both theoretically and empirically. 
The literature about capital markets imperfections and investment instead provides evi­
dence on the influence of financial factors on firm level investment, but does not quantify 
these effects, nor explain their aggregate implications. The few empirical papers that try 
to address the question of the aggregate consequences of financial imperfections lack a 
proper microfoundation. Chapters 3 and 4 aim at filling this gap in investment literature, 
developing a structural model of investment with financing constraints and deriving its 
consequences for firm level and aggregate investment dynamics. Chapter 5 shows that it 
is possible to use such a structural model to derive a new test for the presence of financing 
constraints on firm investment which is robust to the criticisms to the cash flow-investment 
type of tests.
Another limit of these literatures is that the effects of financing and real constraints 
are analysed separately: all the models with non convex adjustment costs assume per­
fect markets, and all the models with financing imperfections assume convex adjustment 
costs. One of the main theoretical contributions of this thesis is to show that by study­
ing the interactions between real and financial constraints it is possible to improve our 
understanding of investment dynamics. Indeed Hubbard (1998) concludes his review ar­
ticle mentioning, among the direction for future research, the challenge of ” incorporating
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financing constraints in models of irreversible investment1'1, which is the aim of chapter 4.
Also regarding inventories, economic literature mainly analyses them separately from 
the fixed investment decisions of the firms. However input inventories and fixed capital 
are used together in production activities, and therefore non convex adjustment costs on 
fixed capital are likely to have an impact on the dynamics of variable capital as well. In 
chapter 4 we show that such interactions are particularly important in the presence of 
both non convexities and financing constraints and are useful in explaining a number of 
stylised facts regarding the cyclical fluctuations of investment.
32
Chapter 2
Financial structure and firm  
dynam ics: a prelim inary em pirical 
analysis
2.1 In tro d u ctio n
In chapter 1 we mention that a theoretical literature emphasises that capital markets im­
perfections could amplify the business cycle fluctuations of investment and production. 
However, the empirical evidence on the links between financial structure, financing con­
straints and firm dynamics is relatively scarce (see section 1.4). Therefore this chapter 
aims at finding further evidence of these links, conducting a preliminary empirical analy­
sis on our sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We investigate on two aspects of firm 
dynamics: i) the dynamics of capital structure and output in the business cycle; ii) the 
importance of financial factors for the growth and the volatility of growth of small firms.
We think that this empirical analysis is important because of the unique feature of our 
dataset, which includes both balance sheet data as well as a rich dataset of qualitative 
financial information directly provided by the entrepreneurs (see appendix 2 for details). 
Such dataset represents a unique opportunity to explore the relevance of financial factors 
for the real activity of firms. Similar studies conducted on US manufacturing firms, like 
the one by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), use indirect and arbitrary criteria, like 
firm’s size, to identify firms with imperfect access to financial markets, while we have the
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advantage of using the direct information from the entrepreneurs about their financing 
problems and about what sources of funds they mostly used to finance their growth1.
The main findings of this chapter are as follows: i) financing constraints affect cyclical 
fluctuations of firms. Those entrepreneurs who state financing problems are more pro­
cyclical in terms of both output and short term debt. They are able to increase their 
borrowing from banks only in expansion periods, while they are unable to maintain stable 
leverage levels during contraction periods. Moreover their growth is very volatile: among 
the smaller firms (turnover between 3 and 15 millions US$), the growth of the financially 
constrained ones is very sensitive to expansion and contraction phases, while the growth 
of the unconstrained ones is not affected by them. This result confirms and reinforces the 
evidence produced by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) about US manufacturing 
firms. We also show that this result is robust to the criticisms that financially constrained 
firms could simply be inefficient firms, or firms who belong to more procyclical industrial 
sectors, ii) Small Italian manufacturing firms finance their growth mostly with short term 
banking debt and retained earnings. However these two financing sources show a certain 
degree of substitution: entrepreneurs who mainly use retained earnings are less able to 
maintain their borrowing levels during economic contractions, iii) The access to long term 
banking debt positively affects firms growth and profitability.
This chapter is important in motivating the theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
remaining of this thesis, for at least two reasons: i) it investigates on the links between 
financial structure and real activity of firms in the business cycle, in order to identify the 
relevant stylised facts. The essential motivation for the structural models developed in 
chapters 3 and 4 is that financial factors are important in order to explain the cyclical 
behaviour of investment. This idea is supported by the empirical evidence cited in chapter 
1 regarding the asymmetric behaviour of small as opposed to large firms in the business 
cycle fluctuations, especially after changes in monetary policy (Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1996). We believe that our sample of Italian manufacturing firm, with the unique
1 In appendix 2 we also describe our sample of Italian manufacturing firms and we show that its char­
acteristics are comparable with the samples of US and UK firms most frequently used in the empirical 
investment literature. This supports the generality of the empirical results obtained from the structural 
model’s estimation in chapter 5.
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combination of quantitative and qualitative data, provides additional empirical evidence 
on the importance of financial factors on firm dynamics, ii) This chapter also investigates 
on how the heterogeneity of firms in terms of their financial structure contributes to 
the empirical evidence cited before. Because we estimate the dynamics of the whole 
distribution of firms, and not simply of its first moment, our analysis leads to interesting 
insights especially regarding the dynamics of leverage, which are considerably different in 
recession and expansion phases especially for the group of firms with financing problems.
Therefore we are not only able to conclude that financing imperfections and financial 
structure matter, but also that there is considerable heterogeneity of firms both with 
respect to the level and the volatility of leverage, and that the latter is linked with the 
heterogeneity in the volatility of growth. These findings motivate the theoretical analysis 
in the remaining chapters of this thesis, where we investigate on how the heterogeneity of 
firms with respect to current and future expected financing constraints affect aggregate 
output and investment dynamics.
The outline of this chapter is as follows: in section 2.3 we illustrate aggregate dynamics 
of capital structure and production of firms. We compare aggregate statistics for small and 
large firms and for constrained and unconstrained ones, selected according to the direct 
information provided by the entrepreneurs. In section 2.4 we illustrate the distribution 
dynamics of firms. We estimate the transition dynamics of the distributions of firms’ 
size, leverage and profitability. We select firms in subgroups according to stated financing 
problems and to the sources of funds mostly used by them to finance their growth.
2 .2  A g g reg a te  d ynam ics o f  financial stru ctu re  and  o u tp u t
Basic descriptive statistics of our dataset are reported in appendix 2. For the empirical 
analysis of this section we use all the 5289 firms with complete balance sheet data from 
1982 to 1992, as well as the subsample with 897 firms which also includes cross sectional 
qualitative information from the First Mediocredito Centrale survey on Small and Medium 
Manufacturing Firms (see appendix 2). We use two criteria to separate firms in subgroups:
i) size. We select firms in three groups according to the average size of total assets in the 
period considered. Figure 2-1 shows that the group of 772 small firms is almost 20 times
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smaller than the group of 1351 large firms.
Figure 2-1: Number of firms and dimensional classes
Dimensional classes
N. Of firms Total Assets
Small Firms 772 (14,59%) 2.880
Medium Firms 3166 (59,86%) 8.577
Large Firms 1351 (25,54%) 48.271
Total 5289
Values in US Dollars, constant 1997 prices
ii) Financing problems. We consider the answers to the questions about the financing 
problems faced by entrepreneurs from the first Mediocredito Centrale Survey (see appendix 
2). This information is cross-sectional, because it refers to the 1989-1991 period as a whole. 
Figure 2-2 shows that 23% of the entrepreneurs stated some kind of financing problem, 
and their average size is half of the size of the complementary subgroup of firms without 
financing problems: this is reflected in the fact that the share of firms with financing 
problems is almost double for small firms with respect to large ones (37.5% versus 19.9%). 
The most important problems are the cost of debt and the lack of financing, while lack of 
collateral is considered a problem only by 2% of the firms2.
2.2.1 D ynam ics of financial structure
The sources of funds, as a percentage of total assets, are reported in figures 2-3 and 2-
4. The three main sources of funds, net wealth, bank loans and trade debt, ensure the 
financing of 75%-80% of total assets. Other liabilities have a marginal importance. The 
main differences between small and large firms are that small firms use more trade debt 
than large firms, which depend more on bank loans3. Another difference in the behaviour
2This may be caused by the fact that this problem is implied by the other two questions. In fact a 
firm with an adequate level of collateral could, in principle, always borrow secured long term debt at low 
interest rates.
3 The fact that small firms finance less with short term bank loans does not contradict the typical finding 
of other studies, that larger firms borrow less from banks (see, among others, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994).
This is true also for Italian firms, but it is not found here because the ’’Centrale dei Bilanci” sample does 
not include very large firms. The more heterogeneous sample from Mediocredito Centrale shows that the 
relation between dimension and short term banking debt is concave4038<p type="texpara" tag="Body  
Text" > These additional statistics are available upon request., increasing from small to medium firms and 
decreasing from medium-large to very large firms, with direct access to capital markets.
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Figure 2-2: Firms distribution according to financing problems 
Dimensional classes and financing problems
N. of firms Avg. Total Assets
Firms without financing problems 688 (77%) 37.77
Firms with financing problems 209 (23%) 20.29
Firms with high cost of debt 136(15%) 15.70
Firms with lack of medium-long term financing 127 (14%) 23.44
Firms with lack of collateral 21 (2%) 17.09
Firms with high cost of debt and lack of m./l. t. debt 56 (6%) 20.25
Firms with high cost of debt and lack of collateral 14 (1.5%) 14.56
Firms with lack of collateral and of m./l. term debt 13 (1.5%) 16.38
Firms with all three problems 10 (1%) 14.95
Total 897 33.71
Small Medium Large
Without financing problems 62.5% 74.8% 80.1%
With financing problems 37.5% 25.2% 19.9%
Values in US Dollars, constant 1997 prices
Figure 2-3: Capital structure - small firms
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Figure 2-4: Capital structure - large firms
Sources of funds a s  % of total a sse ts  - large firms
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of small and large firms regards internal finance. Figure 2-5 shows that small firms retain 
more income in all the sample years.
Figure 2-5: Earnings retention - small and large firms
Share of total earn ings reinvested in the  firm
0.9
Sm all
Firms0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
Large
Firms0.4
0.3
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Figures 2-6, 2-7 and 2-8 analyse financial structure for firms selected using direct 
information about financing problems. Firms with financing problems borrow more from 
banks in all the sample years and have a lower wealth, measured as net assets over total 
assets. The figures also include the values of the test statistic for the equality of the 
subgroups means, computed for each year. They show that the differences in average year 
values are statistically significant for most of the sample years. In particular the difference 
in net wealth levels are strongly significant in all the years from 1984 on.
This result suggests that entrepreneurs with low collateral are the ones who stated
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Figure 2-6: Short term banking debt - firms with and without financing problems
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Figure 2-7: Long term banking debt - firms with and without financing problems
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Figure 2-8: Net worth - firms with and without financing problems
Net assets over total assets
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financing problems. However this does not necessarily imply the presence of collateral con­
straints on borrowing. In fact the direct information used to identify firms with financing 
problems could have selected firms with poor performance, that needed additional finance 
to cover current losses rather than to finance new investments. This issue is considered in 
the next subsection.
2.2.2 Perform ance and volatility  over the business cycle
Figure 2-9 shows the real rate of growth of total sales for the full sample of 5289 firms. It 
emphasises the fact that the sample period covers both expansion and contraction phases. 
A boom starts in 1984, after the deep depression of the beginning of the 80s, and lasts 
until 1989, with a relative decline in 1986. The 1990-1992 years experienced a contraction 
with a real growth rate of sales close to 0 in 1990 and negative in 1991 and 1992. The 
differences in the growth rates of output and short term debt between firms with and 
without financing problems (figures 2-10 and 2-11) are consistent with the ’’credit cycles” 
view, and in particular with the empirical findings of Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1996). Firms with financing problems exhibit higher procyclicality of both short term 
debt and output. Figure 2-10 shows that they have higher growth rates of output in 
expansion periods (1984, 1988 and 1992), and lower rates in contraction periods (1985, 
1986, 1990 and 1991). The variance around these data is however quite high, and the mean 
values of subgroups are not significantly different, with the exception of 1985, 1990 and 
1991. A similar pattern, but with greater differences between firms groups, is observed for 
the growth rate of short term debt (figure 2-11).
A possible critique to this result is that financially constrained firms are more pro­
cyclical simply because they are on average smaller, and smaller firms have procyclical 
technologies, either because they are more flexible than large firms, or because they be­
long to more procyclical sectors. Our data reject both objections. Figures 2-12 and 2-13 
show that smaller firms are not more procyclical than larger ones, both in terms of output 
and short term debt5. Moreover figure 2-14 shows that financially constrained firms are
5 This is in contrast with Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996), who use dimension as a proxy for 
financing constraints. The difference is probably that we do not have enough size heterogeneity among 
the firms in our sample, which are almost exclusively small and medium firms below 500 employees and
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Figure 2-9: Sales growth - all firms
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Figure 2-10: Sales growth - firms with and without financing problems
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Figure 2-11: Leverage growth - firms with and without financing problems
Rate of growth of the ratio between short term bank loans
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present in similar shares in the different industrial sectors (the figure reports all sectors 
with more than 50 firms in the sample). The only exceptions are the “Shoes and clothes” 
and “Paper, printing and publishing” sectors.
Figure 2-12: Leverage growth - small and large firms
Rate of growth of the  ratio between short term  bank loans
and total a sse ts
sm all firms
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Figure 2-13: Sales growth - small and large firms
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The last potential critique to this result is that we are analysing firms with poor 
performance that complain about the denied renewal of loans rather than profitable firms 
that face financing constraints. In fact, as figure 2-15 shows, financially constrained firms 
have lower performance, measured as the ratio of gross income over total sales6. We
without stock market quotation.
61 considered income before taxes and ’’extraordinary items”. Such items are gains or losses caused 
by transactions not linked with the main activity of the firm. For example the revenue that comes from 
selling a building, for a firm that produces shoes, is considered extraordinary revenue. Hence such items 
are not related to firm’s performance, even because are frequently used to cover losses in negative periods.
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Figure 2-14: Distribution of financing problems across industrial sectors
Industrial sectors and financing problems
Sector N firms % with financing 
problems
% without financing 
problems
Whole sample 897 23 77
Mechanic materials and 139 21.6 78.4
machineries
Metallic products 130 26.9 73.1
Textiles 87 21.8 78.2
Shoes and clothes 65 10.8 89.2
Electric and electronic 60 28.3 71.7
materials
Paper, printing and publishing 57 33.3 66.7
Non metallic minerals 56 21.4 78.6
Other manufacturing 53 28.3 71.7
Wood and wooden furniture 50 22 78
Rubber and plastic 50 22 78
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Figure 2-15: Net income - firms with and without financing problems
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separate good firms with a binding liquidity constraint from bad firms in financial distress 
by selecting only firms with positive gross income (income before taxes and extraordinary 
items) in each of the three years considered by the survey, 1989, 1990 and 1991. The 
filter selects out 39.7% of the firms with financing problems and 29% of the firms without 
financing problems. Figure 2-16 shows that once all the companies with negative gross 
income in 1989-1991 are selected out, firms with the ’’lack of financing” problem have 
almost the same performance as firms without financing problems. Nevertheless financially 
constrained firms still exhibit higher variance in the rate of growth of total sales.
Figure 2-16: Net income - firms with and without the problem of lack of medium-long 
term bank loans
Income before taxes and "extraordinary items" over total 
a sse ts  (excluded firms with negative incom e in years 1989-
1991)
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This is confirmed by figure 2-17. Firms with financial problems exhibit greater varia-
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tions in sales over the cycle. Not only are their growth rates higher in booms and lower in 
recessions, but also they seem to lead the decline of sales in the recessions. In fact sales 
growth rates of these firms declined sharply in 1985 and 1989, while the decline for firms 
without financial problems begun one year later, in 1986 and 1990. Mean differences are 
very high, but not very significant. This is because also the standard error of the difference 
is high, as the group with the problem of lack of financing is made of only 48 firms, once 
the positive-performance filter is applied.
Figure 2-17: Sales growth - firms with and without the problem of lack of medium-long 
term bank loans
Real rate of growth of total sales (firms with negative income in 
1989-1991 excluded)
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2.3 F inancial structure and growth: d istr ib u tion s dynam ics
This section7 investigates the distribution dynamics of Italian manufacturing firms, with 
particular reference to the interaction between real and financial variables in the growth 
process. The analysis is conducted using a dataset which includes all the three Mediocre­
dito Centrale surveys on small and medium Italian manufacturing firms (see appendix 
2). They provide information on the financing problems faced by the firms in funding 
investment and also about the composition of financing sources used to fund new invest­
ment projects. This information is available for each firm for three distinct sub-periods 
(1989-91, 1992-94 and 1995-97). The sample is made of 372 firms for which also eight years 
of balance sheet data, from 1990 to 1997, are available (see appendix 2 for details). The
7This section is based on a joint work with Sandra Bulli.
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econometric technique employed is the estimation of the distribution dynamics of firms’ 
size, leverage and profitability8.
Using the qualitative information described above we estimate such distribution dy­
namics for subgroups of firms selected according to the following criteria: a) the degree 
with which firms finance investment using internal funds; b) the degree with which firms 
finance investment using long term debt; c) the financing problems stated by the firms. 
The variables considered in the analysis are the following: (i) size, measured as sales at 
constant 1990 prices9 ;(n) leverage, measured as the ratio of bank loans over total assets10; 
(in) productivity, measured as the ratio of operative profits (income before taxes and 
financial expenses) over total assets. The analysis also distinguishes between periods of 
economic expansion and contraction. Using aggregate data on Italian industrial produc­
tion in the 90s (figure 2-18, source: Datastream), we define ’’contraction” periods the years 
1990-1993 and 1996, and ’’expansion” periods the years 1994-1995 and 1997.
2.3.1 Firm s selected on the basis of th e  degree o f self-financing
We select as high “self-financing” those firms that used retained earnings to finance at 
least 66% of fixed investments in each of the three surveys11, for a total of 81 firms 
(21.8% of the sample considered). Figure 2-19 shows the distributions of size, measured 
in logarithms of total sales at constant 1990 prices, of these two groups of firms in 1990 
and 1997. Firms with high self-financing are on average bigger in 1990 compared with 
low self-financing firms. This difference increases from 1990 to 1997. Information about 
growth expectations conditional on the initial size are reported in figure 2-20. This figure 
corresponds to a nonparametric estimation of the relation between size and growth. The
8The distribution dynamic method, explained in appendix 4, has been firstly used to analyse the 
dynamics of per capita income across countries (Quah, 1993 and 1997) and has subsequently been applied to 
different areas of economic research, like industrial organisation, finance and international trade (Koopmans 
and Lamo, 1995; Stanca, 1999; Redding, 1999). All estimations in this section are performed using D. 
Quah’s econometric package tsrf.
9Similar results were obtained using the variable “total assets”.
10 The analysis of alternative measures of leverage that include commercial loans and other short term 
non banking debt has produced qualitatively similar but quantitatively less important results.
11 The other firms are only relatively less self financed, as retained earnings is the main source of funding 
for almost all firms in the sample. For example among the sample of 897 Italian manufacturing firms (see 
appendix 2) very few of them distribute dividends. We observe nonzero dividends in only 28.6% of the 
total number of firm-year observations, and in only 2.7% of the observations the ratio between dividends 
and revenues is greater than 5%. The percentages fall to 27.1% and to 2.2% for ’’family firms”, which 
report one entrepreneur plus one or more members of the family working full time in the firm.
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Figure 2-18: Total output - Italian manufacturing sector
o o
Source: DAI AS'I'REAM
Figure 2-19: Size distributions - high and low self-financing firms 
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figure shows that, among smaller firms, high self-financing ones have a relatively higher 
expected growth than low self-financing ones. Therefore self-financing seems the preferred 
source of funds for smaller high growing firms.
Figure 2-20: Conditional growth expectations - high and low self-financing firms
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High and low se lf  financing firms
0.4 -i
0.3 -
0.2  -
113.55 156.37 215.35
Dimension
s. (total sales, b illions o f  U ia . 1992 prices)
16.65 2Z93 •59_876.37 5.78 12.09
—  —  Firm s w ith low reta ined  earn ings, expansion  periods
-0.2  -
-  -F irm s  w ith  low  retained e arn ings, con trac tion  periods
-----------F irm s w ith high  retained e arnings, e xpansion  periods-0.3 -
• F irm s w ith h igh rerained earnings, con traction  periods
-0.4 J
Figure 2-21 shows the distributions of leverage in 1990 and 1997. In 1990 the two 
distributions are similar, with a peak of density relative to a leverage of approximately 
25%, but in 1997 they differ: the density of firms with low leverage (0%-20%) increases for 
high self-financing firms. This might suggest that for these firms internal funds substituted 
bank loans in the sample period.
Figures 2-22 and 2-23 show the distribution dynamics of leverage12. Data are in natural 
logarithms, and hence absolute variations represent percentage variations of the original 
variables. The higher the ’’mountain range” along the diagonal, the more persistent over
12 The axes report the value of the variable at the generic years t and t +  1. Therefore a section of 
the graph from a point x on the t axis conducted parallel to the t +  1 axis represents the probability 
density function of the value at time t +  1, conditional on the value at time t being x. The transition 
function, therefore, maps each portion of the distribution from one period to the other and thus describes 
the law of motion of the distribution. A density concentrated along the main diagonal would indicate high 
persistence of the current values. Conversely, if the density is more equally spread over the base this means 
more intra-distribution mobility.
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Figure 2-21: Leverage distributions - high and low self-financing firms 
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time is the value of the variable analysed. It can be seen, especially in figure 2-23, that we 
have ’’two peaks” corresponding respectively to low levels (0-10%) and high levels (40%- 
50%) of leverage. This means that the probability of maintaining a stable leverage level 
is higher for very low or very high values of the ratio. This finding can be interpreted as 
the existence of two alternative optimal structures of capital: one with low leverage and 
occasional bank loans which are repaid in the short run, another with high leverage, where 
bank loans represent the main component of the firm’s funding.
Figure 2-22 shows a higher leverage volatility of high self-financing firms. They present 
a lower persistence of the two peaks, especially in contraction periods. This means that 
high self-financing firms are more likely to vary the levels of leverage over time. Low self- 
financing firms (figure 2-23) present a higher persistence of leverage, both during expansion 
and contraction periods. The analysis of profitability13 reveals that self-financing firms are 
slightly more profitable, but this does not seem sufficient to explain the major differences 
in the financial structure between high and low self financing firms. It seems therefore 
that the choice of high self-financing is motivated by higher earnings but also by the lower
13Not reported here, but available upon request.
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Figure 2-22: Leverage distributions dynamics - high self-financing firms
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Figure 2-23: Leverage distributions dynamics - low self-financing firms
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ability to keep stable leverage levels, especially during contraction periods.
2.3.2 Firm s selected  on th e  basis of th eir access to  long term  debt.
We select as “high debt” those firms who have financed at least 30% of their investment 
with medium or long term debt14 in at least two of the three survey periods, for a total 
of 140 firms (37.6% of the sample). Figure 2-24 shows the size distributions in 1990 and 
1997. It shows that access to long term debt is positively related to firms’ growth. This
Figure 2-24: Size distributions - firms with high and low debt
Dimension: distribution in 1990 Distribution in 1997
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is confirmed by figure 2-25, which shows the growth expectations of firms. Among smaller 
firms, ’’high debt” firms have a higher growth expectation than ’’low debt” firms, both 
in expansion and recession periods. This result could be caused by the fact that small 
very profitable firms at the same time grow faster and get more long term bank financing, 
especially in expansion periods. Figure 2-26, regarding the distribution of firms according 
to their profitability (net income over total assets), rejects this view. In fact ’’high debt” 
firms are slightly less profitable than ’’low debt” firms in 1990, while they are slightly more 
profitable in 1997. Therefore it seems that the access to long term debt has a positive
14Defined as debt repayable after more than 1 year.
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Figure 2-25: Conditional growth expectations - high and low debt firms
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Figure 2-26: Net income distributions - high and low debt firms
Profitability : distribution in 1990 Distribution in 1997
(net incom e over sa les)
2.5
-0.40 -0.28 -0.16 -0.04 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.44 0.56
2.5
-0.40 -0.28 -0.16 -0.04 0.08 0.20 0.32 0.44 0.56
firms with "low debt" 
firms with "high debt"
52
effect not only on firms’ growth but also on their profitability.
Figure 2-27: Leverage distributions dynamics - high debt firms
Leverage in periods of contraction, "high Leverage in periods of expansion , "high
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Figures 2-27 and 2-28 regard the dynamics of the distribution of leverage. The persis­
tence of high levels of leverage is particularly strong for ’’high debt” firms (figure 2-27). 
This happens both in expansion and recession periods. In particular, the probability of 
reducing the leverage at time t + 1, conditional on an high level at time £, is very small. 
Conversely ’’low debt” firms (figure 2-28) are very sensitive to the economic cycle. Their 
probability of maintaining high leverage levels drops dramatically during contraction peri­
ods (the ” mountain range” on the left graphic is lower). This evidence seems to point out 
to a more stable relationship between high-debt firms and financial intermediaries, which 
allows such firms to maintain high levels of short-term debt financing even in recession 
periods15. For smaller high-debt firms this implies higher expected growth and also an 
increase in profitability.
15It is important to note that while leverage includes all banking debt, firms are selected according to 
long-term banking debt only, which is a very small fraction of the former (see figures 2-3 and 2-4), but it 
is an important signal of long-term bank-firm relationships.
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Figure 2-28: Leverage distributions dynamics - low debt firms
Leverage in periods of contraction, "Low Leverage in periods of expansion , "Low
debt "firms debt" firm s
2.3 .3  Firm s selected  on th e  basis o f d irectly  revealed  financing con­
straints
We select in the financially constrained groups all firms whose entrepreneurs stated some 
financing problem in any of the three Mediocredito Centrale surveys, for a total of 123 
firms (33.1% of total firms). The distributions of size is shown in figure 2-29. Financially 
constrained firms exhibit a distribution skewed towards small firms. This skeweness di­
minishes from 1990 to 1997, indicating that the presence of financing constraints does not 
prevent small firms to grow in the sample period. Figure 2-30 shows the expectations 
of growth, conditional on initial size: it shows that smaller (turnover less than 20 billion 
lira) financially constrained firms have very different growth expectations across expansion 
and contraction periods. Conversely small unconstrained firms are almost not affected by 
the business cycles. The leverage distributions (not reported here) confirm the higher 
leverage of financially constrained firms shown in figures 2-6 and 2-7.
The figures relative to the distribution dynamics show that in expansion periods the 
peak at high levels of leverage is more pronounced for firms with financing constraints 
(figure 2-31, right graphic), which have a low probability of reducing those levels. Therefore 
firms with financing constraints have, in expansion periods, a dynamic of leverage very
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Figure 2-29: Size distributions - firms with and without financing problems 
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Figure 2-30: Conditional growth expectations - firms with and without financing problems
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Figure 2-31: Leverage distributions dynamics - firms with financing problems
Leverage during periods of contraction, Leverage during periods of expansion,
financially constrained firms financially constrained firms
time t+1
similar to ’’high debt” firms (figure 2-27, right graphic). In contraction periods, however, 
they behave differently: ’’high debt” firms maintain stable leverage levels (figure 2-27, 
left graphic), while the opposite happens to firms with financing problems (figure 2-31, 
left graphic), which have a higher probability of reducing them. This result confirms 
the findings of section 2.2: firms with financing problems seem unable to maintain stable 
leverage levels in periods of contraction and at the same time their growth is more sensitive 
to the business cycle fluctuations.
2.4  C onclusions & related  literature
In this chapter we analyse our dataset on small and medium Italian manufacturing firms 
to find evidence of the links between financial structure, financing constraints and firm 
dynamics. The main results of this chapter reinforce the impression that financial structure 
matters: i) firms that have stronger links with financing institutions (measured as the 
amount of long term banking debt used to finance new investment projects) are able to 
maintain more stable borrowing levels during contraction phases and at the same time 
they grow more and increase their profitability more than the other firms, ii) Financing 
constraints affect cyclical fluctuations of firms. Those entrepreneurs who state financing
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problems are more procyclical in terms of both output and short term debt. Among 
the smaller firms (turnover between 3 and 15 millions US$), the growth of the financially 
constrained ones is very sensitive to the business cycle fluctuations, while the growth of the 
unconstrained ones is not affected by them. These results reinforce the evidence produced 
by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) about US manufacturing firms. Our analysis has 
the advantage of using direct qualitative information provided by the entrepreneurs about 
their investment financing policy and their financing problems. Our results are confirmed 
by both the simple analysis of aggregate time series and by the distribution dynamics 
estimated for groups of firms selected according to the direct qualitative information.
In the empirical literature about financing constraints and investment of Italian firms 
two papers are related to the analysis of this chapter. Rondi et al. (1998) use aggregate 
annual balance sheet data for two subsamples of large and small private italian compa­
nies. They show that after episodes of monetary tightening smaller firms report a sharper 
decrease in short term debt and a steeper fall in both sales and inventories. Bagella, Bec- 
chetti and Caggese (2001), using the same dataset employed in chapter 5 (see appendix
2) investigate if the cash flow investment sensitivity is related to financing constraints. 
The authors estimate a reduced form investment equation following the Euler Equation 
approach (Bond and Meghir, 1994), and combine a priori information and direct quali­
tative information (see appendix 2) to consistently estimate for each firm the probability 
of being financially constrained. Their main finding is that, when financially constrained 
firms are properly identified, the neoclassical model is rejected only for unconstrained firm. 
Moreover financially constrained firms show positive correlation between investment and 
lagged cash flow.
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Figure 2-32: Leverage distributions dynamics - firms without financing problems
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C hapter 3
A  dynam ic m odel o f investm ent 
w ith  financing constraints: th e  
precautionary saving effect
3.1  In tro d u ctio n
This chapter develops a structural model of investment with financing constraints. The 
motivation for this analysis is that, as mentioned in chapter 1 , existing studies about 
financing constraints and firm investment focus mainly on the estimation of reduced form 
investment equations, without explicitly solving the dynamic investment problems. We 
believe that the structural approach is instead important because it allows to study the 
effects of current and future expected financing constraints on the investment and saving 
choices of the entrepreneurs and to derive their consequences for aggregate investment 
dynamics.
The model proposed in this chapter has two distinctive features. First, output is pro­
duced by an entrepreneur who operates a concave risky technology using capital as a factor 
of production. Capital takes one period to become productive. Second, the entrepreneur’s 
only source of external finance is debt secured by collateral. In this environment, antic­
ipating a risk of a binding financing constraint in the future, the entrepreneur reduces 
the investment spending in the risky technology, and keeps some financial assets (or spare 
borrowing capacity) as a precautionary saving motive. We solve the dynamic investment
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problem and simulate the investment path of an entrepreneur to show that with financing 
constraints investment is more volatile and more sensitive to cash flow than with perfect 
markets. However this sensitivity is mainly driven by future expected financing constraints 
rather than by currently binding ones. This is because the entrepreneur anticipates them 
by reducing investment and increasing her holding of safe financial assets. This implies 
that it is not necessarily true that the investment sensitivity to internal finance is stronger 
for firms facing current financing constraints. Therefore our analysis, even though it con­
firms that the cash flow-investment sensitivity can be caused by financing constraints, also 
supports the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique that there is no theoretical foundation 
for the claim that such sensitivity is monotonous in the intensity of financing constraints.
Our theory also implies that, despite only a small fraction of entrepreneurs having a 
binding financing constraint at any point in time, financing constraints can have a big 
impact on aggregate investment dynamics, because all firms engage in precautionary sav­
ing. We simulate an aggregate economy and we show that the precautionary saving effect 
implies that aggregate investment can have large and persistent responses to temporary 
macroeconomic shocks. Moreover the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs with respect to the 
net worth implies that smaller businesses are on average more financially constrained, 
even though all are ex ante identical regarding their ability to access external finance. 
This is because small entrepreneurs tend to have smaller net worth relative to output, 
either because they have younger growing businesses, or because they became small after 
experiencing low productivity periods recently. This implies that investment of smaller 
businesses is much more volatile in response to temporary and permanent macroeconomic 
shocks.
This chapter is structured as follows: in section 3.2 we discuss the importance of precau­
tionary saving in the context of the literature on investment with financing imperfections. 
In section 3.3 we illustrate the model. In section 3.4 we obtain a numerical solution of 
the problem and illustrate the properties of the policy function. In section 3.5 we provide 
some simple aggregate simulations. In section 3.6 we summarise the conclusions.
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3.2  F in an cin g  con stra in ts, p recau tion ary  sa v in g  and  in v est­
m en t.
Before illustrating the formal model, let us explain the motivation behind it: in the context 
of dynamic investment models a binding financing constraint implies a corner solution to 
the optimal investment problem. The entrepreneur (henceforth E ) would like to invest 
more in her business, but cannot find the necessary financing. When such corner solution 
holds E  reinvests in her business all internally generated finance, and the neoclassical 
investment model is rejected because of excess investment sensitivity to cash flow. The 
cash flow-investment literature tests for the positive correlation between investment and 
changes in internal finance for firms who a priori are more likely to have a binding financing 
constraint. This implicitly assumes that investment is not (or less) sensitive to cash flow 
when the constraint is not binding. But how plausible is this assumption? Intuitively 
an optimising agent would try to anticipate future financing problems by saving more 
when the economic conditions are favourable. Such ” precautionary saving” could prevent 
financing constraints to be binding in most of the states of nature.
Yet this does not necessarily imply that financing constraints have a negligible im­
pact on firm level and aggregate investment. Let’s consider an entrepreneur who allocates 
wealth between consumption, risky investment in her business and safe investment in fi­
nancial assets (precautionary saving). If E  wants to increase the precautionary saving 
to counter future expected financing problems, she must compensate by reducing either 
investment or consumption. Hence if the increase in saving is counterbalanced by a re­
duction in investment in the business rather than by a reduction in consumption, then 
financing constraints may have a large impact on investment dynamics, even if they are 
seldom binding at the individual level. This may happen in reality as consumption may be 
difficult to reduce, either because E's household has a minimum consumption requirement, 
or because of a preference for consumption smoothing.
This discussion clarifies that, in order to study the importance of financing constraints 
for investment dynamics, it is important to focus on the link between financing problems 
and the allocation of wealth between consumption, saving and investment. Yet so far
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precautionary saving has been studied exclusively1 in the consumption literature. Leland 
(1968) defines precautionary saving as the difference between consumption when income is 
certain and when it is uncertain but with the same mean. The literature that followed has 
extended Leland’s results in the multiperiod case and for different sources of uncertainty. 
Caballero (1991) notes that ” The chief conclusion of this research agenda is that whenever 
preferences can be characterized by a separable utility function with convex marginal utility, 
the slope of the consumption path rises as the level of income uncertainty increases” . The 
steeper the consumption path, the more individuals engage in precautionary saving and 
postpone consumption to the future. Zeldes (1989) notes that precautionary saving can 
be also the result of liquidity constraints: ” However, even if the current constraint is not 
binding, so that the Euler equation between time t and time t+ 1  is satisfied, the presence of 
constraints that will bind in the future with some positive probability will lower the current 
consumption of any risk averse individual
Recent empirical studies have found evidence of precautionary saving on households 
behaviour (see, among others, Guiso, Jappelli and Terilzzese, 1992; Carrol, 1994; Hub­
bard, Skinner and Zeldes, 1994; Carrol and Samwick, 1998). Even assuming that liquidity 
constraints do not matter and that such precautionary saving is only generated by income 
uncertainty, one would expect that precautionary saving should be larger for entrepreneur­
ial households, who bear a lot of the income risk. Yet no systematic study has been done, 
until recently, regarding the relationship between entrepreneurship and savings: Hubbard 
and Gentry (2000) analyse data from the 1983 and 1989 Federal Reserve Board Surveys 
of Consumer Finances, and find the following: i) entrepreneurial households own a sub­
stantial share of households wealth and income, and this share increases throughout the 
distributions of wealth and income; ii) wealth-income ratios are higher for entrepreneurial 
households and saving-income ratios are higher for entrants and continuing entrepreneurs, 
even after controlling for age and demographic variables; iii) the portfolios of entrepreneur­
ial households, even wealthy ones, are undiversified, with the bulk of assets held within 
active businesses.
These findings suggest that entrepreneurship has a positive influence on precautionary
xAn exception is Gross (1994). See footnote n.4 in the introduction to the thesis.
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saving and wealth accumulation, and that it is important to study the effects of pre­
cautionary saving on investment. This is the aim of the basic model illustrated in the 
remaining sections of this chapter.
3 .3  A  m o d el o f  in vestm en t w ith  financing co n stra in ts
We consider an economy composed of many entrepreneurs, some active and some retired, 
and many competitive banks. We assume that each active E  chooses consumption and 
investment in order to maximise the expected value of her lifetime utility function. All 
entrepreneurs have the same preferences and have access to the same risky technology.
• P references
p i)  E  has a utility function linear in consumption; p2) her subjective discount rate is 
equal to 1 /R , where R  =  1 +  r, and r is the lending/borrowing risk free interest rate.
Assumptions p i  and p2 are those implicitly or explicitly adopted in the cash-flow 
investment literature, which usually assumes that the firm maximises the discounted sum 
of future expected profits. If markets are perfect and the Modigliani Miller theorem 
holds, then this is the correct objective function regardless of the preferences of E. But 
when markets are not perfect, then preferences matter for investment decisions and to 
use the same objective function is equivalent to impose assumptions p i  and p2. Such 
assumptions imply that E  is indifferent between consuming today and consuming in the 
future. As a consequence in presence of financing constraints she consumes nothing and 
saves all her income until there is even the smallest chance of facing future financing 
constraints. Therefore her investment would be financially constrained only at the very 
beginning of her activity, because she would save and quickly accumulate financial wealth. 
In reality entrepreneurs must consume something to survive, and they also tend to increase 
consumption as their income and wealth increases. Such behaviour is represented by the 
following assumption:
p3) E  has to consume at least a fixed share rj > 0 of output to be able to continue 
activity:
x*t = x t -  rjyt > 0 (3.1)
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We define (1 +  rj)yt as total output. This is composed by rjyt, the minimum consumption 
level and yt, defined by (3.2), that is ’’financial” output that can be consumed, invested 
or saved, xt is total consumption, and is ’’voluntary” consumption above the minimum 
level.
Therefore assumption p3 ensures that consumption is always positive and increasing in 
income2. In the consumption literature the same features (positive consumption increasing 
in wealth) are usually generated by assuming a concave utility function (see Zeldes, 1989, 
for a model of consumption with liquidity constraints). We will show in section 3.3.2 that 
the two modelling choices generate similar results in terms of the effects of future expected 
financing problems on current investment and saving decisions. Our approach3 has the 
advantage of preserving the linearity of the preferences and of rendering the solution of 
the model much simpler. This feature is very important for the extended model proposed 
in chapter 4, which is already considerably complex in that it analyses, in a multifactor 
model, financing constraints together with the irreversibility of fixed capital.
Another way of justifying assumption p3 is to interpret E  as a manager that receives 
private benefits (Jensen, 1986) proportional to the firm’s output. Her objective is to max­
imise her intertemporal utility, and she receives from the shareholders a wage proportional 
to financial profits. Jensen (1986) argues that in a situation with free cash flow and private
benefits a manager may become an ’’empire builder” : she may invest in inefficient projects 
in order to increase her power and her privileges in the company. This overinvestment 
problem is a possible way of interpreting the consequences of assumption p3 in our model. 
In fact in section 3.3.1 we show that the presence of such private benefits implies that the 
investment is inefficiently high with respect to the level that maximises financial profits. 
This is because while the wage of the manager is proportional to financial profits, her pri­
vate benefits are proportional to the output of the firm. Therefore she wants to increase 
the size and the output of the firm beyond the efficient level. In this situation we show 
that future expected financing constraints reduce the investment of the firm because the 
manager values more financial profits, which increase financial wealth and reduce future
2 Because we assume that productivity shocks are persistent (assumption t 3 ), p3  also implies that 
consumption is, on average, increasing in wealth.
3Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) use a similar assumption in a business cycle model.
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financing constraints, than private benefits, which do not affect the wealth of the firm.
Therefore, although the model primarily applies to a small-medium firm owned and 
managed by the entrepreneur, its main results can also be extended to larger firms with 
separation between ownership and management.
Finally, we assume that the expected lifetime of E  is finite: p4) each period E  may 
become ill with an exogenous probability 1—7 , with 0 < 7 < 1, and must retire. Retirement 
is not reversible. Retired entrepreneurs sell their assets4 and consume all the proceedings.
At the aggregate level we assume that each retired entrepreneur is replaced by a newly 
born one, in order to keep the population of entrepreneurs constant. This assumption 
ensures that E  discounts future consumption. Later we will show that this allows for the 
presence of expected financing constraints in equilibrium.
•  Technology
t l )  E  can invest in the risky technology of the firm she owns and manages, kt is the 
stock of capital, installed at time t — 1 , which will generate output at time t.
The assumption that investment takes one period to become productive ensures that 
financing constraints are relevant when E  needs additional funds to exploit new investment 
opportunities.
t2) Net financial output yt is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production func­
tion:
Vt = 6 tk? (3.2)
with a < 1 . All prices are assumed constant and normalised to 1 . Capital depreciates at 
the rate 6 k-
l > 6 k > 0  (3.3)
t3) Qt is a productivity shock that follows a stationary autoregressive stochastic process. 
In this and in most of the following chapter, for simplicity, we assume that 0t is a symmetric 
two state Markov process, even though all the theoretical results can be easily generalised
4They cannot sell the ’’goodwill”, as E ’s work is essential to generate output using her risky technology.
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for a more complicated stationary stochastic process:
9t €  { 6 l , 6 h }  With > 6 L\ pr(0t+ 1 = 0t) = t >  0.5; pr(9t+1 ^  9t) =  1 -  e
(3.4)
Hence the first order autocorrelation coefficient is p =  2e — 1 > 0 , and we have that:
(Ot+i I 6 t = 0H) > Et (0t + 1  | 0t =  0L) (3.5)
• Financial M arkets
f l )  Equity finance and risky debt are not available; f2) at time t E  can borrow from 
(and lend to) the banks one period debt, with face value bt+i, at the market riskless interest 
rate r. A positive (negative) bt+1 indicates that E  is a net borrower (lender); f3) Banks 
only lend secured debt, and the only collateral they accept is the next period residual value 
of physical capital.
Therefore at time t the amount of borrowing is limited by the following constraint:
bt+i < r kkt+1 (3.6)
Tfc is the share of value of capital that can be used as collateral5:
Tfc < (1 -  6 k) (3.7)
The rationale for assumptions fl- f3  is that E  can hide the revenues from the production. 
Being unable to observe such revenues the lenders can only claim, as repayment of the 
debt, the value of E ’s physical assets (Hart and Moore, 1998). Therefore E  can only lend 
or borrow one period secured debt at the market interest rate r offered by the banks6. 
This collateral constraint assumption is supported by the empirical evidence illustrated in 
chapter 2 , which shows that, in our sample of manufacturing firms, those entrepreneurs 
who state financing problems are much less collateralised than those who do not (see figure
5rfc <  1 — 6k implies that E  can ’steal’ a 1 — Tk fraction of the residual value of capital (1 — 6k) kt.
6 We also implicitly assume that in the case of forced liquidation to repay the debt E  can continue the 
business with her residual wealth. Otherwise it is possible that the ex post liquidation threat by the lender 
during the renegotiation process is such that E  can credibly commit ex ante to repay more than Tkkt+i.
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2-8). The timing of the model is represented in figure 3-1. At the beginning of time t E
Figure 3-1: The timing of the basic model
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inherits from time t — 1 the stocks of capital kt. Then 6 t is realised, (1 +  77) yt is produced 
and bt repaid. Residual wealth Wt, net of the minimum consumption level rjyt is:
wt = Vt +  (1 -  6 k)h  ~ h  (3.8)
After producing, with probability 1 — 7 E  becomes ill and retires. With probability 7 
she instead continues activity. She borrows new one period debt with face value 64+1 , 
receiving the discounted value bt+i/R. The net worth wt plus the new borrowing bt+i/R  
are allocated between consumption and investment7. Therefore E ’s budget constraint is 
the following:
x*t +  kt+i = w t + bt+i/R  (3.9)
Let’s define 0  as the vector of structural parameters of the problem: ©' =  {#£, 0 h , e, 
7 , R, 6 k, Tk, 77, a}. In order to analyse the problem, it is useful to consider wMAX = w(Q), 
which we define as the level of wealth beyond which E  has zero probability to face future 
financing problems. It is then easy to prove the following:
P rop osition  1 (i) lim wMAX > 0;
T ) — > 0
(ii)  if Wt > wMAX then conditional on not retiring pr(wt+j < wMAX) = 0 for j  = 
0 , 1, . . . , 0 0 ;
7If bt+ i is negative, then (3.9) shows that w t  is allocated between consumption (xt), risky investment 
(fct+i) and risk free lending (—bt+ i ) /R .
(in) dwMAX/drj > 0 ;
(iv) there exist a finite value of 77, called T7min, such that pr(wt > w) = 0  for t = 
0 , 1, 00, and w < wMAX.
Corollary 2 if  77 > 77min then an active E  has always some probability of facing future 
financing constraints, and she does not consume more than the minimum amount, i.e. 
x t = rjyt and x% = 0 for t = 0 , 1 , 00.
Proof: see appendix 1.
Intuitively when E  reaches wMAX she becomes so rich that her financial wealth can 
absorb any future negative productivity shock and hence she does not have any future 
financing problem. Given that she can costlessly postpone consumption above the mini­
mum level, she will do so in order for her wealth to always remain above wMAX. 77 affects 
both the value of wMAX and the probability of reaching it. 77min is the minimum con­
sumption share which ensures that, starting from wq < w, w MAX is never reached, and 
there is always some probability of being financially constrained in the future. The intu­
ition is that 77 limits the capacity of E  to retain earnings and increases her incentives to 
expand production to boost consumption. As u>t increases, E  becomes richer and cares 
less about financing constraints. Thus she increases the size of the firm to increase her 
consumption, even if it implies investing in less profitable projects. This means that her 
expected financial profits decrease, and that there is always a positive probability that, 
conditional on future negative productivity shocks, wt will decrease enough to push E  in 
the constrained region8.
For the rest of this chapter and the two following we assume9 that 77 > 77min. Corollary 2 
implies that constraint (3.1) is always binding with equality, because with future expected 
financing problems E  always prefers to postpone consumption. Therefore consumption 
is no longer a state variable of the problem, xt is predetermined at the beginning of 
time t , when rjyt is realised, and x% = 0 for any t = 0,1, ...00. We denote the expected
8In section 3.3.2 we show that a bounded stochastic process for wt can be generated with a concave 
utility function plus an intertemporal discount factor (3 >  1/R.
9This assumption is not restrictive, given that typically, for a wide range of parameters, rjmin is around 
0.3-0.4, which corresponds to consumption being only 23%-28.5% of total output.
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lifetime utility at time t of E, after 9t is realised, conditional on not becoming ill and after 
consuming r]yt , by Vt (wt, 6 t \ wq,0 q] 0 ) :
V o(«>o,«o |e)=  M A X  B o | E ( ^ ) ‘ { |[ W t+ i  +  ( l - 7 H + i ] U
/ k t + 1  = k (wt , 0 t)  ^ °
bt+i = b(wtA) J (=o i
(3.10)
wt and 0t are the state variables of the problem, which is defined by (3.10) subject to
(3.6) and (3.9). These constraints define a compact and convex feasibility set for kt+i 
and &t+i, and the law of motion of wt+i conditional on Wt and 6 t is continuous. There­
fore, given assumption t3 and the concavity of the production function, a solution to 
the problem exists and is unique10. In order to describe the optimality conditions of the 
model, let At and (f)t be the Lagrangean multipliers associated to constraints (3.6) and 
(3.9). Taking the first order conditions of (3.10), at a generic time t , with respect to 
bt+1 and kt+1 it is possible to show that the solution is given by the optimal sequence of 
{kt+i,bt+i, Xt,4>t I wt,Ot\Q}tLo that satisfies (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13) plus the standard 
Kuhn-Tucker complementary slackness conditions on A*:
Dkt+ 1 < wt (3-11)
oo
& =  1 + REt J 2  (3-1-2)
J=o
{l + r,)Et (M PKt+i) =  U K  +  E t (Ck+i) + D R 2 Xt (3.13)
D = 1 — Tk/R  is the downpayment required to purchase one additional unit of capital. 
Equation (3.11) combines together the budget constraint (3.9) and the collateral constraint
(3.6) and implies that the downpayment necessary to buy kt+i must be lower than E ’s net 
worth. Equation (3.12) is obtained by solving recursively forward the first order condition 
for 6f+i. Equation (3.13) is obtained using the first order condition for bt+i to substitute 
4>t in the first order condition for kt+1. U K = R  — (1 — 6 ^) is the user cost of capital,
’See Stokey and Lucas (1989), Chapter 9.2.
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and Et (M PKt+i)=aEt (@t+i) is the expected marginal productivity of capital in
financial terms. Et (£lt+1) is the premium required by E  to compensate for the cost of 
future expected financing problems, and it is defined as follows:
Et (Qt+i) = l E t [(&+! -  1) (iUK -  MPKt+i)] (3.14)
At is positive when the constraint (3.6) is binding, and is equal to zero otherwise. It 
represents the shadow cost of not being able to increase investment because of the lack of 
additional funds.
3.3.1 The precautionary saving effect
Let’s first consider the solution without financing problems, by assuming that wq > w MAX. 
In this case proposition 1 implies that E  has always enough resources to invest in her 
business. The collateral constraint (3.6) is never binding, and its associated Lagrange 
multiplier At is constantly equal to 0 for t = 0,1, ...,oo. Hence from (3.12) it follows that 
(f>t =  1 for t =  0,1,..., oo. Hence one additional unit of net worth increases the value 
function only by one. This is because, with linear utility and no financing constraints, 
expected marginal return from investment is exactly equal to R , the discount factor. 
Moreover this implies, from (3.14), that Et (flt+i) =  0 for t =  0,1,..., oo. By substituting 
these values in (3.13), we obtain equation (3.15):
(1 + 1]) Et (M PKt+i | wt > wMAX) = U K  (3.15)
By solving (3.15) we obtain the optimal investment level when E  has zero probability
to face future financing constraints:
uPM  _  Kt+ 1 —
(I + 77) aEt (0t+1 )
1
1 —a
(3.16)U K
Equation (3.15) looks like a standard profit maximising conditions, with one important 
difference: rjEt (M PKt+i) is the share of marginal revenues that will be consumed, while
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E t (M P Kt+ i) is marginal financial revenues. Since 77 > 0 , it follows that:
Et (.M P K t+1 | k t + 1  = fc™) < U K  (3.17)
(3.17) implies that conditional on k ™  expected marginal financial revenues are negative.
We define k%+ 1  as the level of investment that maximises net financial profits, and satisfies
the following condition:
Et {M PKt+1) =  U K  (3.18)
By solving (3.18) for kt+ 1 we obtain the value of k *+ 1  :
aE t {&t+1)h* — Kt+i ~ UK
11—a
(3.19)
Since 77 > 0 it follows that, because of the consumption constraint, E  overinvests with 
respect to the level of investment that maximises financial profits. Therefore:
kt+i > K+i (3.20)
Let’s consider now the case for wq G [0,uJ]. In this case wt is a stochastic process bounded 
above by w. We define wt —W.{9t) < w as the minimum level of net worth such that E  
is not financially constrained at time t and (3.6) is not binding. Therefore if wt < wt
(3.11) is binding with equality and together with (3.13) determines X^B and where 
the superscript C B  denotes the constrained solution:
*S3 =  (3-21)
, C B  _  ( 1  +  V) Et (MPKt+i) - U K - E t (fit+1)
A‘ --------------------------M 5-----------------------  (3'22)
In this situation E  borrows up to the limit without being able to exhaust all profitable 
investment opportunities. Therefore she invests all her resources in productive capital. 
(3.21) means that one additional unit of financial wealth allows E  to increase kt+i by 
1/D  units. This positive correlation between changes in wealth and investment is the
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key assumption of the cash flow-investment literature. However our model shows that for 
an entrepreneur a binding financing constraint is a very costly outcome in terms of lost 
investment opportunities. The cost is measured by \ ^ B as defined by (3.22), and E  will 
try to prevent it by engaging in ’’precautionary saving” .
We explain the intuition behind the ’’precautionary saving effect” by noting that, 
from (3.12), increases in the discounted sum of the expected At+j for j  = l,...,oo. 
The intuition is that the opportunity cost of money for E  increases when such money is 
useful in reducing the chance of being financially constrained in future. Therefore future 
expected financing problems increase the required return on capital and reduce the optimal 
unconstrained investment level below k ™ . To show this, let’s consider k°+1, the optimal 
solution for w MAX > Wt > wt. In this case E  is unconstrained today and At =  0, but she
will be constrained in future with some positive probability, so that Et 
Therefore from (3.13) it follows that k °+ 1  satisfies the following condition:
oo
E
3=1
> 0.
(1 +  rj) Et (M PKt+i) = U K  + E t (Qt+i) (3.23)
Et (flt+ i), as defined by (3.14), is the product between the value of money in terms of 
its ability to reduce future expected financing problems, (j>t+ 1 — 1 , multiplied by the loss 
in monetary profit caused by the overinvestment problem, U K  — M PKt+\. E t (fl*+i) is 
equal to zero if there are no expected financing problems and <pt = 1 for t = 0 , 1 , ...,oo. 
Otherwise it is positive and measures the opportunity value of reducing investment in the 
risky technology to increase financial earnings and to reduce future financing problems. 
The existence of this well behaved solution depends on assumption p4, which implies 
that E  discounts future expected financing constraints at the rate 7  <  1. In fact from 
corollary 2 it follows that 77 > ?7min corresponds to an equilibrium where E  has always 
some future expected financing problems. Therefore 7 < 1 ensures that, despite the 
sequence {Et (At+j) } ^ 0 converges to a positive constant, from (3.12) it follows that the 
shadow value of money is finite: <j)t < 0 0 . The intuition is the following: E  knows that 
by not saving one additional unit of financial wealth she increases the expected financing 
constraints in all future periods, but she does not care about the distant future because 
she will probably be retired by then.
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By comparing (3.15) with (3.23), it is easy to prove the following proposition: 
P rop osition  3 For t =  0 ,1 , ..., oo :
i) K + i < k°+i <  kt+ i 5
ii) (dk°+1/dwt | wt < wMAX) > 0 ;
m) H ax **» =W t —* w m
Proof: see appendix 1.
Proposition 3.i means that the optimal unconstrained capital k °+ 1  is lower than the 
optimal capital with no future expected financing problems k By choosing k °+ 1  smaller 
than kf+( E  chooses to precautionary reduce production and consumption, in order to 
increase the expected return on capital and the share of wt invested in risk free assets11. 
Proposition 3.ii means that changes in net worth affect investment choices even when the 
constraint is not binding, because they change the expectations about future financing 
problems and the amount of precautionary saving. From the above discussion it follows
that kt+1 (w t,0 t) , the level of capital that solves the problem, is the following:
K+\ (wt> 0t) if k%+ 1 (wt , 6 t) < wt/D  (unconstrained region) 
kt+i(w t ,9t)=  (3.24)
kf^{ otherwise (constrained region)
3.3.2 Precautionary saving and accum ulation of financial w ealth
The above discussion implies that an entrepreneur with future expected financing con­
straints accumulates net financial wealth. In fact equation (3.23) can be interpreted in the 
following way: the higher Et {&t+1) , the more E  reduces investment to increase marginal 
financial profits. Since k °+ 1  > k%+1, it follows that this increases also total profits and 
the net financial wealth of E. Therefore (3.23) means that at the margin the advantage 
of reducing investment to increase financial wealth is equal to the cost of reducing output 
and consumption.
11 Given that lending and borrowing rates are the same, E  is indifferent between maintaining some 
additional borrowing capacity and borrowing up to the limit to invest that additional capacity in risk free 
lending. Therefore to say that (3.11) is not binding is equivalent to say that E  is investing part of her 
wealth in risk free assets.
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The optimal choice of k °+ 1  defines the optimal level of net financial wealth but it 
does not determine how it should be allocated between debt and financial assets. In fact 
assumptions p i and p2 imply that if the borrowing constraint is not binding, then E  is 
indifferent between borrowing up to the limit and investing in financial assets and keeping 
some spare borrowing capacity. Therefore if E  engages in precautionary saving, the model 
predicts that this can happen using two equivalent mechanisms: i) accumulation of financial 
assets, which could be liquidated if needed to finance new investment; ii) reduction of the 
level of debt. The firm maintains a low level of debt in order to leave some room to increase 
it if future financing need will arise.
Another mechanism, not allowed by the simple model in this chapter, which can be 
used in reality by a firm in order to reduce future expected financing problems, is to delay 
the investment. If a firm has the chance to delay a profitable investment opportunity, 
then future expected financing problems could influence the delay decision: the firm waits 
to invest if the cost of delaying the new project is lower than the gain in terms of having 
more funds to counter future expected financing problems on the existing projects.
3.3.3 Solution w ith  a concave utility  function
In the previous sections we showed that the minimum consumption share (assumption 
p3) generates an equilibrium with two important properties: i) the financial wealth of 
E  follows a bounded stochastic process; ii) future expected financing problems affect the 
allocation of wealth between saving and investment.
Assumption p3 is sufficient but not necessary to obtain these two results. As a robust­
ness check of the theoretical results derived in the previous section, in this subsection we 
derive the optimality conditions of a version of the model where the preferences of E  are 
defined by a concave utility function instead of by a linear utility function plus a minimum 
consumption share 77 > 0. Our aim is to illustrate the similarities of the two approaches 
in terms of the effect of expected financing constraints on investment. More specifically, 
assumptions pi, p2, p3 and p4 are replaced by the two following assumptions:
p i ’) E 's utility is a logaritmic function of consumption:
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U{xt) = \ n x t (3.25)
p 2 ’) E 's subjective discount rate is equal to (3, where 0 < (3 < 1 /R
Assumption p2’ ensures that the entrepreneur is ’’impatient” , and prefers to consume
today rather than to postpone consumption. The budget constraint is now the following:
xt +  kt+i = wt +  h + i/R  (3.26)
Where wt is still defined by (3.8). The value function of E  is the following:
Vo (wo A ) =  M A X  £ 0 { y '/ 3 t {lnxt} l  (3.27)
{kt+i,bt+i}Zi J
The problem is defined by (3.27) subject to (3.6) and (3.26). We substitute xt in (3.27) 
using (3.26) and we add the collateral constraint with the associated Lagrange multiplier 
Af. By differentiating (3.27) with respect to bt+1 and kt+i we obtain the following:
— =  RXt + RPEt ( —  ) (3.28)
x t Vxm /
§ R \ t  -  am  I g  (R p y  Xt+j,M P K t + 1  I
Et (M PKt+i ) = UK + ---------------5^ --------------------------------------- (3.29)
E (R 0 ) 3  E t ( \ t+j)
j = 1
(3.28) and (3.29) are the Euler equations for consumption and investment respectively.
(3.29) is obtained by taking the first order condition for kt+i and then by substituting X-t
and Et from (3.28) solved recursively forward. The user cost of capital becomes
U K  = 1/(3 — (1 — 6 k)- UK  is greater than U K  because assumption p2’ implies that 
1/(3 > R. The intuition is that the impatient E  requires a higher profitability to be 
convinced to invest rather than consume. If w$ > wMAX and E  is never constrained then 
Xt = 0 for t =  0 , 1 , . . . ,oo. In this case the last term at the right hand side of (3.29) is 
equal to zero, and (3.29) becomes equivalent to (3.18). Moreover consumption follows a 
martingale process:
Xt = W Et ^Xt+^  3^'30^
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from (3.30) it is clear that present consumption is higher than future expected one since 
<  1. Therefore assumption p2' ensures that, if (3 is small enough, wt follows a bounded 
stochastic process, because E  prefers to consume today rather than postpone consumption 
and accumulate financial wealth.
If wt <w_t and the financing constraint is binding, then kt+i and Et (M P K t+ i) are 
determined by (3.11) holding with equality and (3.29) determines A* > 0. Therefore also 
in this alternative model At can be interpreted as the shadow cost of a binding collateral 
constraint. From (3.28) it is clear that, the higher A*, the lower consumption xt. Therefore 
current financing constraints affect the intertemporal allocation of consumption. This is 
what happens in Zeldes (1989) as well as in the model described in the previous section.
Let’s consider now what happens to optimal investment choices. We consider the case 
with wo < w, 0t = 0l and wt >wt, when E  is wealthy enough not to be financially 
constrained today, A* =  0 , but faces a positive probability of being constrained in future,
oo
^2 (Rfi ) 3  Et (At+j) > 0. In this case equation (3.29) becomes the following: 
j = l
“ " I E  (R 0Y h + j,M P K t+^ \
Et (M P K t+1) = U K  ^ (3. 31)
E (R0YEt (\t+j)
3 = 1
caul g  (R 0 y \ t+ j , M P Kt+i
It is easy to see that (3.31) is similar to (3.23). In fact the term —
£  (Rf3)j Et (Xt +j )
3= 1
represents the premium in the user cost of capital induced by future expected financ­
ing constraints. Since assumption p2’ implies that R(3 < 1 , this ensures that the cost
oo
of future expected financing constraints ]T) (R/3)3 Et(\t+j)  is finite12. The numerator
j = i
/  oo \
cov I X) (R (3 y \t+j ,M P K t+1 1 is the covariance between future expected financing prob-
V =1 J
lems and marginal productivity of capital. If the technological shock is persistent, and 
wt — wt is relatively large, then this covariance term is positive, because the constraint 
becomes binding at time t -1-1 only conditional on a positive shock (Qt+i = 6 h)  that in-
oo
creases investment needs. The denominator ^  Et (At+j) is also positive and hence the
j = i
'The same property is ensured, in the basic model, by assumption p4 .
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cm; I 'E'{Rpy\t+i ,MPKt+i
term — -------------------- L is positive as well, and reduces the expected marginal pro-
E  (RP)jEt(\t+J)
3 = 1
ductivity on the left hand side of (3.31). Hence it increases the optimal level of capital. 
This is because E  wants to increase production contingent to a positive shock that also 
increases the shadow value of retained earnings. As wt decreases towards w.t? the denom-
oo
inator Et (At+j) increases, because there is a higher chance of being constrained in 
j=i
/  oo \
future. Instead the numerator cov ^  ^t+j, M P K t+i I decreases, because now also a
V =1 J
negative shock that reduces M PKt+i can increase future expected financing constraints. 
The intuition is that, if Wt is very close to a negative shock (#t+i =  Qt =  6 l )  does 
not modify expected productivity, but generates negative returns in period t -f 1 which 
reduce net worth and can drive Wt below Wf This effect can be strong enough to make the 
covariance term in the numerator negative. The result is that, as Wt decreases towards Wt,
cov( J2 Xt+j,MPKt+i j
the term — ^ - 5 5 ----------------- decreases. From (3.31) it follows that the required return on
E  Etfrt+j)
3 = 1
capital increases and the desired level of investment in the firm decreases. This mechanism 
is analogous to the precautionary saving effect described in the previous section.
3 .4  N u m erica l so lu tio n  and sim u lation s
We now solve the problem and illustrate the properties of the investment policy function. 
We solve the dynamic nonlinear system of equations defined by (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13) 
using a numerical method. Adding the subscript i to indicate the i-th entrepreneur13, we 
discretise the state space of state variables w^t and 6 itt and we solve the problem numer­
ically iterating between the value function and the first order conditions, until the value 
function converges (Judd, 1998). First, we formulate an initial guess of the forward vari­
ables Et (<f>i}t+1) and Et (0i,t+i0i,*+i)14• Second, we solve the static optimisation problem 
conditional on this guess, for each discrete value of the state variables w^t and 9 ^ . Third, 
we update the guess of Et (4>i,t+1) and Et (^t+ i^i.t+ i) • We repeat these steps until the 
value function converges. The numerical solution is obtained using the software package
13 We adopt this notation from now on because we simulate an economy with many heterogeneous 
entrepreneurs.
14 These are the two forward terms present in E t (fit+ i) •
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Gauss. Details about the maximisation routines we developed to solve the problem are 
available upon request. Solving the problem for all possible values of the state variables 
yields the optimal policy function kij+i (wij,9i,t) and the associated Lagrange multipliers 
Aift (witU0itt) and (j>i>t , and the value function Vi>t (wiiti9i,t)-
The main qualitative results of the basic model presented in this chapter hold for a 
very large range of parameters. The specific parameter values used in this and the next 
section are chosen in order to make the simulations comparable with those of the extended 
model presented in chapter 4, where E  employs a multifactor technology with fixed and 
variable capital. This choice is motivated by the fact that the simulations presented in 
the next chapter are aimed at matching more closely observed fixed capital and variable 
capital investment dynamics, and most of the parameters used there are directly estimated 
from our panel data of Italian manufacturing firms.
The parameters regarding productivity are the following: Oh  — 4.52, 9l =  5.71, 
e =  0.62, a  = 0.781, 6k =  0.6129. The values of Oh  and 0l and e are chosen in order to 
match the level of risk faced by the entrepreneurs in the extended model (where there is 
also an aggregate source of uncertainty). The value of a  ensures that the optimal level 
of capital in this single factor model is equal to the sum of optimal levels of fixed and 
variable capital in the extended model. The value of 6k is equal to the weighted average 
of the depreciation factors for fixed and variable capital in the extended model.
The remaining parameters are the following: Tfc =  1 — 6k, R  — 1.015, 77 =  0.4 and 
7  =  0.95. The value of Tk implies that the residual capital is fully collateralisable. The 
values of 72, 77 and 7  are the same ones chosen in chapter 4. The value of 7  implies that 
each period the exit rate is 5%. The value of 77 implies that consumption is equal to a 
share of 77/  (1 +  77) =  28.5% of total revenues.
Figure 3-2 shows the policy function for capital kt+ 1 (wt) conditional on a negative 
productivity shock, 0t = 0l . For low values of wt the constraint is binding at time 
£, and kt+1 =  w t/D . This corresponds to the section of the policy function that is 
a diagonal line, with slope 1/D. The denominator of the slope is the required down­
payment for a unit of purchased capital. In the remaining part of the policy function 
kt+ 1 =  k°+1 (wt ; 0t = 0l ) < k ™  (9t = 0L) . The distance between k°+l and kf_^( measures
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Figure 3-2: Policy function of capital conditional on a low productivity shock
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the extent to which the precautionary saving effect reduces optimal investment choices.. 
For wt = w_t, precautionary saving is responsible for a reduction in the optimal investment
fcPM _k°  p . .
equal to =  30.7% . The difference between k°+1 and k^_  converges to zero as
wt increases, and the probability of facing future financing problems decreases.
Figure 3-3 shows the policy function for capital kt+i (Wt) conditional on a positive 
productivity shock, 9t =  Oh - It shows that when 0t increases the binding constraint region 
(wt < wt) expands and the precautionary saving region (wt > wt) shrinks. This is because 
0t is persistent. A higher 6t means also higher productivity in future, and E  expects to 
increase financial profits and financial wealth, thereby reducing future probability of being 
financially constrained. The consequence is that the maximum precautionary reduction
J .P M  _ f c °
in optimal investment measured at wt =  wt is only equal to t+}PMt+1 =  2 0% .kt+1
3.4 .1  Sim ulation: single firm
Figure 3-4 shows the time path of kt+1 for 50 periods, with a predetermined sequence 
of expansion and contraction phases. The firm’s idiosyncratic shock is 6h for 15 peri­
ods, then 0l for 20 periods, and then again Oh for the last 15 periods. Such arbitrary
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Figure 3-3: Policy function of capital conditional on a high productivity shock
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sequence is chosen in order to better distinguish between the three components of in­
vestment dynamics: change in expected productivity, precautionary saving and binding 
financing constraint. We simulate two entrepreneurs with different initial endowment Wq 
and Wq , but otherwise identical. The first entrepreneur (E1) has Wq > wMAX, and has a 
zero probability to be financially constrained at any time. Hence she changes her stock of 
capital only in response to changes in expected productivity: k}+1 (wt ,0t) =  k ™  (0t) Vi. 
The second entrepreneur (E2) has w < Wq < w. Therefore she is initially unconstrained 
but has a positive probability of being constrained in the future. When, after 15 periods, 
the productivity shock switches to 0l , she reduces her capital in a similar way with re­
spect to the unconstrained entrepreneur. The difference is that she keeps reducing capital 
also in the following periods. From t = 15 to t = 24 the constraint is not binding, and 
E 2 reduces investment because the negative shocks reduce her financial wealth (see figure 
3-5) and increase the chances of facing future financing problems. This is equivalent to 
precautionary saving, in the sense that E 2 borrows less and invests less, in order to keep 
some spare borrowing capacity for the future. From the point of view of figure 3-2, this 
drop in investment is equivalent to moving leftward along the A^t+i policy function, while 
Wij decreases and approaches wt. This precautionary behaviour implies that E 2 manages
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to avoid a binding constraint until t = 24. Prom t = 25 to t =  34 the subsequent contrac­
tion in investment, caused by a binding constraint, is smaller than the one caused by the 
precautionary saving effect in the previous periods. From the point of view of figure 3-2, 
this further drop in investment is equivalent to moving leftward along the diagonal section 
of the kitt-fi policy function, because Wij has decreased below w±. When the productivity 
shock switches back to 0//, the entrepreneur is constrained for five periods. The subse­
quent gradual increase in capital from time t =  40 on is determined by the reduction in 
the precautionary saving effect.
Figure 3-4: Changes in capital stock for a constrained and an unconstrained entrepreneur
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Figure 3-5 illustrates the time paths of capital (k2+1) and financial wealth (w2+1) for E 2. 
It clearly shows that capital has a positive correlation with expected profitability, but also 
with changes in financial wealth (cash flow) not related to changes in expected profitability, 
because of the precautionary saving effect. In the first 15 periods E  accumulates financial 
wealth. As she becomes more confident about the future, she increases the investment in 
the risky asset (firm’s capital), reducing precautionary saving. The situation is reversed in 
the next 20 periods of ’’bad luck” . Here the sensitivity of investment to cash flow becomes 
progressively stronger as financial wealth shirks towards the constrained region. Figure
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3-5 clearly shows that it is wrong to assume that the effects of financing constraints on 
firm investment are confined to the periods when the financing constraints is binding. 
For example the sensitivity of investment to changes in financial wealth is higher between 
t = 15 and t = 25, when the constraint is not binding, than between t = 26 and t = 31, 
when the constraint is binding.
This result supports the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique that there is no theo­
retical foundation for the claim that investment-cash flow sensitivities are monotonously 
increasing in the intensity of financing constraints. However figure 3-5 also shows that the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity can be related to financing constraints also for a profitable 
and wealthy company. For example this is what happens between t = 40 and t = 50, when 
E 2 increases her stock of physical capital, generates profits, increases her financial wealth 
and reduces her debt. Also in this period the correlation between cash flow and investment 
is entirely due to the reduction in future expected financing constraints, and it would be 
absent with perfect financial markets, as is shown by the investment path of E 1.
Figure 3-5: Changes in capital stock and in financial wealth for a constrained entrepreneur
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3.4 .2  Sim ulation: aggregate
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In this subsection section we use the solution of the model to simulate an artificial economy 
with many heterogeneous entrepreneurs. This is a simple ’’partial equilibrium” economy, 
because both interest rate and prices are exogenous. The purpose of this exercise is to 
show the effects of financing constraints on aggregate investment.
The procedure is simple: we simulate an economy with 10000 entrepreneurs for 200 
periods. Each of the productivities of the entrepreneurs evolves accordingly to a value of 
9it, that is independent across entrepreneurs and path dependent across time. If an entre­
preneur retires and exits, a new one enters, so that the total number of them is constant. 
Each period the entrepreneurs are selected into small and large groups according to their 
total assets15, and aggregate statistics for small and large entrepreneurs are computed to 
analyse the effects of an unexpected macroeconomic shock that hits after 100  periods.
It is important to note that the generated dynamics are sensitive to technology as­
sumptions. For example one limitation of the basic model presented in this chapter is that 
the idiosyncratic shock is stationary and E ’s technology is concave. Therefore she wants 
to expand the size of her business only up to a certain steady state that depends on the 
unconditional expectation E (9 t+i) =  (0# + 6l ) /2  =  9. This corresponds to a situation 
where returns to scale are decreasing, or are constant/increasing but £ ”s ’’know-how” is 
essential for the business16.
A consequence of this limitation is that there exists a straightforward way to generate 
higher volatility of small entrepreneurs. It is sufficient to impose the same 9 to all en­
trepreneurs and to assume that new entrepreneurs start their activity with a very small 
endowment. Given that there is an ongoing entry and exit, small entrepreneurs will in­
clude younger ones that are constrained because they are in the start-up phase, while large 
entrepreneurs will include older ones that are less constrained because they are on average 
closer to the steady state.
In order to avoid this effect, we assume that newly born entrepreneurs have a relatively
15 Similar results are obtained using different selection criteria, like capital level or output.
16 The concave technology can be interpreted as a constant/increasing return to scale technology where E 
supplies an essential fixed amount o f ’’quality”. That is, 6t =  9 tE^, where 6t is the stochastic component, 
E  is E's quality and a  +  f3 >  1.
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large initial endowment:
wo =  kPM (0H) (3.32)
(3.32) ensures that new entrepreneurs have enough resources to finance the perfect market 
capital level and that the constraint is not binding in the first periods of life. Assuming 
a smaller value of wq does not change the qualitative results of the analysis, it only 
increases their magnitude. Therefore this assumption has the purpose of emphasising the 
importance of existing firms dynamics and of the precautionary saving effect with respect 
to the effect of a binding constraint in the start-up phase.
Moreover, in order to further generalise the analysis, we consider another dimension 
of the entrepreneurs heterogeneity, regarding the value of 0. We simulate 10000 firms that 
belong to two types:
Typel: t  =  5; 9 \ = 4.42; Q\ = 5.58
Type 2: 02 = 5.23; 9 \ =  4.62; 02H = 5.84 
Type one entrepreneurs have smaller 0, but are otherwise equal, also in terms of risk, as:
(gjr -  e l )  K  ~ %) 
t  f
The fraction of type 1 and 2 among the 10000 entrepreneurs is such that the two types on 
average produce the same aggregate level of output. In this way we make the simulations 
more realistic, assuming that firms do not have all the same average steady state size.
Figures 3-6-3-9 show the cumulative rate of growth of capital for small and large firms, 
before and after unanticipated macroeconomic shocks. Following the empirical literature 
(Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996), we select entrepreneurs according to a fixed per­
centile in the cumulative size distribution function. In each period the entrepreneurs whose 
businesses are below the 30% percentile are selected in the ’’small firms” group and those 
above the 70% percentile in the ’’large firms” group.
Figure 3-6 considers a temporary reduction in output17 of 10%. The immediate nega­
17 Since the model does not have any aggregate uncertainty, the observed variability in the aggregate 
growth rates before the shock depends only on the entry/exit dynamics.
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Figure 3-6: Aggregate capital response to a temporary unexpected negative income shock
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tive impact on investment after the shock is more than 5% for small firms and only around 
1% for large firm. The reason for the difference is that lower output reduces profits and 
financial wealth. Some entrepreneurs reduce investment because the wealth shock pushes 
them in the constrained region, while others reduce investments because of precautionary 
saving reasons. Both effects are stronger for small firms that are relatively less wealthy. 
After the first negative reaction entrepreneurs slowly return to the previous steady state. 
The reduction in cumulative growth rates takes around 25 periods to disappear. Such 
persistency depends on the precautionary saving effect. As long as entrepreneurs are on 
average less wealthy, with respect to the before-shock situation, they have higher expected 
probability to be financially constrained in future, and save more until they reach the 
before-shock average wealth level.
Figure 3-7 considers a symmetric positive shock. Also in this case small firms react 
much more than large ones, increasing capital by almost 5%. This change is relatively less, 
in absolute value, than after the negative shock. The reason of the asymmetry is that few 
entrepreneurs in the steady state experience a binding financing constraint, as argued in 
the previous subsection. Hence the positive shock’s reaction is caused almost exclusively
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Figure 3-7: Aggregate capital response to a temporary unexpected positive income shock
Cumulative growth rate of capital before and after an
unexpected temporary increase in output (+10%)
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by the precautionary saving effect, while the negative shock’s impact is caused by a mix 
of precautionary saving and of binding financing constraint.
Figure 3-8 considers a permanent reduction of r ,  the collateral coefficient, from 0.38 
to 0.19. This reduction means that, after the shock, capital is collateralisable only up to 
50% of its residual value. This shock is like a credit crunch, as it reduces the borrowing 
capacity of all entrepreneurs. In this case small firms’ reaction is very strong, with a drop 
in the stock of capital of 18%, while large firms are almost unaffected. Once again this 
result depends both on binding constraint and precautionary saving effect.
Figure3-9 shows the effect of a permanent reduction in interest rate from 3.5% to 1.5%. 
This shock decreases both the user cost of capital UK  and the downpayment D. The effect 
on Et (Slf+i), the cost of future expected financing constraints, is instead ambiguous. This 
is because on the one hand the decrease in R  means that, conditional on having a binding 
financing constraint, an entrepreneur gets more financing. On the other hand it also means 
that the expected rate of financial wealth accumulation for an unconstrained entrepreneur 
is lower. Therefore she has a higher probability of being financially constrained in the 
future.
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Figure 3-8: Aggregate capital response to a permanent unexpected increase in the collat­
eral requirements
Cumulative growth rate of capital before and after an 
unexpected permanent reduction in i  (from 39% to 19%)
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This discussion implies that Et (^t+i) is less sensitive than U K  to a decrease in interest 
rate. It is important to note that UK  is the cost of capital for an unconstrained (now or in 
future) entrepreneur, while (3.23) implies that UK  -I- Et (f2f+i) is the cost of capital for an 
unconstrained entrepreneur who engages in precautionary saving. It follows that the more 
she engages in precautionary saving, the less her investment is sensitive to interest rate 
changes. Therefore, since smaller entrepreneurs on average engage in more precautionary 
saving, they also respond less to interest rate changes.
Figure 3-9 confirms this, showing that the short term positive reaction to the inter­
est rate shock is stronger for large firms. Figures 3-8 and 3-9 confirm the credit view 
(Bernanke, 1983): if financing imperfections are present in the economy, and affect firms 
behaviour, the availability of credit (figure 3-8) may be more important than interest rate 
(figure 3-9) in affecting investment for financially constrained firms.
3.5 C onclusions
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Figure 3-9: Aggregate capital response to a permanent unexpected reduction in interest 
rate
Cumulative growth rate of capital before and after an 
unexpected permanent decrease in r (from 3.5% to 1.5%)
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In this chapter we illustrate a dynamic model of investment with financing constraints 
and with stochastic productivity that analyses the trade off between investing in physical 
capital and saving in financial assets.
The model shows that not only expected productivity but also financing problems 
affect investment and saving decisions of the entrepreneurs. In particular we derive the 
existence of a precautionary saving effect analogous to the one studied in the consumption 
literature: the amount of wealth allocated between risky projects and safe assets depends 
on future expected financing problems. We solve the model using a numerical method,
and we show that the precautionary saving effect has important implications for firm level 
and aggregate investment: i) the cash flow-investment sensitivity is related to financing 
constraints but it is not necessarily monotonous in the intensity of them; ii) financing 
constraints have a quantitatively important effect on aggregate investment even if only 
a small share of entrepreneurs faces a binding financing constraint at any point in time. 
This is because net worth fluctuations affect the amount of precautionary saving of all 
entrepreneurs.
We use the model’s solution to simulate a partial equilibrium economy with many
heterogeneous entrepreneurs. In the steady state unexpected temporary aggregate shocks 
have a large and persistent impact on aggregate investment because they change the 
precautionary saving levels. For example a negative shock reduces the net worth of all 
entrepreneurs and limits their ability to absorb future idiosyncratic shocks. This makes 
them reduce physical investment and increase their precautionary saving of financial assets. 
The model therefore explains that expected financial constraints may have an important 
depressing effect on investment in downturns. Another interesting result is that small 
firms are on average more financially constrained, despite the fact that all firms are ex 
ante identical with respect to their ability to access external finance and as a result they 
are much more sensitive to aggregate output shocks than large firms. Moreover we show 
that a credit availability shock is more effective than an interest rate shock in affecting 
investment for financially constrained (small) firms, while the interest rate shock is more 
effective for unconstrained (large) firms.
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Chapter 4
A  dynam ic m ultifactor m odel o f  
investm ent w ith  financing and  
irreversibility constraints
4.1  In tro d u ctio n
In this chapter we extend the basic model developed in chapter 3 by assuming that output 
is produced by an entrepreneur who operates a concave risky technology using two com­
plementary factors of production, fixed and variable capital. Both factors take one period 
to become productive. Fixed capital cannot be disinvested unless the whole business is 
sold, while investment in variable capital is reversible. We analyse the interactions be­
tween financing and irreversibility constraints to show that the two problems interact and 
amplify each other. In particular the irreversibility of fixed capital amplifies the effect of 
financing constraints and of precautionary saving on variable investment dynamics. Such 
amplification effect has never been analysed before in investment literature, and we show 
that it is both quantitatively and qualitatively important in explaining certain stylised 
facts about inventories fluctuation: i) aggregate inventory investment is very volatile and 
procyclical; ii) its decline accounts for a large part of the GDP decline in recessions; iii) 
it is contemporaneously correlated with sales; iv) it leads the business cycle, while fixed 
capital lags it; v) output and inventories are more volatile and procyclical for small firms 
than for large ones.
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We analyse the effects of financing and irreversibility constraints on the cyclical fluc­
tuations of investment in fixed capital and variable capital by simulating an artificial 
economy with heterogeneous entrepreneurs and with both idiosyncratic and aggregate un­
certainty. In order to understand how the interaction between irreversibility and financing 
constraints helps to explain the stylised facts mentioned before, let’s consider the example 
of an entrepreneur who faces a permanent decreases in productivity, like at the beginning 
of an economy downturn. We distinguish two cases:
1) irreversibility of fixed capital and no financing constraints. The decrease in produc­
tivity means that the stock of fixed capital is now higher than the desired level. Because 
of irreversibility, the entrepreneur cannot sell fixed capital and she will take some time to 
reduce it to the new optimal level. During the transition period, fixed capital is ineffi­
ciently high and since the two factors of productions are complementary, variable capital 
is too high as well.
2) Both irreversibility of fixed capital and financing constraints. As in the previous 
case, it will take some time to adjust the stock of fixed capital. During the adjustment 
period expected profits drop and the expected rate of wealth accumulation drops as well 
with respect to a situation where fixed capital is reversible. As a result the entrepreneur 
has a higher chance to face future financing constraints: i) if the contraction period is long 
enough, then the drop in wealth can be so severe that she does not have enough funds 
to invest in variable capital; ii) if the contraction period ends, she will have not enough 
resources to invest in both fixed and variable capital and will be financially constrained 
for some time. In order to compensate these higher costs of future expected financing 
constraints, the entrepreneur engages in precautionary saving ex ante, more than it would 
have done with reversible capital. However since fixed capital cannot be reduced, such 
precautionary saving behaviour affects variable capital only. Therefore the combination 
of higher current and future expected financing constraints implies that variable capital 
becomes much more volatile with respect to the case without irreversibility of fixed capital, 
and drops more in response to the permanent decrease in productivity.
In the remainder of this chapter we analyse the implications of these effects for ag­
gregate investment dynamics by simulating an artificial partial equilibrium economy with
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many heterogeneous entrepreneurs. With respect to the simulations illustrated in chapter 
3 aggregate uncertainty is given by a combination of recurrent transitory and persistent 
aggregate shocks that generate an exogenous stochastic business cycle. This means that 
the cross-sectional distribution of net worth and fixed capital among entrepreneurs is de­
termined by both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty, and it affects the way aggregate 
output and investment react to aggregate shocks. In chapter 3 we show that the cross 
sectional distribution of wealth determines heterogeneous responses of small and large 
entrepreneurs to unexpected macroeconomic shocks. Here we also show that: i) the het­
erogeneity of entrepreneurs with respect to fixed capital implies that fixed investment 
reacts less than variable investment to transitory shocks and also that it has a lagged re­
action to permanent shocks; ii) the amplification of current and future expected financing 
constraints implies that aggregate investment (fixed and variable) is sensitive to net worth 
fluctuations, that variable investment is contemporary correlated with sales and that it is 
much more volatile than fixed investment. All these effects become stronger the higher the 
volatility and the persistence of the idiosyncratic shocks, which imply a more dispersed 
distribution of both financial wealth and fixed capital across entrepreneurs.
Because of the time lag for the investment to produce output, changes in the level of 
variable capital in the model can be interpreted as investment in input inventories, such as 
raw materials and work in progress. Thus this extended model is consistent with several 
of the stylised facts mentioned in section 1.5. First, both fixed and inventory investment 
at firm level are found to be sensitive to the availability of internal finance. In particular 
US data show that ” inventory investment for small firms absorb from 15% to 40% of cash 
flow fluctuations” (Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1998)). Second, aggregate inventory 
investment is more volatile and procyclical than fixed investment. ” Changes in business 
inventories, which constitute but a small fraction of total GDP, account for one-fourth of 
the cyclical movements in GDP” in the US (Stock and Watson (1998)). Ramey (1989), 
Blinder and Maccini (1991) and Ramey and West (1999) show that this is especially true 
during recessions, when the drop in inventory investment accounts for a large part of the 
GDP decline. They also provide evidence in support of our approach to model inventories 
as a production factor, because they emphasise that input inventories, like variable capi­
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tal, are quantitatively more important and more volatile than finished goods inventories. 
Third, inventory investment is contemporaneously correlated with sales (Ramey and West 
(1999)). Fourth, inventory investment leads the business cycle, while fixed investment lags 
it (Stock and Watson (1998)). Fifth, small firms are more procyclical than large ones in 
inventories, output, and short term debt (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996)).
The outline of the chapter is the following: in section 4.2 we illustrate the extended 
model. In sections 4.3-4.5 we illustrate the qualitative features of the solution respectively 
with irreversibility only, with financing constraints only and with both problems. In section 
4.6 we describe the numerical solution for selected parameter values. In section 4.7 we 
show the results of the simulation of the aggregate economy. In section 4.8 we summarise 
the conclusions.
4 .2  T h e  ex ten d ed  m od el w ith  financing an d  irreversib ility  
con stra in ts
This model extends the one presented in chapter 3, by assuming the presence of one 
additional factor of production and of irreversibility of fixed capital.
•  P references
Preferences are the same as in the basic model in chapter 3. Therefore see assumptions 
pl-p4.
•  Technology
Assumption t3, regarding the productivity shock, is unchanged in this section. However 
it will be relaxed later in section 4.6, where we consider both idiosyncratic and aggregate 
uncertainty. Assumptions tl  and t2 are replaced by the following: t l  ’) E  can invest in 
the risky technology of the firm she owns and manages, kt and It are the stock of fixed and 
variable capital respectively, installed at or before time t — 1, which will generate output at 
time t.
Variable capital represents variable inputs such as materials and work in progress, 
while fixed capital represents fixed inputs such as plant and equipment. The assumption
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that investment takes one period to become productive also allows us to interpret It as 
end of period t — 1 inventories of variable capital.
t2 ’) Net output yt is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas production function:
yt  =  $t k f  (It + lEf  with ct + 0  < 1  (4.1)
lE is a small fixed amount of variable capital supplied1 each period by E. As in the 
previous chapter, all prices are assumed constant and normalised to 1 . 
tf.) Variable capital is nondurable, while fixed capital is durable:
1 =  Si > 6 k (4.2)
6 1 and 6k are the depreciation factors of variable and fixed capital respectively. 
t5) Variable capital is reversible, while fixed capital is irreversible, and can only be 
disinvested if E  sells her whole business. In this case she cannot start a new business and 
must retire.
Therefore conditional on continuation E  is subject to the following constraints2:
h +1 > (1 -  h )  h  (4.3)
k+i > 0 (4.4)
Irreversibility of fixed capital is justified by the fact that plant and equipment usually do 
not have a secondary market because they cannot be easily converted to other productions. 
Yet we allow fixed capital to be used as collateral by assuming that such conversion is 
easier if the whole of the assets is sold. The assumption that fixed capital is irreversible 
conditional on continuation is consistent with the empirical evidence on a very large sample 
of US manufacturing plants analysed by Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995) (see 
section 1.3).
• F inancial M arkets
:It can be interpreted as E ’s effortless labour supply.
2Constraint (4.4) would be never binding if the Inada conditions are satisfied. However this is not true
in this case, because the presence of lE implies that lim <  oo.
lt + i ~ > o  * + i
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See assumptions3 fl-f3. Tk is the share of fixed capital value that can be used as 
collateral, while from (4.2) it follows that r/ =  0. Therefore variable capital has no 
collateral value, and (3.6) and (3.7) apply to this extended model as well. The timing 
of the extended model is represented in figure 4-1. At the beginning of the period t E
Figure 4-1: The timing of the extended model
1 E either decides to retire, 
j or must sell the firm tobe 
j able to repay bt (!
(*) A ssu m p tio n s a l  a n d  a2  rule this outcom e ou t o f  the 
se t o f  op tim al choices
w.p. I-7 
E  retires
w.p. 7 
E  isShock 0/ ->and bt 
are
Shock 
0 ;+; is 
realisedreceives
(l+ ri)y t
E consumes vJt+Tjyt
E continues: consumes 
x t , and
decides k t+ j , lt+j and
inherits from time t —1 the stocks of fixed and variable capital kt and It. Then Qt is realised, 
(1 4- rj) yt is produced and bt repaid. Residual wealth wt, net of the minimum consumption 
level ryyt is still represented by (3.8). After producing, E  either retires or continues activity. 
In the extended model retirement can happen for three different reasons: i) E  becomes 
ill; ii) E  must retire after having sold the business to repay 6*; iii) E  chooses to retire 
because the liquidation value is greater than the continuation value. We define Dt as 
the dichotomous variable which represents the retirement choice of E  conditional on not 
becoming ill in period t :
{ 1 if E continues activity 0 if E retires
the choice of Dt is subject to the following constraint:
Dt =  0 i f  yt +  i t  (1 -  6k) kt < bt (4-5)
3The difference with the basic model is that, in order for assumptions f l - f3  to be consistent with the
technological assumptions, we implicitly assume that in any default and renegotiation of the debt with 
the bank E  has all the bargaining power. Otherwise the bank could use the threat of liquidation of fixed
capital to enforce the repayment of uncollateralised debt.
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Dt is constrained to be equal to 0 if the inequality (4.5) is satisfied. The left hand side 
of this inequality represents the maximum amount of funds available to repay bt without 
selling the residual value of fixed capital (1 — Sk)kt. Such funds are equal to the financial 
wealth plus the new borrowing available using (1 — 6k)kt as collateral. Hence if bt is higher 
than the left hand side of (4.5) the only way to repay the debt is by selling all the assets 
and retiring. The retired entrepreneur consumes the residual value wt+yyt- If E  continues, 
she borrows new one period debt and allocates net worth plus the new borrowing between 
consumption, investment in fixed capital and investment in variable capital:
x t +  h+i +  kt+1 =  Wt +  bt+i/R  (4-6)
The introduction of irreversibility of fixed capital greatly increases the complexity 
of the solution. To show why, lets derive the Bellman equation of the dynamic opti­
misation problem. We denote the expected lifetime utility at time t of E, after 6t is 
realised, and conditional on not becoming ill at time t, by Wt (wt, 6t , kt) . Wt, dt and 
kt are the three state variables of the problem. 0  is the new vector of parameters:
=  {0L, 0Ht e, 7 , R, h ,  r k,r], lE, a,  /?}.
Wt 0wt , 0t , kt) = M A X  1 (Dt = 1) {x*t +  rjyt +  ^Et[yWt+i(wt+u 0t+i, fct+i)
k t + i , l t + h bt + i , D t
+  (1 -  7) (wt+1 +  rjyt+1)]} +  1 (Dt = 0) (wt +  77yt)
(4.7)
E  maximises (4.7) conditional on (3.1), (3.6), (4.3), (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6). 1(.) is an 
indicator function that assumes the value of 1 if the argument is true, and 0 otherwise. 
bt-1-1, kt+1 , lt+i and Dt are the control variables. They also determine from (4.6).
4 .2 .1  E n d o g en o u s  re tir in g
The solution of (4.7) is more complicated than the one of the basic problem analysed 
in chapter 3, because the contemporaneous presence of financing and irreversibility con­
straints implies that Dt, the retirement decision, becomes endogenous. Conditional on not 
being forced to retire E  chooses voluntary retirement at time t if her utility conditional on
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Dt = 0 (liquidation value) is greater than her utility conditional on Dt = 1 (continuation 
value). Without irreversibility of fixed capital E  never wants to retire, because she can 
always choose a combination of kt+\ and lt+\ that yields an unconditional expected return 
greater than R. Moreover she is never forced to retire as well, because she is always able to 
liquidate the fraction of assets needed to repay the debt without having to sell the entire 
business.
Instead, if kt+i is irreversible, forced retirement happens at time t if revenues are so 
low that E  must sell the fixed capital to repay the debt, as shown by condition (4.5). If 
revenues allow E  to repay the debt and to continue, she may still prefer to retire if expected 
short term return is so low as to offset long term gains from continuing activity. Short 
term return can be very low because of the combined effects of financing and irreversibility 
constraints. In order to explain how this can happen, lets consider the case with lE =  0. 
Moreover suppose that at time t 6t = &h and E  borrows up to the limit to invest in fixed 
and variable capital, while at time t + 1 9t+\ =  6l-  This means that output is low, and we 
assume that it is just enough to repay all the debt, so that no funds are left for investing 
in lt+2 - Therefore at time t +  1 E has now two possibilities: 1) sell the business now, and 
obtain the residual value of her assets wt+i, which is by definition positive. 2) Continue.
It is easy to prove that in this case continuation is not optimal. In fact since E  has 
no funds to invest in variable capital, lt+2 = 0. By substituting this value and lE = 0 in 
(4.1) we get that yt+2 — 0. Hence at time t +  2 E  cannot repay her debt and is forced to 
sell the business and retire. Since the residual wealth wt+ 2  is smaller than wt+1, it would 
have been better to sell and retire at time t +  1 instead.
The above discussion clarifies that the interaction between financing and irreversibility 
constraints can influence the retirement decisions of firms. While this is an interesting 
intuition to explore in future research, it goes beyond the scope of this chapter. Here 
we want to note that the presence of forced and voluntary retirement implies that the 
discount factor of the problem is time variant, and that Dt is itself a control variable: 
Dt = D  (Bt, k t,w t) . This makes the dynamic maximisation problem extremely difficult to 
solve, even numerically. Therefore in order to simplify the analysis we make two additional 
assumptions to rule out endogenous retiring. It is important to note that such assumptions
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do not affect the qualitative results of the model. In fact they rule out the extreme 
outcomes that would increase the expected cost of irreversibility and financing constraints, 
and hence would strengthen rather than weaken the model’s results. The assumptions are 
the following:
al)  lE >  (0 )  ;
a2) w0,Ql -,Qh  and e are su°h that:
i) prob(wt < wmm (kt , 6t)) =  0 for t = 0,1,..., oo;
ii) lim (1 +  rj) Et (0t+i) k?+i (lEY  +  (1 ”  W  R  for t = 0,1,..., oo.
wt—*wmin(kt,6t) L -I
^min ls defined in equation (6.22) of appendix 1. It represents the minimum amount of lE
that allows E  to generate enough revenues to repay the debt without liquidating (1 — 6k)kt .
Therefore she is never forced to retire4. a2 ensures that an active E  never voluntarily
retires. wmm (kt ,0t) is the level of net worth such that lim lt+1 (wt ,k t,6 t) =  0.
wt—»u;min(fct,0t)
a2 ensures that wt is always greater than the minimum level wmm (kt ,0t)- This implies 
that in the worst case scenario, when wt —» u;min (kt j0t) and lt+i —*■ 0 because E  does not 
have funds to invest in variable capital, expected return on the business is at least equal 
to R. Assumptions al and a2 allow us to state the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Under assumptions al and a2 E  does not retire voluntarily, and is never 
forced to retire, i.e. Dt = 1 for t = 0,1,..., oo.
Proof: see appendix 1.
Proposition 4 implies that Dt is no longer a state variable of the problem and that 
constraints (4.4) and (4.5) are never binding5. Therefore we can substitute Dt = 1 for 
t = 0, l,...,oo , in (4.7). Applying also proposition 1 and corollary 2 (see appendix 1), we 
denote the expected lifetime utility at time t of an active E, after 0t is realised, conditional 
on not becoming ill and after consuming rjyt, by W[ (wt,0t^ki) :
4In the simulations presented in the next section, is never greater than 3% of optimal unconstrained
It.
s Given the concavity of the production function, a2 implies that lt+1 (w t ,k t ,9 t ) >  0 for t =  0 ,1 , ...,oo.
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WQ (wq, 90, fco) =  M A X  £ q  |  ^ 2  ( # )  |  #  [vVt+i +  (1  -  7)wt+i] j
1 kt+ 1 = k(w t ,9u kt) N 
Zt+1 =  / (wt,9t ,k t)
6t+i = b(wu 9u h ) ' t=0,1,
(4.8)
The problem is now defined by (4.8) subject to (3.6), (4.3) and (4.6). Also in this case it 
is easy to show that a solution to the problem exists and is unique. In order to describe 
the optimality conditions of the extended model, let Af, fit and <j)t be the Lagrangean mul­
tipliers associated respectively to constraints (3.6), (4.3) and (4.6). Taking the first order 
conditions of (4.8) with respect to bt+1 , lt+i and kt+i it is possible to how that the solution 
is given by the optimal sequence of {bt+i, fct+i, h+i, Xt, ££*, 4>t I h ,w t ,9t ] S } ‘2 :1 that satis­
fies (4.3), (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12) plus the standard Kuhn-Tucker complementary 
slackness conditions on At and fit :
Dkt+1 +  lt+i < Wt (4.9)
(f>t —  1 + R E t £
j=o
(4.10)
(1 +  ri) Et (MPLt+i) = UL + E t (Slw ) 4- R 2Xt (4.11)
(1 +  rf) Et (MPKt+i) = U K  +  Et (Flk,t+1) +  (1 — 8) jE t  (/xt+1) -f D R 2Xt — Rfit (4.12)
Et (M P L t+i ) =  (3Et (0t+i) kf-+1 (it-|-i 4- lE)^ 1 is the marginal productivity of variable 
capital and Et (M P K t+ i) =  aEt (9t+\) (Z*+i 4- lE)^ is the marginal productivity of
fixed capital. UL = R  is the user cost of variable capital. Equations (4.9), (4.10) and
(4.11) are the equivalent of (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13) in the basic model. Et (Clk,t+i) is 
identical to Et (fit+i) defined in (3.14), and Et ( f i ^ + i )  is the equivalent term for variable 
capital:
Et (H/ ,t+ i)  =  l E t [(<f>t+i -  1 ) ( U L -  MPLt+i)] (4-13)
The first order condition for fixed capital, (4.12), is the most obvious difference with
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respect to the solution of the basic model. (1 — 5) 7 Et (fH+i) is the cost of future expected 
irreversibility problems. fit is positive when the irreversibility constraint is binding, and 
is equal to zero otherwise. Since it is not possible to obtain a solution to this problem 
analytically, in section 4.6 we will solve it using a numerical method. Instead in the 
following three sections we wish to describe the main qualitative features of the model. 
We first analyse the solution without financing problems, then we analyse the solution 
without irreversibility problems, and finally we explain how the two problems interact 
together.
4 .3  T h e tw o  factors m od el w ith  irreversib ility  o f  fix ed  cap­
ita l.
In this subsection we rule out current and future expected financing constraints by impos­
ing wo = wMAX. Together with proposition 1 this implies that E  will never be financially 
constrained during her active life, and that At =  0, (f>t =  1 and Et (fl^t+i) =  E t 1) =  
0 for t = 0,1,..., oo. Furthermore in this subsection we also restrict the analysis to the set
 i _
of parameters 0  C 0  such that the irreversibility constraint is binding, at time t, after 
a negative productivity shock (i.e. when $t-i =  Oh  but 0t = 9l )- First order conditions
(4.11) and (4.12) simplify to:
(l + ri)Et (M PLt+l) = UL (4.14)
(1 +  rj) E t (M P K t+1) = UK + { \ - S )  7Bt (rt+1) -  (4.15)
since in this case financial wealth is irrelevant, the problem is now defined by equations 
(4.14) and (4.15) and constraint (4.3), which jointly determine fit (kt ,9t), kt+\ (kt,9t) and 
h+ 1 (h , 9t) . The term (1 — 6) 7 Et (l^t+i) represents the cautious investment effect analysed 
by the irreversibility literature. In fact (4.3), (4.14) and (4.15) describe the solution to a 
simplified version of the problem analysed by Bertola and Caballero (1994). The main 
difference is that we allow for a reversible factor of production to be used in conjunction 
with the irreversible one. The intuitive consequence is that lt+i, the reversible factor, is 
more volatile than kt+1, the irreversible one, both after a positive and a negative shock.
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\This is clear from the comparison of (4.14) and (4.15). After a negative productivity 
shock at time t the marginal productivity of both kt+i and lt+i decreases. E  reduces the 
investment in variable capital lt+1 , while kt+i cannot be reduced below (1 — 6k)kt because 
of constraint (4.3). Following Caballero (1997) we use the notation of the ’’the desired level 
of capital” , which in this case is k ™ .  Therefore a binding irreversibility constraint implies 
that (1 — 6k)kt = kt+i > kf_y[. This corner solution in the fixed capital is reflected by a 
positive /it on the right hand side of (4.15), which indicates that the marginal productivity 
is lower than the user cost of fixed capital. It is interesting to note that while a positive 
At, in case of a binding collateral constraint, indicates that investment is inefficiently low, 
a positive fit signals that investment in fixed capital is inefficiently high. In this sense 
financing and irreversibility problems have opposite effects.
Instead after a positive productivity shock E  wants to invest more in both factors. 
Therefore (4.3) is not binding and fit = 0, while Et (fi’t+i) > 0 because, applying the 
same reasoning made before, (4.3) can be binding at time t +  1 conditional on a future 
negative shock. The positive Et (^t+i) represents the cost associated to future expected 
irreversibility. Such cost increases the required marginal productivity of fixed capital 
Et (M P K t+ i) ,  thereby reducing kt+1- Therefore kt+i increases less than lt+i after a 
positive shock.
On the one hand this result is consistent with the empirical evidence that input in­
ventories are relatively more volatile than fixed capital. On the other hand it implies 
that they are not very volatile in absolute terms, because irreversibility indirectly affects 
them trough the complementarity of the two factors of production. Hence irreversibility 
alone does not explain the high volatility of inventories and the other stylised facts cited 
in section 1.5. Therefore we now analyse the effects of financing constraints.
4 .4  T h e  tw o  factors m od el w ith  financing co n stra in ts
In this section we rule out current and future expected irreversibility constraints by con­
sidering the parameter set ©2 C 0  such that the irreversibility constraint (4.3) is never
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\binding6. Hence = Et (fJ>t+i) =  0 at £ =  0 ,1 ,...,0 0 . In this case the problem defined by
(4.9), (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12) is equivalent to the basic problem analysed in the previous
chapter, but with two factors of production. In appendix 1 we show that proposition 3
applies to both fixed and variable capital. Therefore all the results derived in chapter 3 
regarding future expected financing constraints and the precautionary saving effect are 
extended to the two factor model. In particular, let’s consider (4.11) and (4.12) evaluated 
at nt = Et (r t+1) =  0 :
(1 + 1i)E t (M P L t+1) = U L  + E t (fiM+i) +  R 2A, (4.16)
(1 +  jj) Et (M P K t+1) =  U K  + E t (n M+i) +  D R 2\ t (4.17)
(4.16) and (4.17) are the counterparts of (3.23). If wt<wt then the collateral constraint 
(3.6) is binding, and At > 0. In this case Af, kt+i and lt+i are jointly determined by (4.9), 
(4.16) and (4.17). The three nonlinear equations cannot be solved analytically, but the 
intuition of the result is straightforward: the amount of wealth available for investing is 
shared between fixed and variable capital according to their respective productivities and 
costs. Lets consider the ratio between (4.16) and (4.17):
Et {M PLt+1) =  UL + Et (Oj,t+i) +  -B2At
Et (M P K t+1 ) U K  + Et (n ktt+i) + D R ?\, 1
(4.18) shows that current and future expected financing constraints affect the optimal 
mix between lt+i and kt+i- If financing constraints do not matter (i.e. wo =  wMAX), then 
At =  Et (flz,t+1) =  Et (Qk,t+i) =  0 and (4.18) becomes the standard condition
Et (M PLt+1) = UL
Et (M P K t+1) U K  V ' 1
Alternatively if the financing constraint is binding, for wt that decreases towards ujmin (#t, kt) 
the intensity of the financing constraint At monotonously increases, and from (4.18) it fol­
lows that the optimal mix converges to the following:
’This happens when 6k is large relative to the volatility of the productivity shock.
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Et (MPLt+i) R
At —> 0 0 Et (MPKt+i) RD
(4.20) means that when E  is constrained the relevant cost is not the user cost UL and 
UK, but rather the capitalised value of the downpayment necessary to buy one additional 
unit of capital, which is equal to R and RD for lt+ 1 and kt+i respectively.
This however implies that (4.20) converges to (4.19) when the residual value of capital is 
fully collateralisable (r^ =  1 — 8 k)- In fact in this case ^  and financing constraints
do not alter the optimal mix between k and I. This result is counterintuitive. Given that 
fixed capital can be used as collateral while variable capital cannot, one would expect that, 
ceteris paribus, a constrained E  uses more fixed capital than an unconstrained one. In 
order to explain why this does not happen, we note that in this model what distinguishes 
fixed capital from variable capital is not the collateral capacity. In fact strictly speaking 
both factors have the same collateral capacity, in the sense for both of them only the 
next period residual value can be used as collateral. Such value is always zero for variable 
capital.
Therefore the real difference between the factors is the fact that fixed capital does not 
fully depreciates after one period. This implies that, since the prices of fixed and variable 
capital are identical and equal to one, fixed capital has a lower user cost than variable 
capital. Therefore an unconstrained firm, which compares the user costs of the two factors 
in order to determine the optimal mix between fixed and variable capital, will choose an 
equilibrium marginal return on fixed capital lower than the one of variable capital.
At the same time, since fixed capital does not fully depreciates, it has some residual 
value that can be used as collateral. For this reason the constrained E  values fixed capital 
more than variable capital. When Tfc = 1 — 8 k then the advantage of fixed capital over 
variable capital for an unconstrained E (lower user cost) is identical of the advantage for 
a constrained E  (collateral value). As a consequence both the constrained and the uncon­
strained E  choose the same optimal mix of factors. In order for fixed capital to be used 
more intensely by the constrained E it must be that fixed capital is ’’more collateralisable” 
than variable capital. Since t i  = 1 — 6 1  , then this happens when Tfc >  1 — 8 k- In this case 
(which is not considered in the paper since it would be inconsistent with the implicit as-
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sumptions about the enforceability problem) we would have that the constrained E  would 
choose an higher proportion of fixed capital with respect to the unconstrained E.
Now let’s consider the case with wq < w  and w > wt > wt . In this case Af =  0 but 
Et (Qi>t+i) > 0 and Et (Qk,t+1) > 0. These two terms represent the precautionary saving 
effect on variable capital and fixed capital respectively. In this case k°+1 and l°+l represent 
the optimal levels of fixed and variable capital, and we can rearrange (4.16) and (4.17) to 
show that the optimal mix between k°, 1 and l°+l is determined by:
Et (MPLt+i ) _  UL  [1 - 7  +  7  Et (<ftt+i)] ~  [0 (+1M P L m ]
Et (MPKt+i) U K [ l - ^  + ^Et {4>t+t ) } - i a y v [ ^ M
Assuming that cov [(f>t+1MPLt+1] and cov [0f+1M PAf+1] have a marginal effect, and 
substituting them with 0 in (4.21), we note that (4.21) simplifies again to (4.19). The 
conclusion of this section is that, with financing constraints only, the two factor model 
simply replicates the results of the single factor one. In fact future expected financing 
constraints affect the allocation between saving and investment, but do not alter the 
optimal mix between fixed and variable capital.
4.5 In teraction  b etw een  financing and irreversib ility  con­
stra in ts
Figure 4-2: Policy functions conditional on low productivity shock
Q ualitative features of optim al policy functions
fc+/=(M )fc
l,+t=Wr(\-QjR)w,+l
kt+i*lt+i=Wt+(Tl/R)k,+i
fc+7=(l Jdk, 
InrftytM)
kt+r*k(w„6l)
Irreversibility only
Financing constraint 
only
Both constraints
E is forced to retire
Wt
We consider now the solution of the problem with both constraints. Figure 4-2 sum-
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marises the different types of optimal policy functions (wtj9t,kt) and lt+i (wt,9t,kt)
in the {&*, Wt} space, conditional on 0t = 9l . Instead of describing in detail such solutions, 
we focus only on the most interesting feature: the fact that irreversibility and financing 
constraints interact and amplify each other. We firstly note that, when both constraints
where I \ t + i  =  Uk — (1 +  rj) E t (M P K t+1) and v = (1 — 8k) 7- Equation (4.22) shows that 
the cost of irreversibility increases in the present and expected costs of financing con­
straints. More importantly, the reverse is also true: the irreversibility constraint increases 
the chances of facing financing constraints now or in the future. The intuition is that, when 
fixed capital is irreversible E  knows that, in the case of a negative persistent productivity 
(or demand) shock, like at the beginning of an economic downturn, it will take some time 
to reduce the stock of capital to the new optimal level. During the adjustment period ex­
pected profits drop, and the expected rate of wealth accumulation drops as well relatively 
to a situation where fixed capital is reversible. As a result E  has a higher chance of facing 
future financing constraints: i) if the contraction period is long enough, then the drop in 
wealth can be so severe that E  does not have enough funds to invest in variable capital;
ii) if the contraction period ends, she has not enough resources to invest in both fixed and 
variable capital, and will be financially constrained for some time. In order to compensate 
these higher costs of future financing problems E  engages in precautionary saving ex ante, 
more than she would have done with reversible fixed capital. These considerations can be 
summarised in the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  5 for any set of state variables {w t,kt,9t} such that Xt =  0, n t = 0,
(f)t (wt ,k t ,9t | kt+i is reversible).
P roof: see append ix  1.
Proposition 5 shows that the shadow value of money, which reflects the cost of future 
expected financing constraints, is higher when fixed capital is irreversible. This implies
are binding, is determined by equation (4.12). By substituting recursively we obtain
the following:
Rfa — Et ^   ^ (Efcjt+j+i “I- 4“ DkRXt+j)
Et > 0  and Et (iut+i) > 0, we have that <f)t (wt ,k t ,9t \ kt+i is irreversible) >
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that the precautionary saving effect, which is monotonously increasing in <pt , is stronger 
when fixed capital is irreversible. A quantification of this amplification effect is computed 
in the next section in figure 4-6.
4 .6  M o d e l’s num erical so lu tion
We solve the dynamic nonlinear system of equations defined by (4.3), (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) 
and (4.12) using the same numerical method adopted to solve the basic model in chapter 3. 
First, we formulate an initial guess of the forward variables Et (<!>itt+i) , Et (^t+iO^t+i) 
and Et (^£ + 1) • Second, we solve the static optimisation problem conditional on this 
guess, for each discrete value of the state variables w^tjk^t and Q^ t- This static optimisa­
tion problem is nonlinear as well. Conditional on the value of 9^t the solution falls in four 
possible categories, depending on the values of the couple {w^t, k ^ t} . These categories 
correspond to the four areas in figure 4-2. Third, we update the guess of Et (<f>i}t+1) > 
Et (4>i,t+i@i,t+i) and Et (h'ij+i) • We repeat these steps until the value function converges. 
Solving the problem for all possible values of the state variables yields the optimal pol­
icy functions kiit+i (witt,0itt,ki,t) and li>t+ 1 (witt,9 i,t,k ij) , the associated Lagrange multi­
pliers Xi7t (witu0i,ukitt) , Pitt ( wi,uOi,ukitt) and (wijt,0i,t, kijt) , and the value function 
(wij, 0i,t, kitt). From now on we relax assumption t3 and we model uncertainty in the 
following way:
9i,t =  e{f et (4.23)
6{t is the idiosyncratic productivity shock, and has the same structure for all entrepreneurs:
ei,t G {0L, 0H} with 0H > 0L pr(9{t+1 = 0{t) =  e > 0.5 pr(di,t+i ^  0(t) =  1 -  e
£t can be interpreted as an economy-wide demand shock. Each realisation of St is a 
transitory shock that affects revenues and net worth but does not affect future expected
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profitability. The probability distribution of Et depends on the ’’state of the world” St".
Expansion phase (St = Sg) Contraction phase (St = Sb )
pr(et = eH) v l - v
pr(et = £ l )  1 -  v v
v  > 0.5
pr(St+1 = S t) = £ >  0.5 pr(St+1 ^  =  1 -  £
A change in St can be interpreted as an unexpected change in monetary policy, or 
another unexpected event that modifies expectations about economic activity. Since both 
v and £ are greater than 0.5, it follows that a change in St represents a persistent macro- 
economic shock that changes future expected profitability, and shifts the economy from a 
contraction phase to an expansion phase or vice-versa. This modelling choice of aggregate 
uncertainty is useful because it allows us to better distinguish the financing constraints 
economy, in which any transitory shock that changes financial wealth affects investment 
choices, from the perfect market economy, in which only persistent shocks that change 
expected productivity affect investment choices7.
The parameter values used for the solution are selected according to the following 
criteria: first, the parameters regarding the idiosyncratic productivity shock 6{t are esti­
mated from our panel-data of Italian manufacturing firms. We estimate8 the idiosyncratic 
productivity shock 0it  for each firm i and for each year t. We then discretise 0it  in two in­
tervals and estimate a two state transition matrix. 0l and 0h  are the average value of the 
lower and the upper interval and e is the estimated probability of remaining in the same 
state9: Ql — 4.86, 0h  =  5.37 and e =  0.66. The parameters calibrated for the aggregate 
shock are the following10: £ =  0.85, v = 0.6, sl = 0.93 and £h  =  1.07. Another set of pa­
7 It is important to note that such assumption is not essential for the aggregate results derived in the 
next section. All the results would hold with a simplier two state aggregate shock with the same structure 
than the idiosyncratic shock 0 { t . Only the result illustrated in figure 4-7 would be quantitatively less 
important and in general more sentive to the choice of the other parameters.
8The estimation procedure employed is described in detail in the next chapter.
9The estimated transition probabilities to change state, pr(9t+1 =  9h \ 6t =  0l ) and pr(0t+1 =  6l \ 
0t =  Oh ) are almost identical, allowing the use of a symmetric stochastic process. We chose the value 
of e =  0.66 because the estimated 7  ranges between 0.65 and 0.68 in five out of the 7 industrial sectors 
considered and it is slightly smaller in the other two groups (see figure 5-5).
10Their implications for aggregate fluctuations are discussed in the next section.
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rameters is ’’indirectly” estimated: a  =  0.039, (3 =  0.783, 6^ = 0.06, Si = 1, Tfc =  0.94 and 
R  = 1.015. The chosen values of a  and (3n  imply an average optimal fixed and variable 
capital in the steady state equivalent to the average fixed and variable capital observed in 
our dataset, for a 6 months productive period. The other parameters are estimated from 
Italian macroeconomic data for the same period covered by our dataset, 1982-1992.
The last three parameters are calibrated as follows: lE = 0.027*1™  (0t = Or] St =  Sq), 
77 =  0 .4  and 7 =  0 .9 5 . lE is the minimum value that satisfies assumption al, and is equal 
to 2.7% of the maximum unconstrained variable capital. The value of 7 implies that each 
period the exit rate is 5%. The value of 77 implies that consumption is equal to a share 
of 77/  (1 +  77) =  28.5% of total revenues. In figures 4-3, 4-4 and 4-5 we show the optimal 
policy functions of k ^t+ 1 and h j + i  as a function of w ^ t , for given values of #z,t}12. In 
figures 4-3 and 4-4 kij = 0 and the irreversibility constraint is not binding for any value 
of Wij,  while 0t is equal to Ql and 6h and St to Sb  and Sg  respectively.
These figures confirm the qualitative analysis presented in chapter 3. Both ki}t+i and 
h,t+i increase linearly13 in the net worth in the interval w^t G where the
borrowing constraint is binding. For w^t > ULi,t the borrowing constraint is not binding 
any more, and k ° t + l  and gradually converge towards the perfect market levels k EJ f x 
and lft+i, as w^t increases and expected financing constraints decrease. Figure 4-3 shows 
that in the left end of the unconstrained region, for w^t =  wi t , the precautionary saving
|P M   £0
effect on variable capital is equal to i,t^ MI,1+l =  32.4%, while the same effect for fixed
M+lfcPM
capital is equal to ilt+X Mhf ~-  = 31.1%. Given that the parameters used for these solutions
i , t + 1
are comparable to those used in chapter 3 for the solution of the basic model, it is possible 
to compare these values with the one showed in figure 3-2. The maximum precautionary 
saving effect conditional on w^t = ULiji h  = 0 and 0t = 0l is a bit lower in the basic model, 
being equal to 30.7% . The difference is minimal because figure 3-2 is relative to a situation 
in which there are very low future expected irreversibility problems. In fact kt =  0, which
11 a  and j3 are not directly estimated because the production function we estimate in the next section 
also includes labour cost. The values above are in line with previous estimations we conducted computing 
output as added value net of labour cost.
12The values are equivalent to billion of Italian lira at 1982 prices. 1 billion liras was equivalent to 0.71 
million US$ at the 1982 exchange rate.
i z k t + 1 is slightly bented because the relative importance of decreases as l t + i  increases.
108
Figure 4-3: Policy functions of fixed and variable capital conditional on low productivity
shock and low stock of fixed capital
Ki,t+1(Wi>t) and Li4+i(Wit) policy functions conditional on 0^=9^, S4=Sb and Ki>t=0
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Figure 4-4: Policy functions of fixed and variable capital conditional on high productivity 
shock and low stock of fixed capital
Kit+i(Wit) and Lit+1(Wit) policy functions conditional on 0it=0H, S,=SG and K-t=0
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means that E  does not have an excess stock of fixed capital at time t, but also 9t = 9l and 
St = S b , which means that things ’’can only get better” and E  is expecting to increase 
the level of fixed capital in the immediate future. As a consequence, without current and 
(immediate) future expected irreversibility problems the amplification effect defined by 
proposition 5 is almost absent. Figure 4-4 shows that conditional on good news (9t =  9h 
and St — Sq) the binding constraint region expands, because E  wants to invest more 
today, while the precautionary saving region shrinks, because E  is also more optimistic 
about the future. The maximum precautionary saving effect conditional on Wi)t = w.i t 
is equal to 24% for both lt+i and kt+1, while it is only equal to 20% in the comparable 
policy function in the basic model (see figure 3-3). This larger difference is due to the fact 
that in figure 4-4, for 9t = 9h and St = Sq , there are some future expected irreversibility 
problems. This is because productivity is at its top, and conditional on future negative 
persistent shocks (#t+i =  9l and/or St+1 =  S b ) fixed capital will be inefficiently high 
and profits very low for some time. Hence the precautionary saving effect is amplified by 
future expected irreversibility problems.
Figure 4-5: Policy functions of fixed and variable capital conditional on low productivity 
shock and high stock of fixed capital
Kjt+1(Wit)and Lit+j(Wit) policy functions conditional on 0it=0L, S^Sg and Ku=7.628
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In figure 4-5 9t=9i and St = Sb , but k^t = 7.628 and k^t+i is flat in correspondence
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Figure 4-6: The amplification of future expected financing constraints due to the irre­
versibility of fixed capital
The shadow cost of expected financing constraints (^|tl) with and without 
irreversibility of fixed capital (Kj J and conditional on 0^=0^
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□ . 3
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o . 1
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W :
with the lower values of w^t because the irreversibility constraint is binding. Therefore 
in this region the changes in net worth Witt affect k tt+i only. When the irreversibility 
constraint is binding then the amplification effect is stronger, but the increase in future 
expected financing constraints does not translate in a larger difference between I™  and 
l°+1. This is because of two opposite effects: on the one hand E  would like to precaution­
a r y  reduce lt+i, on the other hand with kt+1 inefficiently high it is also convenient to 
maintain a higher level of lt+i, because the two factors are complementary. It is important 
to clarify that this still implies that variable capital is more volatile as a consequence of 
the amplification effect. This is because both lt+i and kt+\ are inefficiently high and this 
means that profits and financial wealth will drop more if the productivity shock is low in 
the future. Therefore if there is a sequence of negative shocks financial wealth deteriorates 
more rapidly towards the binding constraints region, and in figure 4-5 variable capital 
declines faster as well, moving leftward along the policy function schedule.
This consequence of the amplification effect, a sharp drop in variable capital during 
downturns, is quantified in the aggregate simulations presented in the next section. An 
alternative way to illustrate graphically the amplification effect derived in proposition 6 is
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shown in figure 4-6. In the previous section we explained that <pi t — 1 can be interpreted 
as the premium in the shadow value of financial resources induced by future expected 
financing problems. In figure 4-6 we compare the value of (f)i t — 1 for Wij G [u ^ , oo) (’’the 
precautionary saving region”) for two identical simulations, which differ only regarding 
the reversibility of fixed capital. The figure shows that, when k^t+i is irreversible, the 
value of <j)i t — 1 is up to 50% higher in comparison with when k ij+1 is reversible. It is 
important to note that this difference further increases in the region (not showed in figure 
4-6) with Wij G (w™in,u;i)t), where the borrowing constraint is binding.
4 .7  D y n a m ics o f  aggregate  o u tp u t and  in v estm en t
In this section we use the model’s solution to simulate the investment and production 
path of many heterogeneous entrepreneurs. The aim is to show how the combination of 
irreversibility and financing constraints generates a behaviour of aggregate variables con­
sistent with the stylised facts outlined in the introduction. In the simulated economy, 
the behaviour of aggregate investment and production depends on the heterogeneity of 
entrepreneurs in terms of the state variables. All entrepreneurs are identical ex ante, but 
each of them is subject to different realisation of the idiosyncratic productivity shock 0{t , 
which is uncorrelated across entrepreneurs and serially correlated for each entrepreneur. 
Therefore at time t different entrepreneurs have different values of w^t and ki>t, depending 
on |  Q- The steady state distributions of {w^t^k^t} at time t depends on the para­
meters set 0  and on the rule regarding the endowment level of newborn entrepreneurs in 
the economy. In each period the number of new entrepreneurs is equal to the number of 
retired ones, to keep the active population constant. For the simulations presented in this 
section we keep the same parameters used in the previous section, and we assume that 
the initial endowment of new entrepreneurs at time t is equal to =  2 * kf_^f (6 1 = Oh, 
St = S q )• Such endowment implies that a new entrepreneur is not initially constrained but 
must borrow, to reach the optimal investment level, more than an average existing entre­
preneur. This implies that new entrepreneurs engage in more precautionary saving until 
they build the desired level of net wealth. A lower value of w™w o u l d  imply that new 
entrepreneurs are closer to the binding financing constraint region. This would even in­
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crease the quantitative results of this section. By choosing a higher value of w^fw we want 
to show that expected financing constraints are sufficient to generate the results regarding 
the difference between small and large firms behaviour. As mentioned in the introduc­
tion, the shape of the distribution of {w^t, h j }  influences the way aggregate investment 
responds to the recurrent transitory (et) and permanent (St) shocks. This feature is es­
sential to explain why variable investment leads the business cycle, while fixed investment 
lags it and why small firms are more procyclical than large ones in output and variable 
investment.
The statistics illustrated in the remainder of this section are generated by the simu­
lation of an economy of 3000 firms, for 3000 periods. The chosen values of the aggregate 
shock £ =  0.85, v =  0.6, £l =  0.93 and en = 1-07 generate stochastic business cycles 
which vary for length and amplitude, depending on the realisations of St and et. We can 
have periods with no cycles, when St changes frequently, periods with ”V” shaped cycles 
when a change from Sg to Sb  is followed by a sequence of negative transitory shocks in e 
(and vice-versa), and periods with more gradual contractions and expansions in the simu­
lated economy, when St is constant for many periods but e has both positive and negative 
realisations. To give an idea of the amplitude of the cycles generated in the simulated 
industrial sector, we compute the cumulative growth of aggregate output and calculate 
the average difference between the 300 observations with higher cumulative growth and 
the 300 observations with lower cumulative growth. The average difference is equal to 
30%, which is comparable with the empirical evidence of the cumulative (de-seasoned) 
real growth rate of the Italian manufacturing sector in the 90s (see figure 2-18).
Figure 4-7 shows aggregate statistics regarding the volatility of fixed and variable 
capital, for the economies with and without financing constraints. The economy with 
financing constraints is the one where all the assumptions of the extended model hold, 
while the economy with perfect markets has the two following changes:
fPMl) There is no minimum consumption constraints. All output (1 +  rj) yt is financial 
and can be consumed, invested or saved.
PM2) The entrepreneurs can use future expected output as (collateral.
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The fact that all the output is financial in the perfect market economy implies that 
kt_p[ and are the level of fixed and variable capital that maximise net financial profits. 
Moreover PM2 implies that banks are always willing to finance all positive net present 
value projects, and hence entrepreneurs are never financially constrained in their invest­
ment decisions. These assumptions imply that optimal investment in the perfect market 
economy is independent from the financial wealth of the entrepreneurs and is determined 
by the solution of (4.3), (4.14) and (4.15). In figure 4-7 aggregate variables are plotted as 
a function of the level of idiosyncratic risk measured by aef . We simulate the economies 
for different values of <r0/, ranging from 0 (no idiosyncratic uncertainty) to 0.65. This 
interval includes the vale of a0f estimated from our panel data of Italian firms. In fact 
the estimated Ql =  4.86 and Oh  = 5.36 correspond to aQf = 0.36.
Figure 4-7: Volatility of aggregate fixed and variable capital - economies with and without 
financing constraints (measured as the standard deviation of percentage changes in the 
stock of capital)
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On the left side of figure 4-7 the volatility of aggregate fixed capital decreases in aef , 
because higher idiosyncratic risk implies that the steady state distribution of fixed capital 
becomes more dispersed and hence a bigger fraction of entrepreneurs experiences in each 
period a binding irreversibility constraint. The two economies show similar levels of fixed 
capital volatility, as two opposite effects almost exactly compensate: on the one hand 
investment in the economy with financing constraints reacts to transitory shocks, which
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affect aggregate wealth, while transitory shocks are irrelevant in the economy with perfect 
markets. On the other hand investment in the perfect markets economy reacts more to 
permanent shocks than investment in the financially constrained economy.
On the right side of figure 4-7 we show the volatility of aggregate variable capital. Due 
to its reversibility variable capital is more volatile than fixed capital in both economies. 
However variable capital also decreases in cr0/, because the irreversibility has an indirect 
effect through the complementarity of the two factors.
Despite such complementarity, while fixed capital has similar volatility in the two 
economies, variable capital is more volatile in the economy with financing constraints. 
This is because the irreversibility of fixed capital amplifies the effects of financing con­
straints on variable capital. In fact after a negative persistent shock entrepreneurs can 
only adjust variable capital, fixed capital being irreversible. But the amplification effect 
implies that after such shock current and future expected financing problems also increase, 
and the sensitivity of variable capital to changes in net worth becomes stronger as well. 
As a consequence variable capital reacts more to such negative permanent shocks in the 
constrained economy. Moreover the difference between the volatility of variable capital 
in the two economies increases in <r0/, because such amplification effect increases in the 
amount of firms with a binding irreversibility constraint. This result implies that the 
empirical findings of Ramey (1989), Blinder and Maccini (1991) and Ramey and West 
(1999) regarding the high volatility of input inventories can be explained by the presence 
of financing imperfections. In fact the same authors emphasise the fact that input inven­
tories are more volatile than finished goods inventories, and lt+i can be interpreted as the 
end of the period t stock of input inventories, like raw materials and work in progress. 
They also show that the high volatility of inventories is important because it implies that 
the decline in inventories accounts for a large part of the decline in GDP in both US and 
G7 countries recessions. The amplification effect helps to explain this stylised fact. To 
show it more clearly, we illustrate in figure 4-8-4-10 the relation between episodes of sharp 
decline in industrial output in our simulated economy and the correspondent decline in 
fixed and variable capital. We define as a ’’sharp decline” a sequence of 5 consecutive 
periods of decline in aggregate industrial output that cause an overall decline of at least
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20% in its cumulative growth rate. We find 46 of such sequences in our simulation. Figure 
Figure 4-8: Contraction in fixed and variable capital during downturns - all entrepreneurs
Contraction in capital during downturn
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capital0.15 M
A Contraction in 
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0.24 0.26 0.28 0.3 0.320.22
Contraction in output
4-8 shows that there is a considerable heterogeneity in the response of variable and fixed 
capital to the output decline in each episode. This is not only because the nature of the 
cycles depends a lot on the combination of permanent and aggregate shocks, but also 
because aggregate responses to the same aggregate shock change a lot depending on the 
distribution of wealth and fixed capital among entrepreneurs. In chapter 1 we mention 
that Caballero and Engel (1999) derive the aggregate investment function in presence of 
non convex adjustment costs, to show that in general aggregate investment depends on 
the cross sectional density of plants capital imbalances, so that a sequence of positive ag­
gregate shocks not only causes some plants to invest, but also changes the cross sectional 
distribution of imbalances, meaning that more and more plants are likely to adjust at each 
subsequent aggregate shock. Our theory implies similar nonlinear effects generated by the 
distribution of financial wealth and fixed capital. If a sequence of negative shocks reduces 
the wealth for all firms, each subsequent shock has a larger negative effect on variable 
capital, because entrepreneurs engage in more precautionary saving. This effect is more 
or less amplified by the irreversibility of fixed capital depending on the cross sectional
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distribution of fixed capital among entrepreneurs.
These considerations are illustrated in figure 4-8. The contraction in variable capital is 
much bigger than the one in fixed capital, and both are roughly increasing in the magnitude 
of the drop in output. How much current and future expected financing constraints are 
responsible for the drop in variable capital? The easiest way to quantify it is to compare 
the same statistic for small and large firms. Smaller firms in the sample are less wealthy, 
more financially constrained and more sensitive to aggregate shocks than large firms. This 
is due to two effects: i) ’’age effect”: small entrepreneurs are younger ones, which are 
accumulating wealth to reach their optimal steady state size; ii) ’’precautionary saving 
effect” : small entrepreneurs are the ones that experienced a period of low revenues in 
the recent past, and as a consequence increased their precautionary saving and reduced 
the investment in the risky technology to balance future expected financing constraints. 
On the contrary large firms are more wealthy and behave more like unconstrained firms. 
Therefore if financing constraints are important in affecting the drop in variable capital, we 
expect such drop to be more pronounced for smaller firms. This conjecture is confirmed
Figure 4-9: Contraction in fixed and variable capital during downturns - large entrepre­
neurs
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by figures 4-9 and 4-10. As in chapter 3, each period the small and large firms group are
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Figure 4-10: Contraction in fixed and variable capital during downturns - small entrepre­
neurs
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composed by the smallest and largest 30% of businesses in the sample. The size is measured 
as the amount of total assets (real plus financial). In the same contraction episodes 
analysed before small entrepreneurs are more volatile (figure 4-10), especially in variable 
capital. The sharp contraction in variable capital for smaller entrepreneurs is caused by 
the amplification effect. It corresponds to a situation in which small entrepreneurs face a 
policy function of the type illustrated in figure 4-5. In the previous section we argue that 
in such situation, when fixed capital is irreversible, a sequence of negative shocks reduces 
financial wealth rapidly towards the binding constraint region and variable capital drops 
rapidly as well. This result can explain the stylised fact that the decline in inventories 
accounts for a large part of the GDP decline in recessions (see stylised fact n.2 in section 
2.5). Moreover it is consistent with Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist’s (1996) computations, 
which show that most of the fluctuations in the US manufacturing sector can be accounted 
for by small firms.
The precautionary saving effect also implies that the procyclicality of variable invest­
ment is not confined only to these extreme contraction episodes. Figure 4-11 shows in 
general a positive correlation between inventory investment and sales in the economy with
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borrowing constraints, while the correlation is negative in the perfect markets economy. 
We measure inventory investment as the difference between the end of period t (lt+i) and 
end of period t — 1 (It) stock of variable capital. Sales are measured as beginning of period t 
total output ((l + rj)yt). The correlation is negative in the perfect market economy because 
the productivity shock is mean reverting and hence it affects current output more than 
inventory investment, which is a forward looking variable. The correlation is instead posi­
tive in the financially constrained economy because of an accelerator effect: any change in 
output, even when it is caused by a transitory shock, changes financial wealth and affects 
also investment. Moreover such positive correlation increases in , again because of 
the amplification effect. This result for the constrained economy can explain the stylised 
fact regarding the contemporaneous correlation between inventory investment and sales 
(Blinder and Maccini (1991) and Ramey and West (1999)).
Figure 4-11: Commovements between inventory investment and sales - economies with 
and without financing constraints
Correlation between inventory investm ent 
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Figure 4-12 shows the same statistic for the whole sample and for small and large 
firms. It shows that the procyclicality of inventory investment is mainly driven by the 
small firms subgroup. This result is consistent with the findings of Bernanke, Gertler
Figure 4-12: Commovements between inventory investment and sales - small and large 
firms
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and Gilchrist (1996), regarding the higher procyclicality of small as opposed to large 
firms inventory investment and output. We illustrate it more clearly in figure 4-13, which 
shows that the difference in the cumulative growth rates of output and of variable capital 
between small and large entrepreneurs are both highly procyclical. In the left graphic of 
figure 4-13 we plot the difference between small and large entrepreneurs cumulative growth 
rate of output. The other line plotted is an indicator of the stochastic business cycle, the 
cumulative growth rate of total output. The fact that the two lines move together indicates 
that small entrepreneurs are more procyclical than large ones. The right graphic of figure 
4-13 shows the same evidence regarding the difference in the cumulative growth rates of 
variable capital. These aggregate dynamics of our simulated economy are very similar to 
the observed dynamics of inventories and output of small and large US manufacturing
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firms during the 1978-1992 period, computed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) 
on quarterly US data.
Figure 4-13: Procyclicality of variable capital and output - small versus large firms
Cumulative growth rate of total output (first scale on the right) and difference between 
cumulative growth rates of output and variable capital for small and large firms 
(economy with financing and irreversibility constraints)
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Figure 4-14 addresses the empirical fact that variable capital leads the business cycle, 
while fixed capital lags it (Stock and Watson, 1998). As in figure 4-13, the ’’business 
cycle” is represented by the cumulative growth rate of total output. In figure 4-14 we 
also add vertical lines that mark changes in the state of the economy. A thick vertical 
line marks a switch from Sb to Sg , which implies the beginning of an expansion phase. 
A thin vertical line marks a switch from So  to Sb , which implies the beginning of a 
downturn. Figure 4-14 shows that variable capital is more procyclical than fixed capital, 
because the difference in the cumulative growth rates is itself procyclical. The fact that 
variable capital leads the cyclical fluctuations, while fixed capital has a lagged reaction to 
them, is shown by the fact that the difference between variable and fixed capital increases 
especially at the beginning of upturns (thick vertical line), and decreases at the beginning 
of downturns (thin vertical line). This is to say that variable capital reacts faster than 
fixed capital to turnings points. The reason is a combination of two effects: i) every period 
some entrepreneurs have a binding irreversibility constraint and do not adjust fixed capital
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Figure 4-14: Procyclicality of investment - variable versus fixed capital
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to changes in expected profitability; ii) all entrepreneurs adjust variable capital more than 
they would have done without financing constraints, because at turning points the change 
in expected profitability also changes the levels of precautionary saving.
4.8  C onclusions
This chapter extends the structural model developed in chapter 3 by assuming two factors 
of production, one of which is irreversible. It solves the model and analyses the inter­
actions between financing and irreversibility constraints. The two constraints may seem 
unrelated, because the financing constraint limits the ability to increase capital, while the 
irreversibility constraint limits the ability to reduce it. Indeed the existing investment lit­
erature, reviewed in chapter 1, always analyses them separately. Instead in this chapter we 
show that the two problems interact with each other, and that current and future expected 
financing problems are amplified by the presence of irreversibility of fixed capital. This has 
important consequences for investment dynamics, and we illustrate them by simulating an 
artificial economy with both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty and examining the 
implications of the model for the cyclical behaviour of fixed investment, working capital 
investment and output. We show that the interaction between financing and irreversibility
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constraints explains a number of stylised facts about investment dynamics: i) aggregate 
inventory investment is very volatile; ii) its decline accounts for a large part of the GDP 
decline in recessions; iii) it is contemporaneously correlated with sales; iv) it leads the 
business cycle, while fixed capital lags it; v) output and inventories are more volatile and 
procyclical for small firms than for large ones.
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Chapter 5
A  new  em pirical m ethod to  test 
for th e presence o f financing 
constraints on firm investm ent
5.1 In tro d u ctio n
The structural model developed in chapter 4 shows that the interactions between financing 
constraints and irreversibility of fixed capital help to explain a number of stylised facts 
about aggregate investment dynamics. One essential condition for these aggregate results 
is that the optimal investment and saving choices of the entrepreneurs are affected by 
current and future expected financing problems. In this chapter we test this financing 
constraints hypothesis at the microeconomic level, using a sample of Italian small and 
medium-sized manufacturing firms. The contribution of this chapter is not only in provid­
ing new evidence about the effects of financing imperfections on firm investment, but also 
in developing an original test able to discriminate between the financing imperfections and 
the perfect markets hypothesis.
We formulate the test by considering one implication of the model developed in chapter 
4: because variable capital investment is reversible, the ’’premium” of expected marginal 
productivity over user cost of variable capital reflects the tightness of current and future 
expected financing constraints. We call this premium the ’’excess” expected marginal 
productivity of variable capital, and we use it as the indicator of the intensity of financing
124
constraints. More specifically the financing constraints hypothesis implies that the value 
of the indicator is monotonously decreasing in the financial wealth of the entrepreneurs, 
conditional on fixed capital stock and productivity shock. We test this hypothesis by 
estimating empirical measures of the productivity shocks, the user cost and the excess 
expected marginal productivity of variable capital for our sample of Italian manufacturing 
firms1.
This test is more efficient than the test based on the cash flow-investment correlation 
in discriminating between the financing constraints and the perfect markets hypothesis, 
because of two reasons: i) it is based on a structural model that identifies an indicator that 
is monotonously increasing in the intensity of financing constraints. Thus it is robust to 
the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique (see chapters 1 and 3) to the cash flow-investment 
type of test; ii) it maintains its power of discriminating the financing constraints hypothesis 
from the perfect markets hypothesis in presence of two potential misspecification problems: 
the presence of convex adjustment costs and the misspecification of the stochastic process 
for the productivity shock. That is, if our model is misspecified in these ways, then this 
is likely to increase the chances of ’’rejecting the financing constraints hypothesis when it 
is true” .
This is a considerable advantage with respect to the cash flow-investment type of 
test, which is biased towards ’’accepting the financing constraints hypothesis when it is 
false” if future expected profitability is not properly estimated. Consider for example the 
reduced form investment estimation performed by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), 
where investment is a function of cash flow and of average Tobin’s Q. If average Q does 
not properly takes into account future expected profitability, this is likely to increase the 
correlation between investment and cash flow. This is because cash flow is very sensitive to 
current profitability, which in turn is correlated to future expected profitability. Therefore 
the cash flow investment correlation could simply be caused by the fact that the former 
absorbs the positive effect of the unobserved future expected profitability on the latter. 
This empirical problem can explain why many authors (including Fazzari, Hubbard and
1A similar procedure has been recently suggested also by Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2000): ” ... 
the theory predicts that short run financing constraints can only be identified by estimating the process for  
excess marginal return to production”.
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Petersen (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997)) estimate positive cash flow coefficients 
for very large firms. Such firms have direct access to equity and bond markets, and it 
is very difficult to argue that they can be financially constrained, in the sense of being 
unable to raise funds to finance profitable investment opportunities.
For the empirical analysis of this chapter we use our subsample of 897 small and 
medium-sized Italian manufacturing firms, for which we have 11 years of balance sheet data 
available from 1982 to 1992, plus the qualitative information from the First Mediocredito 
Centrale Survey on Small and Medium Italian Manufacturing Firms. Out of the initial 
sample of 897 firms we restrict our analysis to the subset of 561 firms that reported richer 
information about their fixed assets, namely the details about their stocks of land & 
building and plant Sz equipment.
Among the information in the survey we have the statements from the entrepreneurs 
about the financing problems they faced in the 1989-1991 period (see appendix 2). Entre­
preneurs were asked whether they had any of the following problems regarding investment 
financing: Ql) lack of collateral; Q2) lack of medium-long term financing; Q3) too high 
cost of banking debt (see figure 2-2). This qualitative information is not used to directly 
test the financing constraint hypothesis, but rather to perform an independent robustness 
check which strongly supports the validity of our indicator of the intensity of financing 
constraints: entrepreneurs with an high value of the indicator are three times more likely 
to state financing problems in funding investment than entrepreneurs with a low value.
This chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 defines the financing constraints test; 
section 5.3 defines the estimation strategy; section 5.4 illustrates the results of the produc­
tion function estimation; section 5.5 verifies the validity of our indicator of the intensity 
of financing constraints using the qualitative data from Mediocredito Centrale; section 5.6 
tests the financing constraints hypothesis; section 5.7 summarises the conclusions.
5.2  A  n ew  te s t  o f  financing con stra in ts on  firm  in v estm en t
In chapter 4 we derive the optimality conditions of the extended model as defined by (4.3), 
(4.9), (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12). We consider now equation (4.11). UL is the exogenous 
user cost of variable capital, while both Et 1) and At are endogenous and not directly
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observable. We rewrite equation (4.11) adding the subscript i for the i-th entrepreneur:
Et (* 4,4+1) = (l + v) Et (M P Litt+1) -  UU,t (5.1)
Where Et (**,4+1) is the following:
Et (%'t+i) = Et (fii.i.t+i) + R 2K,t (5.2)
Et (* ^ + 1) is the premium in the expected marginal productivity of variable capital in­
duced either by the cost of a binding constraint A^ or by the cost of future expected
financing constraints Et ( f \t+ i) . It is therefore possible to state the following proposition:
P ro p o sitio n  6 For any t > 0;
(i) lim 0 < Et ( * i , t + 1) < 00
W t —
( ™ )  - E t  ( $ i , 4 + i )  =  0wt—
(n V ---------------------- \Wt<wMAX< 0
P roof: see A ppendix  1
Proposition 6.iii applied to (5.1) implies that variable investment is sensitive to net 
worth fluctuations because current and future expected financing problems, which deter­
mine Et (* 2,4+1) ,  are monotonously decreasing in net worth, conditional on O t^ and k^t- 
Proposition 6 proves that Et (*i,t+1) , the excess expected marginal productivity of vari­
able capital, has the important property of being monotonously increasing in the intensity 
of financing constraints. This means that Et (*i,t+1) is a theoretically consistent indicator 
of financing constraints and is robust to the Kaplan and Zingales critique to the cash 
flow-investment literature mentioned in chapters 1 and 3. This property depends crucially 
on the fact that variable capital is reversible, and hence it can be reduced proportionally 
to the intensity of current and future expected financing constraints. Therefore we can 
formulate the financing constraints hypothesis in the following way:
HO) if  firms are subject, now or in the future, to financing constraints, then we expect 
a monotonously decreasing relationship between Et (* 2,4+1) and w^t, conditional on 6^t
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and kij.
HI) I f  financing constraints are irrelevant then we expect no monotonously decreasing 
relationship between Et ( ^ t+ i )  and w^t, conditional on O^ t and k^t.
An important property of this test, which is equivalent to testing proposition 6.iii, is 
that it is robust to two potential misspecification problems that could affect our estimation 
of the empirical counterparts of Et ( ^ t+ i )  and 0^: i) we have positive productivity shocks 
which increase 0^ , but they are transitory and hence do not affect the investment in 
variable capital lt+i of unconstrained firms; ii) we have positive persistent productivity 
shocks which increase 0^, but they do not immediately increase the investment in variable 
capital lt+i of financially unconstrained firms because of the presence of adjustment costs. 
In both cases we would observe high excess marginal productivity of variable capital, 
because Et (^i,t+1) increases in 0^ , but such high value would not be related to financing 
constraints. However such high value of the indicator would also be accompanied by 
positive cash flows or increases in net worth Wiyt at time t. Therefore if this problem 
is very severe we would observe that the value of Et is increasing rather than
decreasing in w^t- This means that such misspecification problems are likely to bias our 
test toward rejecting the financing constraints hypothesis when it is true, rather than the 
opposite.
The combination of qualitative and quantitative information in our dataset allows not 
only to test the financing constraints hypothesis, but also to directly verify that Et ( ^ * + 1) 
is a reliable indicator of the intensity of financing constraints. Therefore, after estimating 
the empirical counterpart of Et (f&i,t+1) ,  called t^i,t+h  we proceed in two steps: (i) we 
check the validity of t ^ t + i  as a financing constraints indicator using the direct qualitative 
information about financing problems, (ii) We test HO: we discretise the steady state of 
Oitt and kitt and we perform, conditional on these variables, a nonparametric regression 
of f^ t+ io n  Wift- If financing constraints are irrelevant we expect no systematic negative 
relation, at firm level, between w^t and Et (^*,4+1 | 0j,t, k^t) and HO should be rejected by 
the data.
We believe that this strategy is feasible because the discretisation of 0 ^  and kitt can 
be relatively simple. In fact Wiyt is the only variable that directly affects Et (vEq^+i) by
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determining the probability of present and future financing constraints. If w^t is low, then 
Et is expected to be greater than zero, regardless of 6i)t being low or high, unless
the persistency of O^ t is very high. Since the estimated persistency of the idiosyncratic 
productivity shock is quite low, we can condition with respect to Q t^ by discretising for a 
very small number of intervals. At the same time k^t affects Et 1) only when it is 
very high, and Et (M*,t+i) >  and/or [ii t > 0. In this case ki)t amplifies the sensitivity 
of Et ('&i,t+1) with respect to Wi}t. This effect disappears when ki>t is low, so that fii t =  0 
and E t t+i) is verY small. Hence we can eliminate the distortion effect caused by 
Et (^i t+1) > 0  and/or fii t > 0  by focusing on firm year observations with relatively 
smaller fixed capital/variable capital ratio2.
5.3  E stim a tio n  stra teg y
We define (1 + rj)yi,t+i = Y^t+1 33 revenues of firm i at time t + 1. This implies 
that ( i+ ^ ^ m + i  is the unobservable share of revenues that is consumed3. Hence we 
can also define (1 +  rj) Et (M P Litt+i) = Et ^M P L jt+\ j  as "total” expected marginal 
productivity of variable capital. Therefore, given (5.1), in order to test proposition 6 .iii 
we need empirical estimates of the expected marginal productivity of variable capital 
Et ^M P L ft+^j and of the user cost of variable capital UL^t- The production function 
considered in this section is the following:
Y?t = c A A ^ L l N l  (5.3)
with a > 0 ; / 3 > 0 ; 7 > 0  and cx+ (3 +  7  < 1. With respect to the theoretical section, 
we maintain the Cobb-Douglas production function4, but we include labour (N^t) . The
2 A more efficient method would have been to use the observed fixed capital/variable capital ratios to 
estimate, for each firm year observation, the probability to face a binding irreversibility constraint, and 
then to use the estimated probability to correct for the above distortion. This procedure is currently work 
in progress.
3 We tried an alternative approach to estimate directly the share ^1 — ^  of output that is consumed 
using panel data information about the number of entrepreneurs working in the firm together with the 
total labour cost. Results from this alternative approach do not differ substantially from the ones presented 
here.
4 Given that lE, which in the model represents the fixed supply of inputs from the entrepreneur, is 
assumed to be very small, we do not attempt to quantify it, and assume that it is included in L itt.
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inclusion of an additional factor of production does not modify the theoretical results 
showed in the previous section5. c is the constant common to the whole sample. Ai includes 
all assets that are fixed in the time period used for the estimation6. The unobservable 
productivity shock O^ t is the product of three components:
Oi,t =  £tXs,t0i,t (5-4)
£t is an exogenous market wide shock, x s,t 1S an exogenous sector specific shock, and 0{t 
is a firm specific idiosyncratic shock. The subscript s refers to the s-th industrial sector. 
Following the specification of the theoretical model, In 0{t is a first order stochastic process: 
ln6{t+1 =  pln0{t +  v*,t with ~  iid(0,crl) and p > 0 . Hence ln0i)f+i can be either
serially correlated (p > 0 ) or i.i.d. (p = 0 ).
We know that, under some regularity conditions, a , (3 and 7  can be estimated as the 
factors shares of output. This requires that for each factor of production expected marginal 
productivity equals the user cost. This is not true in our model, because the user cost of 
capital does not include the cost of financing and irreversibility constraints. In fact in the 
context of our model the regularity conditions mentioned above would be met if 77 =  0 and 
if there are no financing constraints (u>oi =  wf*AX Vi). In this case the optimal solution is 
Et (M P K i>t+1) =  UKi,t and Et (M P L iyt+l) = ULi>t. Since Et {MPK^t+i) = aE t 
and Et (MPL^t+i) = (3Et , and since the rational expectation hypothesis implies
that T-'l+l^ a consisfent estimator for Et ( 7^ 7 ) when N  is large, it follows
that: (3 = > and ^  Hence it is possible to directly estimate a  and /?, as
average factor’s shares of output. This is not possible if financing constraints affect E ’s 
optimal choices. For example in our model, with 77 > 0 and wt < wMAX, (3 would not be 
a consistent estimator of (3 :
5 Labour could in principle be considered an additional variable factor of production, and hence used 
to test the financing constraint hypothesis in conjunction with variable capital. We prefer instead to 
focus only on variable capital because during the sample period Italian firms were unable to freely reduce 
employment, and therefore labour is closer to an irreversible than to a reversible factor of production.
6One way to interpret this term is to define it as Ai =  1, where Ei is the quality of the i  — th
entrepreneur. This formulation is consistent with the assumption that the ’’know-how” of the entrepreneur 
is essential for her business (See footnote n.16 in chapter 3).
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This issue is important, because we estimate a, (3 and 7  separately for firms in different
industrial sectors, and hence not only we would have biased estimates, but also the bias
would differ among sectors if the intensity of financing and irreversibility constraints differs
among sectors as well. Hence we choose to directly estimate these parameters from the
production function, using an instrumental variable estimation technique.
5 .4  E stim a tio n  resu lts
We estimate equation (5.3) using the following data: p\Y?t is total revenues in monetary 
terms. PfK^t is the replacement value of plant, equipment and other intangible fixed 
assets. pltL ij  is the nominal value of working capital. p™Nij is labour cost in monetary 
terms. Detailed information about these variables is provided in appendix 3. Given that 
land and building are not included elsewhere in the production function, Ai also proxies 
for the size of these assets7. In order to transform the variables in real terms, we divide 
each variable at time t by the ratio and we redefine p\Y?t = y^t and pfZ^t = Zi}t , with 
z G {A;, Z, n} .Variables y ,k ,l  and n are therefore in real terms (valued at constant 1982 
prices). Figure 5-1 reports summary statistics of yitt, , h,t and n^t. By taking logs,
Figure 5-1: Summary statistics of the variables used to estimate the production function
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
yu 33.105 68.002 1.095 1162.078
I* 19.582 51.121 0.093 1200.405
Hi.t 11.303 19.475 0.343 235.296
. J&L - 8.179 18.454 0.067 259.543
Values are in billions of Italian liras, 1982 prices. 1 billion liras was equal to 0.71 million US$ at the 1982 
exchange rate
7 This formulation is correct only if the stock of land and building is constant during the time period 
used for the estimation (11 years). Although this is true for some firms in the sample, it is obviously 
not always the case. Nonetheless we prefer this formulation because balance sheet data do not provide a 
reliable valuation of the replacement value of land and building. In fact almost all the items in the balance 
sheets are valued at historic costs, and due to the occasional nature of the investment in land and building 
we cannot use the perpetual inventory method. We hope that any variation in such assets will be absorbed 
by a similar variation in K i>t.
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we have the following linearised version of equation (5.3):
In yitt = c +  In Ai +  In et +  In x a,t +  a  ln K t  +  P ln k t  +  7 ln ni,t +  In 9fi t  (5.6)
In order to allow for heterogeneity in the technology employed by firms in different 
sectors, equation (5.6) is separately estimated for seven groups of firms. Each group is 
composed of firms with as homogeneous as possible production activities. Figure 5-2 shows 
their composition. The time dimension of the data, 11 annual observations, is too short to 
allow the consistent estimation of ln Ai and of the moments of the distribution of ln x 3,t and 
ln £f. Given that the number of firms in the sample is large we can estimate ln £t and ln x s,t 
as fixed effects. We can also transform the data to eliminate the unobservable lnA*. The
Figure 5-2: Composition of the selected groups
Groups composition
Two Digits (ISTAT*) Sectors Num Two Digits (ISTAT*) Sectors Num
Group 1: Industrial machinery 
Group 2: Electronic Machinery, Precision instruments 
Group 3: Textiles, Shoes and Clothes, Wood furniture 
Group 4: Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics
78
49
117
63
Group 5: Metallic products
Group 6: Food, Sugar and Tobaccos, Paper and Printing 
Group 7: Non-metallic minerals, Other manufacturing
80
66
108
* Italian National Statistic Institute
firm idiosyncratic shock ln 6{t can neither be estimated as a fixed effect, nor eliminated 
through a transformation of the data. In the theoretical model we assume that ln 0{t is 
not observed by E before she decides k^t and l^t at time t. If this is true, and if p — 0, then 
cov(\n9{t ,]nZitt) = 0 for z  G {k ,l,n }  . Unfortunately this is not necessarily true in reality. 
Even assuming that p = 0, we can still expect ln 9{t to be at least partially correlated with 
ln Zij- This is because the duration of a cycle of production is most likely lower than one 
year, that is the frequency of our data. Therefore in order to correct this problem we need 
to use an instrumental variables estimation technique. Lagged ln z^t-j with 2 G {/c, /, n} 
and with j  > 1 are natural candidates as instruments, but their validity depends on the 
degree of serial correlation in ln 9?t . In practice some of the persistency in productivity 
shocks is likely to be captured by the economy wide and industry specific shocks lne* 
and ln x 5)t- Moreover the permanent differences in ln 9?t between firms are captured by 
the fixed effect Ai. Therefore the residual persistency of ln 9{t should be quite low, and 
this means that lagged right hand side variables can be valid instruments. We test the
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exogeneity of {z^i, , for z E (k ,l,n )  by estimating the linearised system (5.6) with
a GMM estimator. This allows, when the number of instruments is greater than the 
number of parameters to estimate, to test the validity of the instruments with the Sargan 
test of overidentifying restrictions. We choose as instruments two lags of the right hand 
side variables8.
In figure 5-3 we compare the tests for the overidentifying restrictions obtained us­
ing lags -1 and -2 with the one obtained using lags 0 and -1. If independent variables 
..., z^t } are contemporaneously correlated with 0{v  but the persistency of ln#^f is 
not very high, then we expect only the 0 and -1 instruments to be rejected. Figure 5-3
Figure 5-3: Test of the validity of the instruments
Sargan test of overidentifving restrictions
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7
Instruments: zu-s with s=0,l and z={k,l,n}
j  test 35.1 44.5 35.1 43.5 47 45.9 35.7
d.f 37 37 37 37 36* 36* 36*
Pr-(j)<%2(d.f) 0.56 0.18 0.56 0.22 0.1 0.12 0.48
Instruments: ztt-s with s=I,2 and z={k,l,n}
j  test 38.9 37.8 39.87 39.71 41.26 42.2 33.64
d.f. 37 37 37 37 36* 36* 36*
Pr.(j)<r*(d.f.) 0.38 0.43 0.34 0.35 0.25 0.22 0.58
N. firms 78 49 117 63 80 66 108
N. observations 624 392 936 504 640 528 864
*One coefficient relative to a two-digit sector dummy variable is estimated
shows that both sets of instruments are not rejected in four out of seven groups, while in 
the remaining three the lags 0&1 specification is close to rejection, with a P-value around 
0.10-0.18. Given that the j-test is usually biased towards accepting the model when it 
should be rejected, we interpret this result as evidence of some endogeneity problem, 
and we decide to adopt the lags 1&2 specification, and to use it on all the groups, for 
homogeneity.
The discussion above and figure 5-3 justify the choice of the Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) as the estimation method9. We first eliminate the firm specific effect Ai. 
The within-firm transformation would be the obvious choice to do it, but unfortunately it
8 We prefer not to increase the number of lags because additional lagged instruments did not improve 
the efficiency of the estimates. Therefore, given that the number of firms per group is relatively small, we 
prefer not to reduce excessively the number of degrees of freedom.
9 Such method is used for a similar problem by Mairesse and Hall (1996).
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is not consistent when we use lagged right hand side variables as instruments to correct for 
the correlation between ln 0{t and l n f o r  2 G {k ,l,n } . We therefore adopt the forward 
orthogonal transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). This is equivalent to 
a ’’forward within transformation” that remains consistent when lagged instruments are 
used10. We then stack the observations in 8 cross sectional equations, for the years 1985 
to 1992. This means that we exclude year 1982, in order to diminish possible distortions 
caused by the perpetual inventory method, and we have the data from 1983 and 1984 
available as instruments. We estimate the system (5.7), where the symbol * denotes the 
transformed variables, imposing the equality of parameters across equations:
ln Vi, 92 =  C92 +  dts +  In fc t*92 +  (5 ln Z?92 +  7  ln nj>92 +  ln 0i)92
ln Vi,9 1  = C9i +  dts +  a  ln fc?91 +  (3 ln Z?91 +  7  ln nj>91 +  ln 0i|9i ^
ln y l&5 =  c85 +  dts +  ot ln k?85 +  ft ln Z<>85 +  7  In n it35 +  In 0i)85
d and c are two digit I.S.T.A.T. sector and year specific dummy variables respectively, 
and capture the effect of ln x s t and lne*. Figure 5-4 reports estimation results using 
ln h i j - j , In U,t-j and ln n^t-j with j  G {1,2}, as instrumental variables11. The first column 
in figure 5-4 is relative to the whole sample, while the next seven columns show estimates 
of a , (3 and 7  for the seven groups separately. The Wald test shows that the restriction 
S+ /3 + 7  =  1 is rejected for all groups except group 7. Therefore we exclude the observations 
in group 7 from the empirical estimation of t^ t+ i-
The estimated output elasticity of variable capital (3 ranges between 0.29 and 0.56, 
and in three groups is higher than output elasticity of labour 7 . These high estimates of 
/3 are quite common in firm-level estimates of the production function (see for example 
Hall and Mairesse, 1996). Output elasticity of fixed capital a  ranges between 0.04 and 
0.11. This range of values is reasonable and consistent with the factor shares of output, 
given the amount of fixed capital as opposed to variable capital used in the production
10The transformed variable is the following: z*jt =  (jp Z lX l)   ^ — r - t+ i (z*.* +  zM+i +  •■■ +  zi , r )j
11 Whenever possible one group is composed by one specific two digit I.S.T.A.T. sector. This is the case 
for groups 1 and 5. Hence the coefficient dts is omitted, in that it would be perfectly collinear with the 
constant c. The other groups are composed by firms in more than one 2-digits sector, because each sector 
has a too low number of firms. Here we include the coefficient dts only if it shows a significant deviation 
from the constant.
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Figure 5-4: Production function estimation results
Estimated coefficients of the production function
All Firms Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7
0.111 0.105 0.062 0.114 0.081 0.038 0.040 0.198
(0.02) (0.02) (0.015) (0.03) (0.02) (0.022) (0.01) (0.02)
p* 0.389 0.377 0.289 0.424 0.454 0.393 0.562 0.406
(0.02) (0.01) (0.013) (0.03) (0.01) (0.017) (0.01) (0.024)
0.441 0.494 0.468 0.348 0.193 0.491 0.350 0.401
/ (0.03) (0.02) (0.023) (0.04) (0.01) (0.034) (0.01) (0.05)
Test o f overid. restr. 65.50 38.90 25.78 39.87 39.71 38.20 45.18 33.64
Degrees o f freedom 37 37 27*** 37 37 36** 36** 36**
D-value 0.00 0.38 0.53 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.14 0.58
Chi square**** 29.7 41.7 814.6 217.2 9.61 11.35 0.01
D-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.91
n. firms 561 78 49 117 63 80 66 108
n. o f  observations 4488 624 392 936 504 640 528 864
* Standard deviation in parenthesis; **One coefficient relative to a two-digit sector dummy variable is estimated 
here; ***Only 6 years used for the estimation of this group; **** Wald test of the following restriction: 
a+ [}+ Y= ]**
(see figure 5-1), and the difference in the user costs of fixed and variable capital generated 
by the difference in depreciation factors (see appendix 3). Overidentifying restrictions are 
rejected for the estimation of the whole sample, but not for single groups estimations. 
This confirms the validity of our strategy to separately estimate technology parameters 
for each group.
Before proceeding to estimate Et ( M P L ^ ) ,  it is important to emphasise some prob­
lems which could have affected the estimates obtained above: i) the choice of the functional 
form for the production function. We chose the Cobb-Douglas production function in (5.3) 
in order to maintain the same functional form used in the theoretical chapters 3 and 4. 
This allows us to use the estimated 0^, a  and (3 to calibrate the parameters for the simu­
lations presented in those chapters. However we do not test this functional form against 
other possible ones, which may fit better the data, ii) Blundell and Bond (1998) show 
that weak instruments can cause large finite sample biases when performing GMM estima­
tion on data transformed using first differencing. The same problem can affect the GMM 
estimates on the data transformed using the forward orthogonal transformation method, 
which is equivalent to first differencing when all moment conditions are used (Arellano and 
Bover, 1995). Indeed Blundell and Bond (2000) show that these biases are the likely rea­
son why the fixed capital coefficient in the production function, estimated using GMM on 
the first differenced equations, is not significant (and even negative in some specifications) 
both in Hall and Mairesse (1996) and in their paper. Blundell and Bond (2000) propose
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a more efficient System GMM estimation method that includes lagged first difference of 
the series as instruments for the level equations.
On the one hand our estimates of the production function coefficients (5.7) do not 
exhibit a downward bias the same size as the one of the estimates of Hall and Mairesse 
(1996). In fact we estimate a positive and significant fixed capital coefficient, with a 
magnitude consistent with the factor shares, as argued above. On the other hand we 
believe that further work is needed to improve our estimations, following the results of 
Blundell and Bond (2000), especially to check whether the bias caused by weak instruments 
is responsible for the rejection of the constant return to scale assumption in 6 groups out of 
7 . iii) Since we assume $itt to be an AR(1) process, we could also substitute O t^ =  p0i,t-1+  
Vitt in (5.6) and transform the model to include Iny^t-i, ln/ci>t_ i,ln  k tt - i  and ln n ^ t-i  as 
regressors. This estimation and the testing of the AR(1) process against some alternative 
functional forms is currently work in progress, iv) Following the theoretical model in 
chapter 4, we define the productivity shock in this empirical section as Et (equation (5.4)). 
Since in the simulations in chapter 4 all entrepreneurs are ex ante identical, their output 
is affected in the same way by such aggregate shock. If this is true also for the firms in 
our sample, then the time dummy should perfectly identify the effect of such aggregate 
shock on the level of output. In reality firms are different, also in the way a common 
aggregate shock affects their output. Therefore the time dummies only partially control 
for the effect for such shocks. This problem is however mitigated by the fact that we 
estimate the production function separately for firms in different industrial sectors.
In order to obtain an empirical estimate of Et (M P L j’t+1  ^ , we proceed in the following 
way: i) we use the estimates a, (3 and 7  to compute the total factor productivity for all 
the years from ’82 to ’92: T F T ij  =  Iny — S in kift +  /?lnk j  — 7 I n W h e r e  TF T^t = 
lnc +  ln Aj +  lne*+ ln x s,t F \n9{t ', ii) we perform a panel data regression with fixed effects, 
year and sector dummy variables, to estimate Inc, ln A{, ln x s,t and Inc*. The estimated 
residual from this regression is 9i t , and we use it to estimate the autocorrelation coefficient 
p12 separately for the seven groups of firms, as shown in figure 5-5. The p estimates
 / __
12We compute T F T itt =  T F T itt —ln x s t j we aPPly to h  the same forward orthogonal transformation 
described before to eliminate A i, and we regress the transformed TF T*t on T F T*t_ i, using t — 2 to t — 5
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Figure 5-5: Autocorrelation coefficient estimation results
Estimated first order autocorrelation coefficient of the firm specific productivity shock
Grout) 1 Gtoud 2 Grout) 3 Gtoud 4 Gtoud 5 Group 6 Gtoud 7
o AA 0.338 0.357 0.342 0.339 0.338 0.332 0.344r ('0.071 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Test of overid. restr. 1.599 1.67 1.60 1.59 1.59 1.61 1.60
Degrees of freedom 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
p-value 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66
n. of observations 390 305 585 315 400 330 480
P ~ 0.22 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.25 0.35 0.32
♦Alternative estimator of p based on the estimated transition probabilities of 0iit discretised in a two states 
transition matrix.
are positive and significant, but relatively low, ranging from 0.33 to 0.36. These values 
are broadly consistent with an alternative estimator p simply based on the transition 
probabilities of o{t discretised in a two states transition matrix. Using (5.3) we define the 
expected marginal productivity of variable capital as the following:
Et (M P L lt+1) = Et ^ 2 ± I J  =  0E t (cAie lt+let+1Xs,t+iK ^t+iL i7 + i^ ,t+i)  (5-8)
As we mentioned before, the term Ai absorbs between-firm differences in 0{t . Given that 
Y?t is decreasing return to scale in Litt and Ai also absorbs permanent dimen­
sional differences between firms. Hence, in order to compare marginal productivity of 
variable capital across firms, we eliminate this effect and consider instead the following 
variable:
Et (M P L lt+ l)W =  0E t (9 {t+1) Et (5-9)
Equation 5.9 also assumes13 that cov k^t+ iA + A .t+ i)  =  0. Hence our estimator
/  rr>  \  W  — ------   Wof Et (M P L j+1) , called tM P L t+1, is the following:
M PLZ+ i = $  ( A t+ iK t+lll7+ A t+ i)  (5.10)
where t0i,t+i =  exp +  ln?t +  ln x s,t) •
lags as instruments.
13This assumption is not likely to cause a relevant bias in the estimates of Et (M P L fit+i ) W , because 
the estimated correlation between the empirical counterparts p0iit and t+1 is quite low. It
ranges from a minimum of 0.05%, for firms in group 6, to a maximum of 4.83%, for firms in group 3.
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In  order to derive (5.10) from (5.9) we implicitly assume that investment is planned 
one period in advance. Therefore k{tt+1 , k,t+ 1 and n^t+i are predetermined at time t. 
Regarding the shock, 'p\n0{t is the estimate of Et , while Et(et+1) and Et (xs,t+1)
are simply approximated by the estimated fixed effects et and x s,t-
The user cost of capital UL^t, in monetary units relative to 1982 prices, is the follow­
ing14:
=  +  (5.11)
Pi Pi
we apply to it the same normalization15 on prices applied to so that we define u k j =
i
? \U Lit. Furthermore Si =  0 by construction, because we include in h,t+\ only variable 
P t  ’
capital consumed during time t +  1 (see appendix 3 for details). Hence the user cost 
simplifies to:
vlitt = l  + rt (5.12)
where rt is the real interest rate at time i, measured as the nominal riskless short term 
interest rate (average nominal interest rate, during period t of the three months treasury 
bills) minus inflation rate (change in the consumer price index between the fourth quarter 
of period t — 1 and the fourth quarter of period t). In order to use (5.12) as the equation 
that defines the user cost of variable capital, we adopt a series of simplifying assumptions16 
which include the fact that we maintain assumptions p i  and p 2  regarding the linearity of 
preferences. This implies that the user cost of capital is independent on the risk faced by 
the firms’ projects, in reality agents are risk averse, and in equilibrium the user cost of
14This formulation is considerably simplified by the fact that we do not formally treat taxes. If we allow 
for taxation differentials, then ULi,t would be multiplied by one minus a term that represents the expected 
tax benefit of one additional unit of investment at time t. Such tax benefit is mainly given by the ’’debt 
tax shield”, because tax credits are usually associated with fixed capital investment. An explicit treatment 
of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, also because we do not have accurate information on the 
incidence of tax exhaustion in order to measure the effective tax parameters facing individual firms. Even 
though we agree that tax differentials play a relevant role in determining Italian firms’ capital structure, 
we follow Bond and Meghir (1994) in assuming that fluctuations in the user cost of capital due to tax 
distortions are mainly absorbed by firm and year specific effects, captured by Ai and et. All of the results 
presented in the following part of the paper are based on deviations from firm averages that are independent 
on Ai, while the exclusion of et does not affect the results in any relevant way.
15 Another simplification of this formulation is that we do not consider relative prices differences. In order 
to consider relative prices changes between variable capital and output we should multiply both terms on 
the right hand side of (5.11) by p \ /p \ .  This distortion is likely to have no effects on the results, for two 
reasons: i) the two indexes we use to normalise output and variable capital (see appendix 3) are almost 
identical in all the years of the sample; ii) since the distortion is constant across firms, it is captured by 
yearly dummies et-
16 See footnotes 14 and 15.
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capital should include a component above the riskless interest rate representing the price 
of risk. While this implementation is currently work in progress, it is important to note 
that the main aim of this section is to test wether the marginal productivity of variable 
capital is abnormally high for financially constrained firms. Recall that, from (5.2), the 
expected marginal productivity of variable capital is higher for financially constrained 
firms because of the two components Et 1) and A^. Et 1) is the cost of future
expected financing constraints. Simulations presented in the previous chapter (see figure 
4-6) show that this component can be up to 50%. X^t is the cost of currently binding 
financing constraints, and its magnitude goes from the maximum value of Et (fiz,t,t+1) 
upwards. Figure (5-7) below and the estimations performed in the next subsection confirm 
this orders of magnitude, showing that for firms with low financial wealth the premium 
in the expected marginal productivity of variable capital is around 60-80%. Therefore 
we believe that the bias in ul^t, even though it could seriously influence our results, it is 
probably not enough to explain the magnitude of them.
Given (5.12), the estimator for Et (vE^t+i)^ is the following17:
* ^ ” *+1 = (tMPiZ+i -  ulw )  (5-13)
Figures 5-6 and 5-7 show basic statistics18 and the kernel estimation of the distribution 
function of t'&ft+i • Figure 5-7 shows that t4 /^+1has an asymmetric distribution with a 
thicker tail corresponding to higher than average values. The financing constraint hypoth­
esis implies that these are firm-year observations where, because of financing constraints, 
the firm could not increase variable capital to exploit profitable investment opportunities.
We verify this hypothesis in the next two sections.
17The estimator of Et (v&i.t+i) does not include fixed effects Ai as well. Since by construction
N  ^  N  ^  /  N  ^  \
X) In Ai =  0, and since the exponential is a convex function, it follows that ^  Ai >  exp I ^  InAi I =  1,
i= 1 i= l \t= l /
and is expected to slightly underestimate Et (^ i .t+ i) . This bias is expected to be small, and in any
case it is constant at firm level.
18This is filtered from outliers. We first exclude observations that deviate from the mean by more than
8 times the standard deviation, then recompute the mean and exclude all observations that deviate more
than 4 times from the standard deviation. Out of the initial 4821 observations, we eliminate 51 observations  -
for
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Figure 5-6: Estimated excess expected marginal productivity of variable capital ( t'&ft+i)
Summary statistics for tY wi.t+i t
Mean St. dev. Min. Max.
0.026 0.727 -1.05 3.013
Figure 5-7: Density estimation of the excess expected marginal productivity of variable 
capital
K e r n e l  d e n s i t y  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  „ , w ( b a n d w l d t h = 0 . 1 )
0.8 T
0 .7  - -
0 .6  - •
0 .5  - -
0 .4  - -
0 .3  - -
0.2  - -
0.1
1 .15 - 0 .4 6 0.22 0.91 1 .59 2 .2 7 2 .9 6
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5.5  E m pirica l ev id en ce  o f  financing co n stra in ts on  in v est­
m en t
Before testing the financing constraints hypothesis, we can verify the validity of the the­
oretical model and of our estimator t^™t+i using the direct information about financing 
problems available in the Mediocredito Centrale survey. We consider the entrepreneurs 
that stated problems in accessing external finance in the 1989-91 period (questions Q l, Q2 
and Q3). Such problems are directly related to the t^Tt+i variable. The bigger t^ f t+ v  
the higher the shadow value of additional funding for the i-th entrepreneur and the higher 
the probability that she answers positively to one of the questions regarding financing 
constraints. Among the 561 firms considered, 21.6% of their entrepreneurs indicate one of 
the three problems in accessing bank credit during the 1989-1991 period. We construct 4 
dichotomous variables, rationj with j  = {1,2,3,4} , that have value 0 if the i — th  entre­
preneur does not state any financing problem, 1 if she answers positively to questions Ql, 
Q2 and Q3 respectively (j = 1,2 and 3) or states any of the three problems (j = 4).
We verify the reliability of t'&i’t+i 35 a vabd indicator of the intensity of financing 
constraints by regressing ration? on 4 ^ , which is the average value of t'&ft+i in the 
period covered by the Mediocredito Centrale survey:
ration;? =  o 0 +  (*1 $™ +  <22 dim* (5.14)
 w  1992 /  ^  \   w
4^ =  Yh ( t'&ft+i) • The time interval used to compute 4/j includes 1989, 1990 and
£=1989 '  ’ '
1991, the period which the questions refer to, and 1992, the year in which the questionnaire 
has been compiled, dim* is the size of the ith firm in number of employees, included to 
control for size effects. Figure 5-8 shows estimation results. The first column is relative 
to the whole sample and to rationf as dependent variable. The coefficient relative to 
is positive and significant. The second and third columns repeat the same regression for 
larger (more than 300 employees, 19% of the sample) and smaller (less than 300 employees, 
81% of the sample) firms. The cutting point between small and large firms is suggested 
by figure 5-9, which shows the tri-dimensional smoothing of ration4 with respect to both 
iff™ and dim*. Figure 5-9 shows that the positive correlation between the probability of
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Figure 5-8: Relation between stated financing problems and the financing constraints 
indicator
Probit regression :raho//;=afl+fl/ 'F’i+aidirm
Whole
sample
Larger
firms1
Smaller firms
Dependent variable Ration4 RationS Ration4 Ration1 Ratior? Ration3
(all problems) (all problems) (all problems) (Low collateral) (Lack o f  bank 
credit)
(High cost o f  debt)
d o -0 64*** -0.69 -0.78*** -2.05*** -1.48*** -1 04***
(0.09) (0.42) (0.16) (0.31) (0.20) (0.17)
ai 0.24** -0.16 0.30*** 0.36* 0.28** 0.29**
(0.11) (0.36) (0.12) (0.20) (0.14) (0.13)
CX2 -0.0006* -0.0007 0.0005 0.001 0.002* 0.0005(0.0003) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Obs with ration=0 341 70 271 341 310 296
Obs with ration=l 92 11 81 11 42 56
(% of total) (21.2%) (13.6%) (23%) (3.1%) (11.9) (15.9%)
Total obs 433 81 352 352 352 352
Standard error in parenthesis; 1: M ore than 300 employees; 2: Less than 300 employees; * Significant at 90%  confidence level; 
** significant at 95% confidence level; *** significant at 99% confidence level; ration \ = 1 if the entrepreneur stated financing
constraints, and 0 otherwise; = average value o f the premium in the expected productivity o f variable capital; dim i = 
dimension in number o f employees;
stating financing problems and is strong for all the firms except the larger ones, so 
that on average ’’small-medium” firms with a high value of are three times more likely 
to declare financing constraints than entrepreneurs with a low value of it. Such relation 
tends to disappear for firms bigger than 250-300 employees.
In order to interpret this result, we note that in our estimation the assumption that 
6{t is stationary plus the condition that a  +  /? +  7  < 1 imply that we assume different 
steady states sizes for different firms, according to their fixed effects Ai. Each firm evolves 
around such steady state according to the realisations19 of the idiosyncratic shock ${t . 
Therefore the result illustrated in figures 5-8 and 5-9 is consistent with the assumption 
that the higher the average size of firms, the less likely they are to face the informational 
or contractual problem which causes the financing constraint (3.6). This assumption is 
realistic as large Italian firms usually have strong links with financial intermediaries, and 
the assumption that they have access only to fully collateralised credit is not realistic for 
them.
The strong correlation between rationj and for small and medium firms below 
300 employees is confirmed by the probit regression results in figure 5-8. The last four 
columns show that the coefficient is positive and strongly significant, especially for the
19This stationarity assumption is reasonable in this context, given that the time series is 11 years only.
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Figure 5-9: Probability of stating financing problems as a function of size and financing 
constraints indicator
Non parametric estimation of the probability of stating financing constraints;, 
conditional on 1^ rWt+1 and on size
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specification (j  = 4) that pools together the three different questions. This result shows 
that , K +1 is a valid indicator of the intensity of financing constraints, supporting the 
validity of our theoretical model and our empirical approach, and rejecting the view of 
efficient financial markets. This result is robust because of the following considerations: i) 
the qualitative and quantitative information come from different sources (see appendix 2). 
This reduces the probability that those entrepreneurs that declare financing constraints 
also manipulate their balance sheets data to show that their investment is inefficiently low; 
ii) we condition for firms size, thus ruling out the possibility that is on average higher 
for small firms, which are also more likely to state financing constraints; iii) the result is 
not driven by sectorial differences: table 2-14 shows that financing constraints are equally 
distributed in the different industrial sectors.
Given that t'&fj+i a n°isy measure of the intensity of financing constraints, because 
of the estimation problems mentioned in the previous subsection, this consistency result 
with our qualitative information is very important. This result is also not contradicted 
by the observation that firms that declare financing problems have lower net income (see 
figure 2-15). In fact t'&i’j+i *s the estimated marginal productivity of variable capital, not 
the total marginal productivity of the projects in the firm. That is, proposition 6 implies 
that financially constrained firms have high marginal productivity of variable capital, being 
unable to invest efficiently. At the same time they may have overinvested in the past in 
fixed capital, and may have an irreversibility problem. The discussion in chapter 4, and in 
particular in section 4.5, emphasises the fact that financing constraints are amplified by the 
presence of a binding irreversibility constraint, which implies that investment in variable 
capital is inefficiently low while the one in fixed capital is inefficiently high. If the firm 
borrowed in the past to finance the current level of fixed capital, it can have a situation with 
high marginal productivity of variable capital, due to the binding borrowing constraint, 
and low total profits, due to the low total productivity because of the unbalanced use of 
factors, and the high cost to pay the interest on the stock of existing debt.
This interpretation is supported by our analysis in chapter 2. When we select out 
firms more likely to have a binding irreversibility constraint (firms with negative sales 
growth) and firms that are more likely to have high interest payments (firms that declare
144
the problem of the high cost of debt), then the average net income of the group of firms 
with financing problems increases considerably (see figure 2-16).
5 .6  A  form al te s t  o f  th e  financing con stra in ts h y p o th esis
After verifying that t'&ft+i 1S indeed positively related to directly revealed financing con­
straints, we test the financing constraints hypothesis by performing a nonparametric esti­
mation of t'&ft+i with respect to w f t , conditional on Et and k{>t :
t*r,t+i = g ( < t \ K t + i ’kz )  (5.i5)
g(.) is a nonlinear function estimated using a nonparametric estimation method20. The 
variables considered are the following:
Financial wealth: we consider two alternative variables:
i) w}t — net financial wealth at the end of year t — 1 (liquidity plus short term financial 
assets21 minus the loans that have to be repaid before the end of time t), plus the new 
cash flow generated during time t.
ii) wf t — net financial wealth at the end of year t — 1.
w j t would be the best estimator of net financial wealth available for investment at time 
t, if time t investment would be productive only from time t +  1 on. In reality this is not 
always the case, as time t cash flow is partly generated by time t — 1 and partly by time t 
investment. This implies that our nonlinear estimation of (5.15) could be biased. Therefore 
w f t is a less precise but more consistent estimator, because it excludes by construction 
the time t cash flow generated by time t investment. We eliminate the size effect from 
both w]t and w \t by scaling these variables by the average size of firm i during the sample 
period. Finally, since the estimators of Et (^{t+ij and Et (M PLt+ i) do not include the 
firm specific productivity effect Ai, we apply the same procedure to w jt and w ft , and
20The estimation of (5.15) is performed using a local polinomial regression method that fits a locally 
weighted least squares regression using raw data near each target observed point. We used the software 
package Glassbox available at www.quanttools.com.
21 The implicit assumption we make, in order to focus only on financial variables, is that the entrepreneurs 
use the collateral value of the firms’ assets at the end of time £ — 1 to borrow secured debt up to the limit, 
and then maintain the additional resources in the form of financial assets.
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T T
consider the values w jy = w jt -  Y  w jt and w2f  = wf t -  Y  wit  that are the deviations
t= 1 ’ ’ ’ t= 1 ’
form firm specific means.
Expected productivity: we consider the empirical counterpart of Et > that is
t@i,t+1 =  Ps@i,t'
Fixed capital: from k^t we compute k f t , following the same within transformation 
applied to w f t .
In order to estimate (5.15) we condition by Et (o{t+1 j^ by discretising the state space 
of its estimator 1 in 3 equally spaced intervals and by estimating (5.15) for each 
interval. Moreover we condition by k^t by excluding from our analysis the observations in 
the fourth quartile of k™22.
If the financing constraints hypothesis is not rejected by the data, we expect to find 
a negative slope of the conditional mean of t^ fj+ i with respect to w f t . Such a slope 
should be convex: steeper when w f t is very low, then gradually flatter as w™t increases. 
This is illustrated in figure 5-10, which shows the predicted relation between Et 
and w f t for a given Et {0iyt+i) and k^t, simulated using the same parameters used in the 
calibration in the previous section and applying to the simulated data the same within- 
transformation described above. The highest values of Et (^™t+i^) » m  correspondence 
with the lowest values of wf t , are due to a very high cost of a binding financing constraint 
(Aj^). In this region the slope is very steep because the strict concavity of the production 
function implies a very high marginal productivity of variable capital. As wealth increases, 
decreases, at a gradually slower pace.
Figures 5-11, 5-12 and 5-13 show the estimation of (5.15) for smaller firms (less than 
300 employees) using both wj™ and w2™. The shaded lines represent the boundaries of the 
90% confidence interval. The downward sloping relationship predicted by the financing 
constraints hypothesis is confirmed for the low and medium productivity shock observa­
tions23 for both w jj  and w2™ (Figures 5-11 and 5-12). For wj™ the model predictions 
are not confirmed for high values of financial wealth, for which we observe an upward
22See the discussion in section 5.2.
23The minimum of t\P^t+i is lower than zero, and this could be due to one of the reasons mentioned 
before: i) the bias induced by the elimination of Ai (see footnote n.17); ii) the overestimation of the user 
cost of capital, given that we do not explicitly measure tax differentials (see footnote n.14).
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Figure 5-10: Expected relation between the intensity of financing constraints and financial
wealth
Predicted relation between the premium in the expected productivity 
of variable capital Et^Pt+iW) and net wealth Wtw
EtC*Vl*> 0.9
-0.05 0.15 0.35-0.45 -0.25
sloping relation. This could be due to one of the two misspecification problems mentioned 
in section 5.2. Suppose a firm receives a positive shock between time t — 1 and time t , 
which increases financial wealth at the end of time t — 1 and also cash flow at the begin­
ning of time £, but does not increase investment during time t (which determines 
either because the shock is transitory, or because of the presence of convex adjustment 
costs. For this firm we should observe high t'&ft+i but also high net worth. The effect 
should be stronger on wj™ than on wj™, which does not include time t cash flow. This 
can explain why the positive relation between t ^ f t +1 anc  ^ne  ^worth f°r the high values of 
the latter is stronger when using w\™ than when using w?™. It is important to note that 
if this problem is severe then we increase the chances to reject rather than to accept the 
financing constraints hypothesis. In this respect this test is more efficient than the test 
based on the cash flow-investment correlation. This is because, as we mentioned before, 
an high cash flow-investment correlation is likely to be caused by unobserved productivity 
shocks, while it is more difficult to argue that the relation showed in figures 5-11 and 5-12 
is due to something else than the presence of financing constraints.
One possible alternative explanation for such downward sloping relation between
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and wj™ is the bias in the user cost of capital induced by the absence of the risk premium. 
Since, as mentioned above, the user cost of capital as defined in (5.12) does not include a 
term to reflect the risk premium, it is possible that high t'&i’t+i observations are relative 
to firms with risky projects, which are on average smaller and hence less wealthy. At the 
same time such riskier firms may also find more difficult to obtain bank financing and may 
be more likely to complain about the lack of banking debt or the too high cost of debt. 
We think that this alternative explanation may partly explain our results, and further 
work needs to be done to assess the influence of the risk factor both on t^T,t+ 1 an<^  on 
our qualitative information. At the same time, as argued in the previous subsection, we 
think that the risk factor is not enough to explain the magnitude of our findings. In fact 
figure (5-10) shows that the model predicts, for firms with low net financial wealth, that 
a binding financing constraint may cause a premium in the expected marginal produc­
tivity of variable capital up to 80%. Such prediction is important because it is based on 
technological parameters calibrated from the same panel data of italian firms used for the 
empirical estimation. Figures (5-11) and (5-12) not only confirm the downward sloping 
relationship between t ^ f tt+1 and but also they show a similar magnitude of t^™t+i 
, around 60%-80%, for firms with low financial wealth. Even if the omitted risk factor 
contributes to this result, it probably does not fully explain it, given its size.
Observations with high productivity shock in figure 5-13 instead exhibit a slightly up­
ward sloping relation between w ft and t ^ t+ i  also in this case more pronounced for w}™. 
This is probably caused by the fact that by considering all the firm-year observations with 
higher productivity shocks, we select those observations for which the two misspecification 
problems mentioned in section 5.2 are more severe, and as a consequence we reject the 
financing constraints hypothesis. This interpretation is supported by the qualitative infor­
mation in figure 5-14: in the subset of observations of small firms with high productivity 
shock (third column) fewer entrepreneurs state financing constraints, and the probability 
of stating them is not correlated to the value of W”.
The qualitative information in figure 5-8 also suggests that the financing constraints 
hypothesis should be rejected for larger firms, for which W” is not related to financing 
constraints. Figure 5-15 confirms this. The estimation of (5.15) rejects model’s prediction,
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Figure 5-11: Estimated relation between the intensity of financing constraints and financial
wealth - small firms - low productivity
Non parametric regression of the premium of expected productivity of variable capital f',Jrw w
with respect to net wealth 
(smaller firms & low productivity shock)
Dependent variable Wtlw Dependent vanable Wt2w
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0.4
- 0.2  -
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Figure 5-12: Estimated relation between the intensity of financing constraints and financial 
wealth - small firms - medium productivity
Non parametric regression of the premium of expected productivity of variable capital t^ i W
with respect to net wealth 
(smaller firms & medium productivity shock)
Dependent vanab le W,1 Dependent vanable Wt‘
0.81
0.60.8
0.40.6
0.20.4
0.2
-0.20
-0.4-0.2
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Figure 5-13: Estimated relation between the intensity of financing constraints and financial
wealth - small firms - high productivity
Non parametric regression of the premium of expected productivity of variable capital
with respect to net wealth 
(smaller firms & high productivity shock)
Dependent vanable Wt2wDependent variable Wtlw
IjftJ
Figure 5-14: Relation between stated financing problems and the financing constraints 
indicator - small firms
Probit regression and productivity shock le\els:ration!i=ao+ai i+a2 dimji iu u i  ic ^ ic sm u ii u u iu u tu u  iiu liv icvtia .#  ui isn i—w yxw / jl / t
Smaller firms2 
Dependent variable: Ration 4 
(all problems)
Low productivity Medium productivity High productivity
shock shock shock
oco -0.77*** -0.58*** -1.09***
(0.27) (0.24) (0.32)
OCi 0.28 0.43** 0.09
(0.19) (0.21) (0.27)
0C2 0.0006 0.0001 0.0009
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0022)
Obs with ration=0 96 97 78
Obs with ration=l 30 36 15
(% of total) (23.8%) (27.1%) (16.1%)
Total obs 126 133 93
Standard error in parenthesis; 1: More than 300 employees; 2: Less than 300 employees; * Significant at 90% confidence level; 
** significant at 95% confidence level; *** significant at 99% confidence level; ratiom = 1 if the entrepreneur stated financing
constraints, and 0 otherwise; , = average value of the premium in the expected productivity of variable capital; dim, = 
dimension in number of employees;
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showing instead an upward sloping relationship between t ^ t+ i  an<^  w7t- As before this 
upward sloping relation is steeper for w}™ than for wf™ and it could again be caused by 
the two misspecification problems mentioned before.
Figure 5-15: Estimated relation between the intensity of financing constraints and financial 
wealth - large firms
Non parametric regression of the premium of expected productivity of variable capital t¥ w w
with respect to net wealth 
(larger firms)
Dependent variable W,2wDependent vanable Wtlw
/1
j 0.7
0.5
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-0.1
-0.3
-0.5
-0.4
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5.7  C onclusions
In this chapter we use the structural model developed in chapter 4 to formulate an original 
test for the presence of financing constraints on firm level investment. After estimating 
the excess marginal productivity of variable capital, we verify that it is monotonously 
decreasing in firms financial wealth for all the firms in the sample except the larger ones. 
This result allows us to reject the perfect market hypothesis in favour of the financing con­
straints one. In the chapter we explain why this test is more efficient than the tests based 
on the cash flow-investment correlation. This is because of three main reasons: i) our 
theory shows that, after conditioning for fixed capital stock and productivity shock, the 
excess marginal productivity of variable capital is monotonously increasing in the intensity 
of financing constraints, and therefore it is a theoretically consistent indicator for them; ii)
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the validity of the indicator is strongly supported by our qualitative information: entre­
preneurs with a high value of it are three times more likely to state financing constraints 
than entrepreneurs with a low value, even after controlling for the size of their companies; 
iii) our test is efficient in discriminating the financial imperfections hypothesis from the 
perfect market hypothesis. We argue that for at least two forms of misspecification of the 
model the test is likely to be biased towards rejecting the financing constraints hypothesis 
when it is true rather than accepting it when it is false.
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Chapter 6
A ppendices
Appendix 1
P r o o f o f  proposition  1.
Following the notation in paragraph 3.3.1, we consider k which is the level of 
capital that maximises expected profits Et (Ili+i):
Et (n (+i | k ™ )  =  (1 +  rj) y ™  -  U K k ™  (6.1)
where yf+( is the level of output generated using k ™ . Et instead denotes the
expected profits net of the minimum consumption share rjyt'.
Et (vt+i I = Et (nt+11 fcf+Y) -  W m  (6-2)
From equation (3.18) it follows that Et (7Tt+i) is maximised by the level of capital 
kt+i < k f^ f .  Let’s derive from (3.8), (3.9) and (6.2) the law of motion of wt :
A w t+i = r(wt -  x*t ) +  7r*+i (6.3)
The proof of point (i) of proposition 1 is very simple. From (6.2) it follows that 
lim Et (ftt+i) = Et (n £ ^ f) , and from (3.15) and (3.18) it follows that lim k*+1 = k 
Moreover from (3.6) and (3.9) it follows that lim kt+i =  0 and lim itt+i = 0 . Therefore
w t —>0 u>t—> 0
for wt = 0 it follows from (6.3) that wt+1 =  0, and E  is still financially constrained at 
time t + 1. Therefore it must be that wMAX is greater than 0.
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Regarding point (ii) of proposition 1, we first claim that, as long as there are some 
future expected financial constraints, it is optimal to set x * = 0. We now show that wMAX 
is the level beyond which financial wealth becomes a monotonously increasing stochastic 
process. Given (6.3) wMAX is the following:
w m a x  _  (^t+i I k t+i =  fcj+y; ®t+1 =  Ql ) /g ^
r
Intuitively, wMAX ensures that even in the worst case scenario, with 6t+1 =  9l , the 
return from existing capital rwMAX is equal to the loss in profits. Therefore from (6.3) 
it follows that Awt+i = 0  conditional on 9t+1 = 0l and Awt+i > 0  conditional on 
9t+1 =  9h • Therefore when E  reaches a level of wealth equal to wMAX she becomes so 
rich that she has a zero probability of being financially constrained in future, and always 
chooses k[+j , for j  = 1, . . . ,  oo, as optimal level of capital. Moreover she becomes indifferent 
between consuming today or postponing consumption. That is, x \ can be greater than 
0. The claim that it is optimal to set x \  equal to 0 if there are some future financing 
constraints implies that with wt > wMAX E  is indifferent in choosing any x% between 0 
and wt — wMAX. This together with (6.4) proves point (ii).
In order to prove point (iii) of proposition 1, let’s note that from equation (3.15) and 
from the concavity of the production function it follows that d k ^ f  /drj > 0. Since A£+1 
is the level of capital that maximises Et (nt+i) , condition (3.20) and the concavity of the 
production function imply that dEt /dr] < 0. Applying this result to (6.4) proves
point (iii) of proposition 1. Finally, in order to prove point (iv) of proposition 1, we define 
77min (©) as the minimum level of 77 that satisfies the following condition:
(7T t + i  I kt+1 =  A:™; 0t+ 1 =  Oh) = > -rm (0 t = 9H) (6.5)
where ^  (9t = 9h ) is the minimum level of financial wealth that supports an investment 
level of k ™  conditional on 9t = 9h - (6.5) implies, for wt = w, the following:
Awt+i < 0 conditional on k ™  and 9t+i = 9l (6 .6 )
Awt+i = 0  conditional on k f^ f  and 9t+\ =  9h  (6 .7 )
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(6 .6 ) and (6.7) imply that wt never grows above w , which by definition is smaller than 
w m a x M
P ro o f o f proposition  1 for the extended  m odel.
We redefine the following:
Et (n ;+11 J&Y)= (!+ » ? )  y f t f  -  U Kk™  -  ULl™  (6.8)
Et (^ t+ i) =  Et (n (+i) -  nyt+i (6.9)
Prom (4.16), (4.17) and (4.19) it follows that A£+1 < k ™  and Z£+1 < I™ . The proof 
of point (ii) is the same as before, with (6.4) redefined as follows:
w ' m a x  _  (^t+i 1 fcj+i =  ^t+i ? h +1 =  I ™  \ 0t+1 =  Ql )
r
The proof of point (i) follows the proof for the basic model, by noting that assumptions 
al and a2 imply that lim lt+i(wt ,kt,0t) = 0 and that in this case Z^ in is such 
that E  has just the necessary resources to repay the debt without liquidating her business. 
Therefore it follows that for wt —► wmm(kt,9t) E  is constrained today and has a positive 
probability to be constrained tomorrow, and therefore wMAX > wmm(kt,6t) >  0 for any 
(kt,0 t)• The proof of point (iii) follows the proof of the basic model, because from (4.16), 
(4.17) and (4.19) it follows that dk™ /dr] > 0 and dlf+f/dr] > 0. The proof of point (iv) 
is also analogous to the one of the basic model, using (6.9) instead of (6.2).H
P ro o f o f corollary 2.
In order to prove corollary 2, lets consider the expected lifetime utility at time t of 
an active entrepreneur, after 0t is realised, conditional on not becoming ill and before 
consuming xt, denoted by V't (Wt, 0t, h  \ ©,wo, #o) • We write it as a dynamic Lagrangean, 
including the constraints (3.1) and (3.6) and the associated Lagrangean multipliers dt and 
At respectively:
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Vo (wOl0o) = M A X
(  ^kt+i = k(w u Gt ,k t)
E q <
bt+i = b(wu Gu kt)
oo .
E©t= 0
(1 +  tft) xf +  rjyt 
+ ■ («;t+i +  772/t+i) 
+ A t [rfcfet+i -  6t+i]
H
(6 .11)
By using (3.9) to substitute a;J in (6.11), and by taking the first order condition with 
respect to &t+i, we have the following:
$t = RXt +  7 Et (tft+i)
we can solve equation (6 .12) forward to get the following:
(6 .12)
(6.13)
At is positive when the borrowing constraint is binding, and zero otherwise. Proposition
( o o  . \
l.iv implies that Et l 3^t+j > 0 and therefore > 0 for any t > 0, and hence the
V=° /
constraint (3 .1) is always binding with equality and x* = 0 , which proves corollary 2 .■ 
Proof of corollary 2 for the extended model.
The proof is analogous to the one for the basic model, using (4.7) instead of (6.11).H 
Proof of proposition 3.
We first analyse the properties of the term Et (fh+i) defined by (3.14). For wq > 0 and 
given the absence of fixed costs in the model it follows that conditional on not retiring 
wt > 0 for t = l,...,oo . Therefore Et (M P K t+1) < oo, At < oo, and Et(Xt+j) < oo 
for t = 0 ,1 ,...,oo and j  = 0 ,l,...,oo. As j  increases, the future expected productivity 
shock Et (Ot+j | @t) converges to the unconditional expectation E  (Gt+j) , and proposition 
l.iv implies that Et (Ai,t+j) converges to a constant greater than zero. Therefore from 
(3.12) it follows that 1 < < oo for t = 0,1,..., oo. Now suppose that E  sets kt+i = k%+1.
It follows that Et(M PKt+ 1) = U K , and from (3.14) that Et (f^t+i) is very close to 0. This 
and (3.23) imply1 that k°+1 > k*+1. Therefore from (3.23) and (3.14) it follows that, for
b eca u se  of the positive correlation between <f>t+1 and M P K t+ i  in (3.14) it follows that Et  (Slt+i)
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t =  1 , ...,oo:
Et (flt+i) <  oo (6.14)
as a consequence from the comparison of (3.15) and (3.23) it follows that k ^ f  > k°+l.
This proves proposition 3.i.
We now note that, as Wt increases, the probability of having a sequence of negative 
shocks long enough to drive wt below Wt decreases. Such probability becomes zero when
wt > wMAX. Hence, for t = 0,1,..., oo and for j  = 0,1,..., oo:
dXt+j < 0 (6.15)
dwt
lirn Pr&t+j > 0 ) =  0  (6.16)
W t — * W M A X
Therefore from (3.12) it follows that lim <pt =  1 for t =  l,...,oo . Applying these
W t —
results to (3.14) we have the following:
lim Et (fim ) =  0 (6.17)
W t ~ * W M A X
Finally, we note that from (6.15) and (6.16) it follows that dEt {4>t+j) /dw t < 0 for j  = 
0 , l,...,oo  and for t = 0 , l,...,oo. Applying this result to (3.14) and (3.23) we have the 
following:
dEtVU+i) < 0  (6 .18)
dwt
Proposition 3.ii and 3.iii follow immediately from (6.17) and (6.18) applied to (3.23).H 
P ro o f of p roposition  3 for th e  ex tended  m odel.
Proposition 3 can be proved for lt+i without any additional assumption. Instead to 
prove it also for kt+1, we need to impose the following:
0-3) 0l ,6h  and e are such that, for rj >
r)Et (M P K t) -  7  (1 -  6k) Et (^ + i)  > 0  V (kt ,w t , 0t) (6.19)
evaluated at fc*+1 is slightly smaller than zero. Therefore for 77 very small it is possible that fc°+1 <  fc*+1. 
numerical solutions of the problem show that such value of 77 would be very close to zero, and indeed much 
smaller than T7min.
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The smaller is the expression in the left hand side, the less the precautionary saving 
effect tends to influence kt+i. This assumption is not essential for model’s main results 
and for the empirical test in chapter 5, which rely on proposition 3 to be satisfied for lt+1- 
The proof is then analogous to the one for the basic model. ■
Proof of proposition 4.
We first prove that assumption al implies that E  is never forced to retire. We substi­
tute (3.6) in (4.6) obtaining the following:
kt+i +  x% -j- < Wt +  (6.20)
the left hand side of (6.20) is constrained downwards by constraints (3.1), (4.3) and (4.4). 
Therefore, if we substitute u>t using (4.6), and x%, kt+i and lt+i from constraints (3.1), 
(4.3) and (4.4) holding with equality in (6.20), we get the following condition:
yt + ^ ( l - h ) h > b t  (6.21)
condition (6.21) is symmetric to (4.5) and is necessary to ensure that E  is not forced to 
violate (4.3) to repay the debt. We determine Z i^n, the constant level of variable capital 
supplied by E, as the level of lE such that (6.21) is always satisfied for all the possible levels 
of state variables Wt, kt and 0*. The left hand side of (6.21) is monotonously decreasing in 
6t and It, therefore the worst possible situation is the one in which It —> 0 and 9t = 9l - 
We substitute these two limit values in (6.21), and we substitute yt using (4.1). We also 
define k as the maximum feasible level of kt compatible with 9t = 9l . Solving (6.21) in 
terms of lE yields the following:
lE >
BA = Imin (6-22)
Where 9 =  Et(9t+\ | 9t =  0l)« We then prove that assumption a2 implies that E  
never voluntary retires. Since E  is risk neutral, in order to prove that continuation is 
always optimal it is sufficient to prove that expected return from the investment in the 
firm is always greater than R. If irreversibility is not binding, E  is always able to choose
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a combination of kt+i and lt+i such that this condition is satisfied. We consider instead 
the case when irreversibility is binding. The case in which continuation is less likely to be 
optimal is the one in which E  is most constrained. At the limit: Wt = w™in, rrjf =  0 and 
lt+1 = 0 , because all the resources are used to repay bt , and there is no money to invest 
in variable capital. E  compares two choices: i) if she continues, she borrows up to the 
maximum. By substituting the limit values x% = 0, lt+i = 0 and bt+i = Tf-h+i in (4.6) 
we get the following:
<*+! =  « * / (  1 - ^ )  (6.23)
therefore E  invests kt+i, and receives expected total revenues, net of debt repayment, 
equal to:
Et (7Tt+i | Dt = 1) =  (1 +  77) Et (#t+i) kt+ilE +  (1 — 6k — Tfc) kt+ 1 (6.24)
ii) if E  retires, she is indifferent between consuming and investing wt in the risk free asset. 
Therefore substituting Wt from (6.23), her expected return is:
Et (TTt+1 I Dt =  0) =  Rwt =  R  ( 1  -  fcm  (6.25)
therefore E  always prefers to continue if Et (7r*+i | Dt =  1) > Et (nt+i \ Dt = 0) for t > 0, 
which is exactly the condition imposed by a2. ■
Proof of proposition 5.
We start by noting that from (6.15) it follows that, for j  = 0 ,1,..., 00  and for s > j:
^  \wt+j<wMAX<® (6.26)
from (4.10) and (6.26) it follows that 4>t decreases if the expected rate of growth of financial 
wealth increases. Therefore in order to prove proposition 5 it is sufficient to prove that the 
expected rate of accumulation of financial wealth is lower when irreversibility is binding. 
In order to prove it, let’s consider (6.3) evaluated at x* = 0 :
A w t+i =  rwt +  7Tt+i (6.27)
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by taking expectations:
Et (Awt+i) =  rwt +  Et (^ t+ i) (6-28)
Now recall that by definition a binding irreversibility constraint implies that fixed
capital is inefficiently high: (1 — 6k)kt = kt+\ > k°+1. k°+1 is the optimal level of capital
when fixed capital is reversible. Also proposition 3 implies that k°+l > A£+1, which is the 
level of capital that maximises Et • Therefore, since the concavity of the production
function implies that Et monotonously decreases in the level of capital for kt+i >
A£+1, it follows that:
Et (Awf+i | (1 -  6k)kt = kt+1 > kf+1) < Et (Awt+i \ k$+1) (6.29)
proposition 5 is proved by generalising (6.29) for any future Et (Aw t+ j )  with j  = 1,2, ...oo.B
Proof of proposition 6.
Proposition 6 follow directly from (6.16), (6.17) and (6.18), and from the fact that, 
when wt is smaller than wt, the concavity of the production function implies that A^ 
monotonously decreases in w ^ M
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Appendix 2: description of the data
The empirical analysis illustrated in chapters 2 and 5 of this thesis is based on two 
datasets of Italian manufacturing firms:
I) A panel of balance sheet data for 5289 Italian manufacturing firms. This is a subset of 
the Centrale dei Bilanci dataset (64.463 firms at 1992 according to the Cerved database) 
which includes only firms with complete balance sheet data from 1982 to 19922. The 
advantage of this dataset is the amount of quantitative information available on the firms: 
the panel data includes assets and liabilities, profit and losses, and detailed information on 
the financial flows. The disadvantage is the absence of entry and exit during the sample 
period and the fact that the sample is not representative of the population of Italian 
manufacturing firms, because it is mainly composed of small and medium firms below 500 
employees.
II) The three Mediocredito Centrale surveys on small and medium Italian manufac­
turing firms. The research department of Mediocredito Centrale, the Italian largest in­
vestment bank, compiled the three surveys in 1992, 1995 and 1998. Each survey includes 
a large questionnaire on firms activity, ranging from the form of ownership, to the invest­
ment and financial policy, to other organisational aspects. Each questionnaire covers the 
three years before its compilation (1989-91, 1992-94 and 1995-97 respectively) and includes 
balance sheet data for the same three years for around 4000 firms. The unique advantage 
of this dataset is the direct information about firms financial policy. In particular in this 
thesis we use the information about the financing problems the entrepreneurs faced in 
funding new investment projects and the information about the financing sources mostly 
used to fund them. The other advantage is that the surveyed firms are representative of 
the Italian population: in each survey the sample is randomly stratified (it reflects the 
sector’s geographical and dimensional distribution of Italian firms) for firms below 500 
employees, while it is by census for firms with more than 500 employees. The main dis­
advantage of this dataset is the fact that the sample composition changes across surveys,
2 Actually the sample ranges from 1992 to 1994, but we do not use in the thesis the information from 
1993 and 1994 balance sheets, except than in figures 6-2 and 6-3, because there are inconsistencies in some 
assets and liabilities time series between 1992 and 1993, probably due to the fact that the accounting rules 
changed in 1993 as a result of the E.C. armonisation of accounting procedures.
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and as a consequence only 347 firms have both qualitative and quantitative data from all 
the three surveys.
The most interesting aspect of these datasets is that they have a fairly large number 
of firms in common. In particular in section 2.2 and in chapter 5 we consider the 891 
firms present in both the Centrale dei Bilanci dataset and in the first Mediocredito Cen­
trale survey. Such firms have both complete balance sheet data, from 1982 to 1992, and 
the detailed qualitative information from the first Mediocredito Survey, which refers to 
the 1989-1991 period. In particular the survey asked if the firms had one of the follow­
ing problems in financing new investment projects in the 1989-1991 period: i) ’’lack of 
medium-long term loans”; ii) ’’too high cost of debt” or iii) ’’lack of collateral”3. Also 
the second and third Mediocredito surveys asked direct questions about financing prob­
lems. Unfortunately each survey asked substantially different questions to reveal financing 
constraints, and hence it is not possible to pool such information across surveys.
Such pooling is instead very useful when we describe the more general link between 
financial policy and growth in section 2.3. This is because all the three surveys asked 
identical questions regarding the composition of the new investment financing.
Basic descriptive statistics
Figure 6-1 shows descriptive statistics about the size of firms. The first column refers 
to the Centrale dei Bilanci sample of 5289 firms; the second column to the 891 firms with 
also qualitative information from the First Mediocredito Survey, and the third column the 
347 firms with full qualitative data from the three Mediocredito surveys. The first two 
samples axe clearly more homogeneous in terms of size, while the third one is the more 
heterogeneous, ranging from very small (the 10% percentile average size of total assets is 
of 6.3 billion lira, that is around 5.4 million us$) to relatively large (the 90% percentile is 
of 260 billion lira).
The sample 2 is the one more extensively used in the thesis, in that it is the basis for 
the empirical analysis in chapter 5. In this sample, as in the samples 1 and 3, the balance
3In addition each firm could optionally assess a degree of intensity ranging from 1 to 3. Since the 
large majority of firms simply chose one problem without selecting intensity, we decide not to use this 
information here, because previous work on this dataset (see Bagella Becchetti and Caggese, 2001) found 
little relevance of this additional information.
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Figure 6-1: Summary statistics
Basic statistics of the 3 datasets of italian manufacturing firms (size measured as 
the value of total assets in millions* of italian lira, end of 1992)_______________
Sample 1: balance 
sheet data for 5289 
firms from 1982 to 
1992
Sample 2: balance 
sheet data for 891 
firms from 1982 to 
1992 plus qualitative 
information for the 
1989 -1991 period
Sample 3: complete 
information (balance 
sheet and qualitative) 
for 347 firms for the 
1990 -1997 period.
N of firms 5289 891 347
Mean 29626.79 54744.59 126687.3
Median 13800 2578 1 35026.5
Std. Deviation 71303.88 118057.3 316731.6
Skewness 14.12254 8.744808 5.832289
Kurtosis 294.189 105.1583 41.79036
Minimum 745 2401 1385
Maximum 1955000 1955000 3293412
10% percentile 4828 7352.7 6371.4
20% p. 6572 11436.6 11378
30% p. 8579 15477 17258.6
40% p. 10837 19929.2 22984.2
50% p. 13800 25781 35026.5
60% p. 17551 34102.8 49804.8
70% p. 23324 44712.8 80022.9
80% p. 34810 69093 136765.8
90% p. 58709 110167.2 260007.9
* One million of italian lira equals to 900 US$ at the averag e 1992 exchange rate.
sheets are at company level instead that consolidated at group level.
This could be a problem for two obvious reason: i) our theory refers to a owner/manager 
that decides about investment and allocates funds, while if the firms analysed belong to a 
group then it means that production and financial decisions are taken at different levels, 
ii) If the firms belong to a group, then their financial wealth as accounted in the balance 
sheets may not be related at all to their borrowing capacity.
Our qualitative information allows us to determine that this is a relatively small prob­
lem for sample 2. In fact 65% of all the firms and 71% of the firms with less than 300 
employees are independent firms. The qualitative information from Mediocredito Centrale 
also reports information on mergers, acquisitions and splitting of companies. In the 1982- 
1992 period 7.3% of all the companies in sample 2 split in two or more companies, while 
27.8% of all the companies merged with or acquired another company. These episodes do 
not constitute a problem because they are taken into account by the Centrale dei Bilanci 
in forming the panel of balance sheets: for companies merged-acquired during 1982-1992 
data are aggregated between the merged companies before the merging date, so that data
171
are relative to a uniform productive unit.
The following descriptive statistics, illustrated in figures from 6-2 to 6-5, are computed 
using the Centrale dei Bilanci Sample of 5289 firms. We first show that the characteristics 
of the Italian sample are comparable to those of the most widely used UK and US samples 
of manufacturing firms. For example figure 6-2 compares the logaritmic distribution of 
the sample of 5289 Italian firms with respect to the distribution of a more comprehensive 
sample of UK manufacturing firms analysed by Hart and Oulon (1996). The distribution 
of our sample is less dispersed with respect to the UK sample, given that large firms are 
not included in it. Nonetheless deviations from normality are similar in both samples. 
Firms distribution is more concentrated in 1994 than in 1982, because of the absence of 
new entries in the period. Figure 6-3 shows the results of a simple regression that relates
Figure 6-2: Summary statistics - comparison between Italian and UK data about manu­
facturing firms
Measures of size - summary statistics
UK Firms (Hart & Oultonltalian Firms - 1982 ** Italian Firms -1994 ** 
1996)*_________________________________________________
Sales*** Net Assets***Sales**** Total Sales**** Total
Assets**** Assets****
Mean 7.20 5.55 8.74 8.48 9.87 9.78
Standard Dev. 1.66 1.96 1.03 1.04 1.01 1.01
Skewness 0.19 0.43 0.28 0.44 0.47 0.61
Kurtosis 3.18 1.83 1.50 1.44 0.58 0.690
N. of firms 57812 79491 5272 5289 5289 5289
*87109 firms, 1989-1993 
** 5289 firms, 1982-1994 
*** Log of Br. Pounds **** Log of Italian liras
initial size to the rate of growth and the variability of growth. The results confirm the 
stylised fact that growth rate and variability of growth are decreasing in size (Hall, 1987; 
Hart & Oulton, 1996). Another issue we briefly want to explore is the degree of lumpiness 
of investment. This is done in figures 6-4 and 6-5. Figure 6-4 shows that, at firm level, 
investment is quite lumpy if measured with respect to total investment in years 1982-1994. 
On average the year with higher investment accounts for more than 25% and 38% of total 
investment in equipment and structures respectively. This investment is however small 
compared to total assets (first two columns of figure 6-4), as it accounts for less than 10
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Figure 6-3: Summary statistics - conditional growth 
Growth rates and variability of Growth as a function of initial dimension
Dependent Variable: rate of growth of total assets
1982-1985 1986-1989 1990-1994
Variab. Coeff t-stat Variab. Coeff. t-stat Variab. Coeff t
(Const.) 55.8 33.5 (Const.) 1.426 6.358 (Const.) 2.671 7.409
Ln8201 -7.5 -32.4 Ln8601 -0.093 -3.274 Ln9001 -.253 -5.806
Ln8202 -6.9 -32.9 Ln8602 -0.099 -3.758 Ln9002 -.250 -6.152
Ln8203 -6.5 -32.9 Ln8603 -0.103 -4.100 Ln9003 -.240 -6.238
Ln8204 -6.1 -33.0 Ln8604 -0.098 -4.146 Ln9004 -.231 -6.347
Ln8205 -5.4 -33.0 Ln8605 -0.092 -4.324 Ln9005 -.212 -6.483
Dependent Variable: st. dev, of the rate of rowth of total assets: 1982-1994
Variab. Coefficient t
(Constant) 5.601 26.954
Ln8201 -.734 -25.358
Ln8202 -.684 -25.852
Ln8203 -.646 -25.891
Ln8204 -.607 -25.959
Ln8205 -.539 -25.967
Each variable is Log (Total Assets) * Dummy. A dummy is equal to one for the corresponding 
dimensional class (5 equal dimensional classes in 1982), zero otherwise. A variable Ln yycl is 
Log of total assets computed at year yy for dimensional class cl. Smallest class is 01 and largest 05
% of total assets for more than half of the firms in the sample. Figure 6-5 considers the 
lumpiness for different groups of firms. Small firms make more concentrated investment in 
structures than large firms do while firms with financing problems do not exhibit a different 
behaviour with respect to firms without financing problems. These simple statistics are 
broadly comparable to the results of Dorns and Dunne (1998), cited in chapter l 4.
4 Even though Doms and Dunne use plant level data while we use firm level data, we expect this not to 
cause too much difference as most of our firms are small and hence are most likely located in one single 
plant.
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Figure 6-4: Summary statistics - investment
Lumpiness of investment
Deciles Maxinveql Maxinvstrl Maxinveq2 Maxinvstr2
10 0.024 0.009 0.146 0.213
20 0.042 0.033 0.172 0.254
30 0.061 0.050 0.197 0.295
40 0.082 0.067 0.222 0.333
50 0.103 0.084 0.251 0.382
60 0.130 0.104 0.285 0.441
70 0.163 0.129 0.335 0.506
80 0.210 0.160 0.410 0.610
90 0.299 0.227 0.522 0.801
Mean 0.143 0.107 0.304 0.4431
Maxinveq= maximum investment in equipment in one year, in the period 1982-1994 
Maxinvstr= maximum investment in structures in one year, in the period 1982-1994 
Variables 1: investments over average total assets 
Variables 2: investments over total investment in the 1982-1994 period
Figure 6-5: Summary statistics - investment for subclasses of firms
Maximum investment in one year over total investment* in the period 1982-1994
Investment in Investment iil Investment in Investment in
structures equipment structures equipment
Small Firms 0.54 0.33 Firms without 0.39 0.27
Std. Dev. 0.24 0.19
financial problems 
Std. Deviation 0.19 0.15
Medium Firms 0.45 0.31 Firms with 0.39 0.27
Std. Dev. 0.22 0.17
financial problems 
Std. Deviation 0.21 0.16
Large Firms 0.37 0.28
Std. Dev. 0.17 0.16
Mean 0.44 0.30
Std. Dev. 0.22 0.17
* total investment is the sum of all positive investments in the years 1982-1994
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Appendix 3: description of the variables used in the esti­
mation of the production function.
p\Yi,t' total revenues realised during year £, at current prices.
t". we compute PtKi,t as the sum of the replacement value of two different kind of 
fixed capital: i) plants and equipment; ii) intangible fixed capital (Software, Advertising, 
Research and Development). In the theoretical model in chapter 4 we assume that it 
takes one period for fixed and variable capital to become productive. The assumption is 
realistic, but the time lag necessary to install the new capital is less than one year, and 
most likely around or less than six months. Therefore we include in PtKi,t all capital 
purchased before the end of time t. Balance sheet data about fixed assets do not reflect 
their replacement value, for at least two reasons: first, the depreciation rate applied for 
accounting purposes is very variable and does not coincide with the physical depreciation 
rate; second, all values are ’’historical”, and do not take into account the appreciation of 
the assets in nominal terms. Hence, to compute the replacement value of capital we prefer 
to adopt the following perpetual inventory method:
p M m  = P t ^ U 1 + *f)(! -  * )  +
J={1,2}, where l=plant and equipment and 2= intangible fixed capital . n 1 — % change 
in the producer prices index for agricultural and industrial machinery (source: OECD, 
from Datastream); 7r2 = % change in the producer prices index (source: OECD, from 
Datastream). 6J are estimated separately for the 20 manufacturing sectors using aggregate 
annual data about the replacement value and the total depreciation of the capital (source: 
Italian National Institute of Statistic). Given that within each sector depreciation rates 
vary only marginally between years, we conveniently used the yearly average: 61 ranges 
from 9.3% to 10.7%, and 82 from 8.4% to 10.6%.
p\Lift : this variable is computed in the following way: beginning of the period t working 
capital inventories (materials, work in progress and finished products), plus new purchases 
of materials in period t, minus end of period t working capital inventories. Also in this case 
the time lag necessary to transform variable inputs in revenues is much less than one year. 
Therefore we assume that all the variable inputs that are in stock at the beginning of year
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t will contribute to generate year t revenues. By subtracting the end of period t working 
capital inventories we also assume that a fraction of the new purchases of materials during 
period t contributes to period t revenues, while the remaining part represents investment 
in the variable capital that will become productive in period t + 1 .
p™Nij : this variable includes the total cost of the labour and the services used in year
t.
In order to transform the variables in real terms, we used the following price indexes 
(source: ISTAT):
Output Y?t : consumer prices index relative to all products excluding services.
Fixed capital K^t ’■ producer price index of durable inputs.
Labour N^t ■ wage earnings index of the manufacturing sector.
Variable capital L^t : wholesale price index for intermediate goods.
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Appendix 4. transition dynamics theory
To illustrate how the estimation of transition matrices works, lets’ call the variable of 
interest for the researcher at time t X t (with t an integer) and assume it can take values 
in a certain set E. Let Ft be the distribution of that variable at time t: its law of motion 
is described by a first order autoregressive process (Quah, 1997):
Ft+1 = T * (Ft)
The operator T* maps the distribution from period t to period t +  1. More precisely, the 
operator T* can be interpreted as a transition function or stochastic kernel P (x, -).5 Let 
A  be any subset of E\ then the distribution at time t +  1 is defined by:
F,+1 (A) = J  P (x,A )F t (dx)
Thus the transition function maps the distribution Ft from one period to the other. Al­
though it assumes a markovian structure of the underlying process, the approach of dis­
tribution dynamics is different from the traditional Markov process theory. In the latter, 
the emphasis is on a scalar process, from which an unobservable sequence of probability 
distributions is usually inferred. Distribution dynamics shows his originality in the fact 
that a sequence of entire (empirical) cross section distributions is actually observed, while 
the (dual) scalar process is implied but never observed (Quah, 1996). Estimation of the 
kernel is carried out by first estimating non-parametrically the joint density function of 
the process at times t and t+ 1 and then normalizing it by the marginal in t (see, for exam­
ple Quah, 1996). The estimated transition probability density is independent of the time 
period t (it is a stationary transition density): this is a common assumption in Markov 
chain theory.
5The stochastic transition function, or stochastic kernel, P ( x , A ), describes the probability that the 
next step will take us in a certain set A,  given that we are currently in state x :
P ( x , A )  =  P r(X t+i € A  | X t =  x)
for all values x in E  and all the subsets A.  This framework is appropriate in this context, as the variables 
of interest in this work are continuous variables in the sense that they can assume any value on the real 
line or a subset of it.
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